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Summary 
When votes are cast in an election and a winner is declared, people can accept the result, 
they can challenge it or they can turn against democracy. This thesis seeks to understand 
why in some cases elections are accepted while in others they are challenged and their 
outcomes rejected. Conventional wisdom holds that when elections are held according to 
international standards, acceptance will follow. I challenge this notion. As experience 
shows, sometimes even elections classified as free and fair evoke protests, while less 
technically perfect elections are sometimes widely accepted.  
So, when, where and under what conditions are election results accepted? And what can 
we do to increase their credibility? There are many aspects than can influence this but I 
focus on three main areas that deserve especial attention. A first research phase relies on 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis. It shows that holding free and fair elections is necessary 
but not sufficient for the acceptance of election results. Two other factors are needed: a) 
political parties need to support electoral institutions and b) election results need to be 
transparent. A second research phase uses multilevel regression to explore the first of 
these factors in greater detail. Findings show that including political parties in the 
appointment of the members of the electoral management body has a positive impact on 
election credibility. A third research phase consisting of a small N structured comparison 
focuses on election results. It shows that having visible and inferable results contributes to 
preventing and mitigating post-election protests. In short, an election not only has to be 
“free and fair” but also needs the legitimacy and credibility obtained when political parties 
support the main election institution and when results are clear, widely available and 
completely beyond doubt. 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
1.1 Relevance and aim of the study 
When votes are cast in an election and a candidate or a party is declared winner, losers can 
react in three different ways: they can accept election results, they can challenge the results, 
or they can turn against democracy (Lago and Martinez i Coma, 2016). The acceptance of 
results can be illustrated by graceful losers conceding defeat after razor-thin margins, by 
shrugs of resignation after the opponents have obtained clear victories or by candidates 
simply accepting their fate in a process they see as common and natural. Al Gore and Hillary 
Clinton come to mind but with them thousands of democratic politicians have embraced the 
verdict of the ballot. Challenging election results can come in the shape of a judicial claim, a 
boycott or a post-election protest. On the other hand, the clearest example of turning against 
democracy is illustrated by a coup d’état.  
This thesis seeks to understand why in some cases elections are accepted while in other 
cases they are challenged and their outcomes rejected, as outlined by the main research 
question: When, where and under what conditions are election results accepted?  And 
derived from this, what can we do to increase the credibility of electoral institutions and 
processes? First, this research will map and describe the extent of election challenges around 
the world. Second, the thesis seeks to find out which factors contribute to the acceptance of 
election results. Third, once identified, these conditions are analysed with the objective of 
developing practical solutions and informing policy for strengthening electoral processes and 
institutions. At the heart of this research question lies the legitimacy and the very survival of 
elections and democracy. When people believe that elections have been free and fair and 
election results are accepted, stability follows and democracy is strengthened. People 
express their preferences at the ballot and go on with their day to day activities. Governments 
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are formed and new laws are enacted. However, when people do not believe that elections 
have been free and fair, the opposite occurs. In the words of Kofi Annan (Global Commission, 
2012:3): 
“When the electorate believes that elections have been free and fair, they can be a 
powerful catalyst for better governance, greater security and human development. But 
in the absence of credible elections, citizens have no recourse to peaceful political 
change. The risk of conflict increases while corruption, intimidation, and fraud go 
unchecked, rotting the entire political system slowly from within”. 
 
To have credible elections, we need to have elections with integrity. Electoral integrity relates 
to “international commitments and global norms surrounding elections, endorsed in a series of 
authoritative conventions, treaties, protocols and guidelines (…) [which] apply to all countries 
worldwide throughout the electoral cycle, including during the pre-electoral period, the 
campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath” (Norris, 2014: 9). Using the Electoral Integrity 
Project’s and other scholars’ measurements of the concept (Elklit and Reynolds, 2005; Norris, 
2014), electoral integrity is composed of 49 indicators clustered into eleven stages reflecting 
the entire electoral cycle. These eleven stages range from the laws regulating the election, to 
electoral procedures, to the drawing of election boundaries, to the enrolment of voters, to the 
registration of candidates and political parties, to the coverage provided by the media, to the 
access to political donations, to the voting process, to the counting of votes, to post-election 
challenges and protests to the performance and impartiality of electoral authorities.  
All of these aspects are important for the integrity and credibility of an election. However, are 
all of these components equally important? Should they be assessed together or should some 
elements need to be assessed individually? Which components deserve more attention? The 
answer to these questions depends on the phenomena we are interested in analysing.  For 
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this research the main aim is to have elections with credibility and to prevent post-election 
conflict. In line with this, participants in the 5th Global Electoral Organization Conference 
(GEO): Credible Elections for Democracy1 recognised that while the electoral cycle is 
composed of multiple phases, “four main areas were identified to group possible acts of 
violence resulting directly from the organisation of elections” (GEO, 2011:15). These areas 
are: the legal framework, the lack of trust in Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), the 
administration of the electoral process, and the election results stage. This is not surprising, 
as during an election cycle these are key, pivotal moments which can ensure the election 
process stays on track or tips and derails, with the possibility of generating conflict.   
This research will look at the role played by EMBs, the administration of the electoral process 
and the election results stage. The fourth area, the legal framework, will not be analysed. This 
is because the regulations governing an election are too broad, covering all areas surrounding 
an election. The legal framework is not related to any one component of the election cycle, 
but to all of them, which makes it difficult to pin down. As a result, any study on the rules of an 
election has to focus on a specific aspect regulated by that framework, be it the rules 
governing campaign finance, access to media or party registration. Sarah Birch, for example, 
studies the manipulation of the rules of the electoral game and focuses on the design of the 
electoral system. In particular she analyses the impact of proportional representation systems 
on confidence in elections, finding that these systems are more highly rated than others as 
they contribute to having a level playing field (Birch, 2008).  
                                                          
1 The 2011 GEO Conference was hosted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (International IDEA) and the Independent Electoral Commission of Botswana in partnership 
with the Association of European Election Officials, the Electoral Commissions Forum of Southern African 
Development Community Countries, the Electoral Institute for Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, the 
Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the United 
Nations Electoral Assistance Division, and the United Nations Development Programme. The three day 
event included 273 participants, including EMB senior officials and staff from 51 countries (GEO, 2011). 
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1.2 The structure of the thesis 
1.2.1 Introduction and setting the scene  
This introduction presents the main research question, along with the purpose and 
significance of the study. It highlights the importance of electoral integrity and focuses on the 
main conditions that will be studied and analysed in order to provide an answer to the 
question. It then outlines the general structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 sets the scene for our 
research. Most importantly, it shows the relevance of the study and its findings for improving 
electoral integrity. It offers an overview of challenged elections around the world and shows 
us that election challenges and protests also occur in democratic regimes. Democratic 
elections are not free from malpractices and therefore need to be strengthened for their 
results to be accepted. This is important as the main aim of this thesis is not only to 
understand when, where and under what conditions election results are accepted, but to 
prescribe appropriate policies that follow logically from the findings. In providing an overview, 
the chapter asks: how often around the world are elections challenged? Are challenges more 
likely in authoritarian or hybrid regimes or are they equally likely in democratic settings? How 
often do challenges lead to protests? And are these protests peaceful or violent? Do they 
occur in democratic countries as well? Findings indicate that contested elections also occur in 
democratic countries. The data also challenges conventional wisdom which argues that 
having a good quality election is enough for it to be accepted by citizens and other 
stakeholders. 
The chapter then seeks to understand why people challenge election results and sometimes 
turn to the streets. All elections, as a titanic human and logistical exercise, experience 
problems and can also be subject to a number of forms of malpractice. This affects their 
credibility and can lead to having challenged election results. Therefore, as the chapter 
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outlines, improving the integrity of elections is paramount. There are a number of ways to do 
so this research focuses on the three aspects identified as the main areas that group possible 
acts of violence resulting from an election (GEO, 2011): the overall administration of the 
electoral process, the role played by EMBs and the election results stage. Then the chapter  
makes the case for their importance in the study of the election confidence and the 
acceptance of election results around the world. 
First, the way elections are managed has been considered by practitioners and scholars as a 
key process that contributes to the credibility of an election (Elklit, 1999; Elklit and Reynolds, 
2002; Mozzafar and Schedler; 2002; Norris, Frank and Coma, 2014; Maserumule, 2015). It is 
argued that when elections are developed according to international standards, acceptance 
will follow. However, sometimes even elections classified as free and fair are challenged and 
protested, while not so technically perfect elections, have been widely accepted. The 1994 
post-apartheid election in South Africa comes to mind. 
Then, the chapter makes the case for going beyond the good administration of the election 
and looking at other factors, in this case the role played by EMBs and by the election results 
stage. Factor Analysis of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index confirms the 
importance of these two areas for the integrity of elections. First, electoral institutions play a 
central role in the organization of the election and therefore it is very important that they are 
seen as impartial and credible arbiters. For this reason, literature has studied a number of 
aspects that can strengthen their integrity and credibility. These include their organizational 
structure, their functional capacity and their work ethos (Norris, 2015).  This research focuses 
on the structural element of EMBs. In particular, I study the relationship between EMBs and 
political parties and analyse whether support from political parties to EMBs matters for 
electoral credibility. I hypothesize that party support has a positive impact on confidence in 
electoral processes. Second, I look at transparency in election results. This stage is directly 
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linked to the outcome of the election and because of its timing, duration and format it is 
instrumental in the acceptance of results and for preventing or reducing post-election protests 
or violence. This research focuses on the transparency of election results as a determinant of 
the elections’ success and literature has yet to explore the relevance of this component. 
Chapter 3 reveals that literature has so far not focused on the role played by these three 
key areas.  First, the chapter offers an overview of the origins of the scholarship in elections 
and describes the recent ‘electoral integrity agenda, focusing on what can be done to 
mitigate problems when elections fail to meet international standards and global norms. It 
then outlines two main fields of study that contribute to this agenda. The first is the micro 
level study political behaviour. This research strand studies how a number of factors such 
as context, institutions, experiences and individual characteristics -including socialised 
norms and values- are expected to shape citizens perceptions and attitudes towards 
political and electoral institutions.  However, as the chapter argues, this research is not a 
study of public opinion. Instead, this research is interested in how certain institutions 
contribute to the credibility and acceptance of an election. There is a second research 
strand more aligned with this: the macro level study of systems and institutions. This field 
has helped to understand which types of electoral systems, institutions and procedures are 
associated with the credibility of elections. However, the chapter also shows that this 
research has so far not systematically analysed the impact of the main factors analysed in 
this dissertation (political support to election bodies and transparency of election results).  
1.2.2 Methods and literature 
Chapter 4 details the different methodologies used to analyse the role played by the three 
main areas under study (support of political parties to EMBs, the overall administration of the 
electoral process and transparency in the election results stage). The research is inspired by 
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mixed methods. This approach traditionally uses different methods to study the exact same 
data. This is not the case in this research, as the three methods used do not explain the same 
dependent variable. While the QCA section (Chapter 5) focuses on the acceptance of election 
results, the quantitative chapter (Chapter 6) addresses credibility of elections and the small-N 
analysis (Chapter 7) focuses on post-election protests. However, the methods do complement 
each other and measure related phenomena. And when findings from different 
methodological approaches are broadly consistent they enhance the robustness of the 
research claims. This is relevant since at the end, the goal of the research is to understand 
why election results are accepted.  
For answering these questions, therefore, the research involves three different phases, 
involving three different -but complementary- methodologies. The first phase involves the use 
of multivalue Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA). This set theoretic method analyses 
all presidential elections in Latin America between 2000 and 2015 and seeks to identify which 
conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the acceptance of election results. QCA is an 
intermediate method that borrows from both Large-N and Small-N methods allowing to 
analyse cases systematically  while having a deep understanding of them. QCA formalises 
qualitative comparative methods and helps identifying which conditions and which 
combinations of conditions lead to an outcome (in this case the acceptance/rejection of 
election results). There are four different configurational comparative methods (crisp-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA), fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA), multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) and generalized-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (gsQCA) (Thiem, 2014). For the purposes of this study, 
mvQCA was selected as the most appropriate type. In particular, this research hypothesizes 
that there are five conditions which contribute to the acceptance of election results: 
democratic consolidation, the closeness of an election, the support of political parties for 
14 
 
 
 
electoral institutions, the overall quality of the election and the transparency in election results. 
As discussed above, it considers the three aspects identified as the main areas that group 
possible acts of violence. 
Then, the research drills down and studies some of the conditions individually. Phase two 
focuses on the support of political parties for electoral institutions, and specifically on the 
inclusion of political parties in the appointment of EMB members. The research proposes four 
types of EMB models, depending on the level of participation of political parties in the 
appointment of their members. Then, it tests the extent to which these four categories affect 
trust in electoral processes. This is done through binary logistic and multilevel regression of 
results from the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) survey. Binary logistic 
regression is used to estimate the effect of the different levels of support of political parties for 
the EMB.  These methods are appropriate given the size of the sample, as it is appropriate for 
testing multiple variables and as the independent variable – a four point scale - requires such 
a research design. Then in order to have more robust findings, and considering the 
hierarchical structure of the data, the research employs multilevel regression. 
Phase three focuses on the third critical area under study, transparency in election results. It 
studies the role of transparent election results in the credibility in elections, and specifically 
the prevention of post-election protests. For doing so, it conducts a small-N paired focused 
comparison of the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections in Mexico. Both elections were 
followed by protests. But while the 2006 post-election protests were widespread, protracted 
over more than two months and involved a civil disobedience campaign and a sit it, the 2012 
protests were significantly smaller and short lived. The research hypothesises the difference 
between these two cases can be attributed to the degree of transparency of election results, 
controlling for other possible factors. Small-N paired focused comparison was selected in 
order to obtain a more in depth knowledge of the cases and of the causal mechanisms at 
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play. As the focus is to understand the details of how transparency works for preventing or 
reducing post-election protests, this was selected as an appropriate method.  
1.2.3 Empirical findings 
We then move into the empirical chapters of the thesis, which describe and analyse these key 
variables and their impact on the confidence in elections and the acceptance of their results. 
As mentioned, the overall quality of election administration, the role of EMBs and the election 
results stage have been identified to group possible acts of violence in an election and are 
especially relevant for having a successful electoral process and an accepted outcome (GEO, 
2011). . Chapters 5, 6 and 7 study these factors in detail. 
Chapter 5 addresses the role of all of these factors in the acceptance of election results. In 
particular, it seeks to answer the question of When, where and under what conditions 
election results are accepted?  Conventional wisdom holds that good election 
administration is enough for the acceptance of election results. In particular, this view 
states that if most aspects of election administration are sound and if the election in general 
is considered “free and fair”, then the acceptance of results by citizens and political parties 
will follow automatically. This chapter seeks to challenge this view and in addition to 
analysing the role played by election administration it considers other factors that as we 
have already learnt are relevant for the success and credibility of an election. Specifically, 
the chapter looks at the role played by five conditions: democratic consolidation, the 
closeness of an election, the support of political parties for electoral institutions, the overall 
quality of the election and the transparency in election results. In order to test the effect of 
these independent variables on the acceptance of election results, I use multivalue 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA), which identifies which are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for both the acceptance and rejection of election results. This is 
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especially helpful as it allows knowing if having a good quality election is sufficient for the 
acceptance of election results or if there are other factors at play. I focus on presidential 
elections in Latin America between 2000 and 2015.  Results show that none of the key 
conditions by themselves lead to the acceptance of results.  Rather, it is a combination of 
conditions that can lead to this. More importantly, in the face of close elections –which are 
more challenging- results show the critical importance of having political party support for 
electoral institutions and transparent election results. This helps explain why many 
democratic elections in spite of being hailed as “free and fair” by election observation 
missions are sometimes rejected and followed by post-election protests and even violence. 
This is confirmed by a second QCA model, which tests the importance of these conditions 
beyond Latin America. By considering elections held in Africa, Asia and Europe in the same 
period of time (2000 to 2015) the model shows that the findings can travel to other 
contexts. 
Chapter 6, To include or not to include? Party representation in electoral institutions and 
confidence in elections: A comparative study of Latin America focuses on the role of EMBs. It 
addresses the debate regarding EMB autonomy from political parties and seeks to find out 
which EMB model is best for having confidence in elections. There are two models for 
ensuring the impartiality of an EMB, which is needed if the process through which candidates 
and political parties are elected is to be considered legitimate. These are the “expert” model, 
where management of elections is delegated to experts at arm’s length from political parties, 
and the  “multi-party” model, where political parties nominate their own representatives to sit 
on the board of the EMB. There is no agreement on which of these two models is the best for 
the credibility of elections (Molina and Hernandez,1999; Estevez, et. al, 2008; Hartlyn, et al, 
2008 Birch, 2011; Ugues, 2014; Rosas, 2010; Tarouco, 2016). This chapter examines the 
extent to which the support of political parties for EMBs matters. I hypothesise that political 
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parties, as the main object of regulation of EMBs, must be consulted for all election related 
activities, including –and especially- in the appointment process of the members of the 
electoral institution.   
In this chapter, the inclusion of political parties in EMBs is measured by a four point scale of 
EMB models depending on the level of participation of parties in the appointment of their 
members. The levels are: EMBs with no participation from political parties; EMBs where 
political parties have an indirect role in the appointment; EMBs where some members are 
party representatives and others are selected by another method; and EMBs where all 
members are political party representatives. Results show that although it may be 
advantageous to include political parties in the appointment process of the EMB members, 
not all forms of inclusion yield the same level of benefits in terms of confidence in elections. In 
particular, confidence in electoral processes is significantly higher where political parties have 
an indirect and a partial direct role in the appointment of the EMB members, compared to 
those where parties do not participate in the appointment process. This is demonstrated 
through logistic and multilevel regression of results from 5,261 questionnaires to legislators in 
the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) survey. 
Chapter 7, Free and fair, but also visible and inferable: the role that election results play in 
post-election protests, focuses on election results, another of the key conditions identified for 
having a successful election. It analyses the role of transparency in results for preventing and 
mitigating post-election protests. It compares the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections in 
Mexico which experienced different levels of protest. After the 2006 elections, runner up 
Andres Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) rejected the results, called fraud and asked his 
supporters to protest the electoral process and its outcome. Around one million people 
flooded into the streets just in Mexico City, with r big protests in other cities around the 
country. The protest in Mexico City became a civil disobedience campaign and turned into a 
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sit down blocking one of the city’s main avenues, Reforma, and paralysing the city for two 
months. AMLO called for a constitutional convention and was self-proclaimed Mexico’s 
“legitimate president”. The 2012 elections were also followed by protests, albeit of a much 
smaller scale. In this case, AMLO again runner up in the election, challenged election results 
once more. However, his call did not have much echo. The millions of 2006 were thousands 
in 2012. Protests only lasted a few days instead of months. AMLO did not proclaim himself 
legitimate president. I argue that the degree of transparency in the election results stage in 
both elections explains this variation. The degree of transparency is measured using 
Michener and Bersch’s (2013) minimal definition, which considers two basic conditions, 
invisibility and inferability. .. Using these indicators I analyse three devices used by Mexico’s 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) in both 2006 and 2012 elections to process and communicate 
election results: the programme of preliminary election results (PREP), the quick count 
system, and the district count (the official tabulation and communication of results). This is 
studied through a small N focused comparison which allows conducting a structured, 
systematic and guided data collection and analysis process. Results show that transparency 
in election results has an impact on the extent of post-election protests. Election results which 
are clear, accurate, widely available, and easy to understand and transmitted/announced in a 
timely fashion contribute to positive perceptions of the election results and the electoral 
process and therefore can prevent and mitigate post-election protests. This explains the much 
smaller scale, scope and duration of protests after the 2012 election.  The same thing cannot 
be said about the 2006 election, where lack of transparency lead to one of the worst post-
election crisis Mexico has ever lived.  
Finally, chapter 8 summarises the results of the three complementary research 
phases/methodology and the lessons learned in the research. From here, it provides 
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recommendations for policy makers and election officials. It also presents potential future 
research avenues. 
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2. CHAPTER 2: ELECTORAL INTEGRITY AND CHALLENGING ELECTIONS: SETTING 
THE SCENE 
2.1 Introduction 
When reading the news it is not rare to find out that an election somewhere around the world 
was challenged and followed by protests and violence. Most of these news stories come from 
countries classified as authoritarian or as hybrid regimes. This view is also supported in 
scholarly literature arguing that losers’ consent is more likely in democratic countries (Lago 
and Martinez i Coma, 2016). This is the “loser-friendly” concept, which follows Przeworski’s 
(1991) view that in a democracy losers choose to comply with the results as elections are free 
and fair and therefore allow them sufficient chances of winning in the future. Waiting is more 
profitable than rebelling.  
However, election challenges also occur in democratic regimes. Democratic elections are not 
free from malpractices and therefore are not safe from being challenged. Even long-standing 
democracies such as the United States, Canada and Britain are vulnerable to flawed elections 
(Norris, 2014). So, how often around the world are elections challenged? Are challenges more 
likely in authoritarian or hybrid regimes or are they equally likely in democratic settings? How 
often do challenges lead to protests? And are these protests peaceful or violent? Do they 
occur in democratic countries as well? This chapter will give an overview of the extent of post-
election challenges in the world. It will describe the frequency of election challenges as well 
as identify if these challenges were followed by protests, and if these were peaceful or violent. 
Second, it will try to explain why these challenges occur, especially in democratic countries 
which are supposed to be free of these issues. Third, it will describe all the types of issues 
and malpractice that can affect the integrity of an election. Finally, it will focus on the three key 
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conditions analysed by this thesis and make the case for their importance in the study of 
election confidence and the acceptance of election results around the world.  
2.2 The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index 
To measure electoral integrity and losers consent around the world, I use data from the 
Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI), version 4.0. This is a survey which gathers 
the perceptions of experts on the integrity of elections, understood as the extent to which 
the conduct of elections meets “international standards and global norms (…) endorsed in a 
series of conventions, treaties, protocols and guidelines” (Norris, Frank and Martinez i 
Coma, 2013:9). 
There are a high number of alternative sources for measuring the quality of an election and 
its components, including mass surveys, media reports, legal analyses, election forensics 
and Election Observation Mission reports.  However, none of these sources are relevant for 
the purposes of this chapter – and for answering questions such as how often elections are 
challenged around the world and how often do these challenges lead to protests. The main 
reason these sources cannot be used relates to their lack of depth, global coverage, and 
specialization. For instance, mass surveys can give us a general assessment by a big 
number of citizens about the conduct of the election. However, these surveys do not 
analyse the specific components of the election and are limited as respondents might not 
be well acquainted with many technical aspects. Election observation missions on the other 
hand, do provide an in depth understanding of the electoral process and its components. 
This is as increasingly observers are being deployed not only for election day, but as part of 
a long term team that monitors aspects ranging from campaign media to post-election 
disputes. However, the problem here lies in the lack of coverage, as there is no single 
organization that observes all elections around the world (Martinez i Coma, Norris and 
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Frank, 2015). Then, using media reports can be useful for obtaining information about 
irregularities, fraud and violence, but these are limited as their selection and partisan bias 
has been widely documented. Finally, election audits are useful for assessing the 
performance of electoral procedures and staff, as well as to detect problems in certain 
activities, such as in the processing and tabulation of election results. However, they 
cannot be used for global comparisons as they are usually implemented in a single country 
or even at the constituency level (Alvarez, Atkeson, Hall, 2012). 
Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter an expert survey covering all countries 
worldwide throughout the electoral cycle is especially relevant.The PEI Index allows us to 
systematically compare how far the conduct of elections around the world meets 
international standards and norms and to measure and assess the different components in 
an election. The PEI index covers all national elections (parliamentary and presidential) 
held in independent countries, excluding microstates with a population of less than 
100,000. In its latest version, the PEI index contains information gathered from about 180 
elections held in 139 countries from 1 July 2012 until 31 December 2015. In particular it 
monitors the quality of the elections around the electoral cycle – covering the pre-election 
period, the campaign, election day and the post-election phase – as suggested as best 
practice by the United Nations (2016). It is based on 49 indicators grouped into eleven 
stages, ranging from electoral laws to the impartiality of electoral authorities. 
Moreover, this assessment is done by experts with deep knowledge about elections.  PEI 
defines experts as political scientists (or scientists in a related discipline) who have 
demonstrated knowledge about elections in a specific country. In particular, this is identified 
by 1) membership of relevant research groups or relevant professional networks; 2) 
publications, including books, scientific articles or conference presentations in the field of 
elections or 3) employment in a university as a lecturer/ professor or researcher. For each 
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election, the Electoral Integrity Project identifies roughly 40 experts per country, both 
domestic and international people for balance (Norris, et al., 2016). PEI version 4.0 had a 
response rate of 29%, obtaining responses from a total of 2,080 experts.  
Is this expert survey reliable? From the pilot study in 2012, the results of the PEI have been 
tested, showing substantial external and internal validity. In order to test its external validity, 
the PEI has to be compared with independent sources of evidence, such as other expert 
datasets created by scholarly projects. For instance, comparing the PEI index 4.0 with 
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem’s) assessment of the quality of electoral democracy, yields 
a high correlation (R=.83***, N127) (Norris, et al., 2016). This is not the only case. It has 
been reported that correlations between the PEI Index and other related measures – 
including flagship indices such as the Economist Intelligence Unit measure of Electoral 
Processes and Freedom House’s measure of Electoral Processes- are also quite strong 
and significant (Norris, et al., 2016). In regards to internal validity, OLS regression analysis 
was used to predict whether the index varied by the characteristics of the experts. Several 
factors proved significant (sex, length of time living in the country) while others 
“reassuringly” were not (chiefly political ideology but also age and education) (Norris, Frank 
and Martinez i Coma, 2013).  
This, however does not mean that there are no issues surrounding the PEI Index. First of 
all, we have to consider that not all types of electoral experts are taken into account. The 
Index focuses solely on people with an academic background who have held positions at 
universities or published on elections or politics about a specific country. Other experts, 
such as election officials without academic experience, are left out. Second, the number of 
available experts varies from country to country. This of course, depends on the size of the 
country but also on its resources and access. As a result, while there is a surplus of experts 
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for certain countries (the United States and Mexico, for example), there is a deficit for 
countries such as Cape Verde and Mali.  
Nonetheless, the PEI Index is a very useful tool for measuring electoral integrity. In contrast 
to other data sources, it allows us to have a global, comprehensive and systematic 
comparison of the quality of elections around the world. It allows us to measure and 
describe individual components - from pre-election to post-election- and it is conducted by 
people with deep knowledge on the topic. Moreover, it is quite reliable, with results similar 
to other democracy and election measures and with a strong consistency amongst its 
experts’ assessments. And more importantly, by focusing on the quality of elections and by 
considering aspects such as post-election challenges and the existence of peaceful and 
violent protests after the election, it allows us to answer the questions outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
 
2.3 Challenging elections around the world-  
As stated, this research uses data from the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI), 
version 4.0 to identify and describe post- election behaviour around the world. To measure 
this, I use indicator 10-1 on the PEI survey, which asks experts a few weeks after a national 
election has taken place if parties or candidates challenged the election results. Answers go 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Therefore, lower scores indicate cases where 
parties did not challenge the election results while higher scores indicate results were very 
much challenged.  To clarify this, the following examples are illustrative. On the higher end of 
the scale we have the Burundi 2015 presidential election, which scored 5 in the measure. 
Since independence Burundi has experienced a series of military coups that have weakened 
democratic procedures and institutions. After a devastating ethnic based civil war in the 1990s 
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a new constitution was approved in 2005. Under this constitution elections were held in 2005 
and 2010, with the opposition boycotting the latter after protesting the very flawed May 2010 
local elections. Since then, the government has cracked down on opposition members in what 
has been labelled a “restricted political atmosphere” (Polity IV, 2010). In this context, 
President Pierre Nkurunziza –despite a controversy about his eligibility- decided to run for a 
third term in office. This caused protests, violence, a coup-attempt and increased attacks on 
the opposition. 17 opposition parties boycotted the election while the UN Secretary General 
and regional leaders asked for elections to be postponed (IBT, Telegraph, 2015). Elections 
were held regardless, with Nkurunziza winning reelection with 69.41% of the vote. Violence 
and unrest have continued after re-election, with deaths on both sides. In December, a new 
rebel group, Republican Forces of Burundi, was formed with the purpose to oust the President 
(Al Jazeera, 2015). The 2013 elections in Venezuela score 4.29 in the scale. In power since 
1999 and after surviving a failed coup in 2002, a recall referendum in 2004 and after 
abolishing terms in office, Hugo Chavez passed away in March 2013. Then, presidential 
elections were held to appoint his successor. In these elections, Nicolas Maduro, former Vice 
President and interim president after Chavez’ death, obtained a razor thin victory with 50.66% 
of votes over opposition leader Henrique Capriles who received 49.07% of votes. With this 
razor thin margin (1.49%) Capriles rejected the results, claimed the process was marred with 
irregularities and demanded a full vote recount (El Pais, 2013). Venezuela’s National Electoral 
Council (CNE) confirmed Maduro’s victory. The opposition took to the streets to protest and 
attacked several buildings of Maduro’s political party. Protestors clashed with government 
forces, leaving 7 dead and dozens injured (El Mundo, 2013). On the other side of the scale 
we find cases of countries were election results were not challenged. An example of this is the 
2015 election in Canada (with a score of 2 in this measure), where voters gave an 
unexpected but decisive victory to the Liberal Party under Justin Trudeau. This election was 
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ranked 20th best among all 180 elections covered so far by the PEI, and 5th for elections in 
2015,  providing “an example of a contest generally well administered around the whole 
electoral cycle” (Norris et al, 2016:41).  A similar example is the 2014 election in Costa Rica 
(with a score of 1). This election was characterised by a “high level of professionalism and 
technical capacity” (OAS, 2014: 5) and was the first election conducted after the new 2009 
election code introduced a number of procedures to strengthen the organisation and 
management of the electoral process (OAS, 2014).  
Figure 2.1 presents these results by country. It shows the “challenge of elections” score by 
country on a world map, using standard deviation for the different categories2. As the map 
shows, challenging election results is quite a routine phenomenon, with Africa, the Middle 
East and South East Asia being the regions where this is more common. It is not a 
coincidence that these three regions, on average, have the lowest scores on the aggregated 
PEI Index for 2012-20153. In Africa, for example more than half of the states in the survey 
have low integrity scores, with countries such as Congo Republic, Djibouti, Burundi, 
Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia which have some of the lowest ratings around the world 
(Norris et al, 2016).  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The cut-off points are chosen so that the step for each category is one standard deviation wide. The 
middle category stretches from -0.5 Std. Dev. To +0.5 Std.Dev. and encompasses about 38% of all the 
data. 
3 The 4.0 version of the PEI Index shows that the regional average of integrity on a 1-100 scale is 47 for 
Africa, 49 for the Middle East and 56 for Asia Pacific. (PEI presents an average for the entire Asia Pacific 
region. However, excluding countries from Oceania and East Asia from the sample yields an average for 
South East Asia of 47/100.) 
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Figure 2.1. Elections challenged around the world. 2012-2015 
 
Then, Figure 2.2 allows us to see the performance of individual countries by using their mean 
absolute values. Countries such as Finland, Costa Rica and Switzerland obtain low scores as 
parties and/or candidates do not challenge election results. Not surprisingly, these countries 
are consistently ranked most highly by the PEI Index, with scores of 86, 80 and 79 out of 100. 
On the other upper side of the graph, we find countries such as Kenya, Mauritania and 
Cambodia where election results are very much challenged. Kenya has a legacy of violence 
in elections while Mauritania and Cambodia are both authoritarian regimes. Again this is not a 
surprise as all three countries rank poorly in the PEI index, with scores of 41, 44 and 32, 
respectively.  
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Figure 2.2 Challenging results around the world. Scores per country: 2012-2015 
 
Note: For illustration purposes labels are shown for just a sub-set of the 139 countries 
2.3.1 Challenging election results in democracies 
However, as we can also tell from figures 2.1 and 2.2, elections are not only challenged in 
non-democratic countries or hybrid regimes. Parties and candidates also challenge election 
results in democratic regimes, and sometimes even in well-established democracies. Figure 
2.3 below considers elections that take place only in democratic countries (a country is 
considered democratic if it scores 6 or higher on the Polity IV rating of political rights)4. It lists 
a total of 102 out of the 180 elections included in the PEI 4.0 survey and presents a 
scatterplot with 2 key indicators. First, it presents the mean score of challenged results on a 1 
                                                          
4 Polity measures three components related to the democratic quality of a regime: executive recruitment, 
executive constraints and political competition. It also records special conditions, including periods of 
factionalism, interregnum, interruption and transition and change events, such as autocratic backsliding, 
executive auto-coups, revolutionary change, state failure and coup d’état. More information on Polity IV at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
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to 5 scale. Scores between 3 and 4 represent “challenged” elections, while mean scores 
between 4 and 5 correspond to “highly challenged” elections. Second, it shows the electoral 
integrity score for that election (on a 1 to 100 scale), with higher values corresponding to 
elections with high levels of integrity.  
 
 
First of all, as we can see (illustrated by cases located in the bottom right section of the plot) 
election results are also challenged in democratic countries. Data shows that election results 
were challenged in 34 out of 102 elections (measured by an election challenge score above 
3-‘neither agree nor disagree’). Then, elections where highly contested in 18 cases (mean 
scores 4 and 5 - agree and strongly agree). More importantly, we find that several elections 
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were also challenged in spite of having moderate or high electoral integrity scores5. These 
cases have been highlighted in red to show that elections are challenged in spite of having 
good quality (PEI scores above 55). 
 In particular, I labelled three of these cases to illustrate the point.  A first example is the 2014 
presidential election in Indonesia, where runner up Prabowo Subianto of the Great Indonesia 
Movement Party claimed massive cheating and challenged the election results, declaring the 
election unconstitutional. These claims diverge from a high PEI score of 60.14 for that 
election, and also collides with the opinion of most national analysts, which deemed the 
election credible and inclusive (Nelson, 2016). The 2014 presidential elections in El Salvador 
and the 2014 general elections in Thailand are related examples.  These two elections 
obtained moderate to high scores in terms of their integrity, but were nonetheless challenged. 
And, in the case of Thailand, elections were unfortunately marked by violence and followed by 
a political crisis and a coup d’état by the armed forces (BBC, 2014). As of October 2017, the 
military junta is still in power as fresh elections have not been held. A detailed account 
showing PEI and election challenge scores for all 102 elections in democratic countries can 
be found in Table 1 in the appendix. 
 
2.3.2 Challenging results and post-election protests 
As Lago and Martinez i Coma point out (2016) when votes are cast in an election and a candidate 
or a party is declared winner, losers can react in three different ways: they can accept election 
                                                          
5 The PEI index considers scores ranging from 0 to 100, where 100 is the highest score possible 
for a particular country. Scores above 70 points are considered “very high” in electoral integrity; 
scores from 60 to 69 are for countries or elections with “high” integrity; 50 to 59 is “moderate”; 
40 to 49 is “low”, and scores below 40 points on the PEI Index are considered cases of “very 
low” integrity. (Norris et al, 2016) 
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results, they can challenge the results, or they can turn against democracy.  In turn, challenging 
election results can take many forms, including both legal and extra legal action (Chernykh, 
2013). First, a party can take legal action by filing a petition to another electoral body or the 
judiciary and ask for a recount or even to cancel or nullify election outcomes. Second, a party can 
choose to go for extra-legal action and can decide “staging a post-electoral mass protest, refusing 
to recognize the newly elected legislature by not taking its seats or even boycotting the second 
round of elections (Chernykh, 2013: 1362).   
Challenging election results can lead to post-election protests. These protests can be peaceful and 
lead to election reform and to broader changes to the political and economic system of the 
country. At the same time, however, such protests can become violent and can have important 
consequences for the political stability and for the advancement and consolidation of democracy in 
the country (IDEA, 2010; Chernynk, 2013). How prevalent are challenged elections around the 
world? And how often do they lead to protests? 
In addition to measuring whether parties or candidates challenged the election result, the PEI 4.0 
survey considers experts’ evaluations of the existence of post-election protests. The survey 
contains two indicators. The first measure asks whether the election lead to peaceful protests, 
using a scale going from 1 (the election did not lead to peaceful protests) to 5 (the election lead to 
peaceful protests). The second asks whether the election triggered violent protests, also 
employing a five point scale. Using election-level data from the PEI Index, (Table 2.1, first row) we 
find that 45% of all elections conducted worldwide between between1 July 2012 and 31 December 
2015 were challenged by parties and/or candidates (81 out of 180 elections).  Then, 23% of 
elections worldwide were followed by peaceful protests (42 out of 180 elections) and about 8% of 
them triggered violent protests (15 out of 180)6.  In the smaller universe of democratic countries, 
the frequency of challenged elections and elections followed by protests is lower, but still relevant. 
                                                          
6 This is obtained considering answers equal and greater than 3 on the five point scale used by the PEI 
survey. 
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Table 2.2 (second row) illustrates this: 33.3% of democratic elections are challenged, 20.6% are 
followed by peaceful protests and 5% by violence. Table 2.2 focuses on challenged elections. Out 
of all challenged elections worldwide within the period of time covered by the PEI Index (81 in 
total), 48.1% were followed by peaceful protests while a worrying 17.3% lead to violence. Amongst 
democratic countries, 55.9% of challenged elections lead to peaceful protests and 14.7% ended in 
violence. 
 
Table 2.1.  Challenged elections worldwide and in democratic states. 
Elections Challenged Peaceful 
protests 
Violent 
protests 
All elections 180 81 (45%) 42 (23%) 15 (8.3%) 
Democracies 102 34 (33.3%) 21 (20.6%) 5 (4.9%) 
    
Table 2.2. Percentage of challenged elections leading to peaceful / violent protests. 
Elections  Peaceful 
protests  
Violent 
protests 
All elections 81 39 (48.1%) 14 (17.3%) 
Democracies 34 19 (55.9%) 5 (14.7%) 
 
2.4 Challenges and election malpractice 
The tables above show us that a considerable percentage of challenged elections lead to protests 
that sometimes turn violent. Why is this fairly common? Why do people challenge election results 
and turn to the streets? If we look at news headlines after any election around the world we will 
find an answer to these questions. Stories highlighting long queues, tired poll workers, poorly 
designed ballot papers and confusing voting machines are quite common. Beyond Election Day, 
33 
 
 
 
reports on gerrymandering, illegal campaign finance, unfair news coverage and government 
manipulation of results are just some of the many issues that elections face across the world.   
It is safe to say that all elections –regardless of where they are held- experience problems. On the 
one hand, these problems have to do with governments, political parties, candidates and other 
actors actively trying to manipulate the electoral process and its outcome for their own or their 
parties’ interest. This has been labelled as “electoral malpractice” and takes three main forms: the 
manipulation of the legislative framework of elections, the manipulation of the choices of individual 
voters or the manipulation of the administrative process of voting (Birch, 2011). These 
malpractices include gerrymandering, disenfranchisement, the improper use of state resources in 
campaigning, violating caps on campaign spending, bias in media coverage, vote buying and voter 
intimidation and coercion, amongst others. Moreover, as Birch also indicates (2011), manipulation 
can go beyond these three main areas and can occur both before the start of the electoral process 
and after its conclusion. The manipulation of the timing of elections and the illegal financing of 
party war chests fall in this category. On the other hand, not all problems in an election are about 
wrongdoing. In these cases, irregularities are unintended and have to do more with human or 
technical errors and mistakes or a lack of resources. Ballot miscounts by tired or poorly trained 
election officials (or working at night with poor lighting conditions), bad quality in voting ink, flawed 
logistics for distributing election materials or an out of date electoral roll are just some examples of 
this. This is in line with a second classification stating that problems regarding the integrity of the 
election can be of first and second order (Norris, 2013). First order problems are commonly related 
to major violations of human rights and large scale fraud, illustrated by actions such as the 
imprisonment of opposition leaders and voter coercion by security forces, while second order 
problems are about “more mundane issues of maladministration, lack of technical capacity or 
human error” (Norris, 2013:566). 
Regardless if they are intended or unintended, first or second order, all these types of malpractices 
can have important consequences. In fact, “electoral malpractices (…) are intrinsically important as 
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the lynchpin of liberal democracy” (Norris, 2014: 7-8). First, they can modify the outcome of the 
election (this of course, depends on the closeness of the race and the extent of the malpractice). 
Second, they can affect the quality of future elections. For example, if not addressed, 
gerrymandering and malapportionment will remain a problem for the future. Third, they can affect 
the credibility and legitimacy of the regime and its institutions and shape how people see 
democracy (Elklit, 1999; Birch, 2011; Norris, 2013). Finally, malpractice usually leads to 
challenged election results. Irregularities and flaws in elections can translate into frustration and 
anger and lead to unrest and violence (Birch, 2011).  
2.5 Strengthening elections  
How can we prevent conflict and violence? Living in a democracy increases the chances that 
elections will not be challenged. In democracies with free and fair elections losers are more likely 
to comply with the results as they believe they will have a sufficient chance to win in the future 
(Lago and Martinez i Coma, 2016). Democracies are self-reinforcing. However, this is not enough. 
As shown above, democratic countries also experience episodes of protests and violence. 
Therefore, the focus must be on strengthening the integrity of electoral processes. This has been 
highlighted as important for the acceptance of an election by both scholars and practitioners 
(Lopez-Pintor, 2000; Mozzaffar and Schedler, 2002; Birch, 2006; IDEA, 2006; Norris, 2014; Lago 
and Martinez i Coma, 2016). Electoral integrity is an overarching concept which encompasses 
many different aspects that occur before, during and after Election Day (Norris, 2013). However, 
as outlined in the introduction, this research will focus on three aspects that have been identified 
as the main areas that group possible acts of violence resulting from an election (GEO, 2011). 
These are the overall administration of the electoral process, the role played by EMBs and the 
election results stage. 
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2.5.1 Election administration 
First, this thesis focuses on the quality of election administration. Scholars and practitioners 
agree that the quality of an election is key for its success and credibility. In one of the first 
scholarly works on the topic, Robert A. Pastor (1999) presents election administration as “the 
missing variable” for explaining the causes and consequences of democratic transitions. In his 
view electoral procedures are “no simple matter” and have a political side to it, which is very 
delicate. Technical problems or even rumours of irregularities can easily lead to boycotts, 
protests and violence, especially in emerging democracies. After this first work, a number of 
studies have shown that the quality of an election has a positive impact on its acceptance and 
on the support and legitimacy of democracy and that of the political system (Elklit, 1999; Elklit 
and Reynolds, 2002; Mozzafar and Schedler; 2002; Norris, Frank and Coma, 2014). In short, 
“the way elections are managed can either make or break a democracy” (Maserumule, 
2015:85). For practitioners there is also a rare unity when it comes to highlighting the 
importance of this aspect. Good examples of this are election observation reports. Usually 
statements and reports from intergovernmental institutions such as the European Union, the 
Organization of American States or the African Union or from non-governmental organisations 
such as the Carter Centre link the success and acceptance of an election to meeting 
international standards of electoral integrity, to being “free and fair” or to having technical 
accuracy in the conduction of the electoral process. For instance, the 2010 mission of the 
Centre for Electoral Advice and Promotion (CAPEL) to the 2010 presidential elections in 
Colombia indicated that “the election was developed according to international standards (…) 
which resulted in a decrease in violent acts” (CAPEL, 2010). Then, on the 2012 report on the 
Ghanaian elections, the Commonwealth secretariat mentioned that “the [2008] elections were 
found to have been conducted in an open, transparent and inclusive manner, and were 
therefore considered credible.” (Commonwealth, 2012: 6).  Similarly, elections which are not 
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clean and where there is significant fraud fall in the category of flawed or failed elections and 
are linked to contestants rejecting election results and even to violence and instability.  
However, election administration is not the only factor behind the acceptance and credibility of 
an election. Sometimes, elections classified as “free and fair” have been followed by protests 
and even riots, while elections with technical flaws have been widely accepted. An example of 
this is the 1994 elections in South Africa. In January that year, the recently created 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had less than 4 months to hold the country’s first 
ever democratic election. For the first time ever, the election would include all South Africans 
over 18 years of age, a sixfold expansion of the electorate from the apartheid years. The task 
was daunting. In addition, there were many other technical challenges. There was no voters 
roll, no voter cards and as most of the country had never experienced an election before, 
there was no record of suitable places to set up polling stations (Mawson, 2010). It was a 
completely new experience, an experiment almost. On top of that, white extremists opposed 
the electoral process and conducted acts of violence. On Election Day, there was a shortage 
of ballots in many polling stations, which also experienced long queues, leading to discontent 
and fatigue from both voters and poll workers. Complicating matters further, it was discovered 
that a computer hacker had accessed the counting and tallying system (Elklit and Reynolds, 
2000). Nonetheless, in spite of these “technical flaws (…) results were (…) generally accepted 
by all—voters, parties, and international observers” (Elklit and Reynolds, 2000:25). These 
technical and administrative shortcomings were overcome and results were accepted 
because of three main factors. First, these elections had Nelson Mandela, a very credible 
figure and a key symbol of struggle against apartheid. Second, the IEC had a good 
relationship with political parties and was trusted by them. The IEC set up national, provincial 
and local inter party liaison committees, where all political parties were represented and were 
able to discuss matters pertaining to the election and voice their concerns (Mawson, 2010). 
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Third, the level of transparency in the election allowed creating an atmosphere where the 
outcome was trusted. The IEC had an open policy of information for voters and political 
parties, giving them insights into what was going on, which made them more likely to accept 
EMB decisions more willingly (Elklit and Reynolds, 2002). In the words of Judge Johann 
Kriegler, who directed the Independent Electoral Commission, “we had the worst 
administration you can imagine (…) but we had the political will and we were legitimate. 
That’s what you need. If you haven’t got a Mandela, you’re in trouble” (Mawson, 2010:1).  
2.5. 2  Beyond election administration: electoral institutions and electoral results 
As the South African example shows, not everything is about the good administration of an 
election. Therefore, this research focuses on two other more specific aspects highlighted by 
the findings of the 5th Global Electoral Organization Conference as critical for preventing 
violence and for the successful conduct of an election. These are the role played by EMBs 
and the election results stage. This research gives especial attention to these two areas and 
seeks to explain their contribution to having accepted and credible elections.   
Factor Analysis of the PEI Index confirms the importance of these two areas for the integrity 
of elections. In particular, the Principal Component Analysis shows that although all of the 11 
dimensions of the electoral cycle measured by the PEI7 contribute strongly to the underlying 
dimension of integrity, “Vote Count” and “Electoral Authorities” are the highest.  In the PEI 
Index the dimension “vote count” is related to election results, including indicators for vote 
count and the announcement of election results without undue delay. On the other hand the 
“electoral authorities” measure is related to the role played by EMBs and includes measures 
of the impartiality, transparency and performance of the election authorities. These two areas 
                                                          
7 The 11 dimensions in the PEI are: electoral laws, electoral procedures, voting district boundaries, voter 
registration, party and candidate registration, media coverage, campaign finance, voting process, vote 
count, post-election and electoral authorities. (Norris, et al, 2015) 
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have the highest loaded scores in the analysis, which means they are especially critical for 
electoral integrity, as shown in the Component Matrix below (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 Component Matrix. Principal Component Analysis (PEI Index). 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
1-4i. Electoral laws index (20-
100), imputed 
.810 
2-5i. Electoral procedures index 
(25-100), imputed 
.926 
3-4i. Voting district boundaries 
index (20-100), imputed 
.720 
4-4i. Voter registration index 
(20-100), imputed 
.847 
5-6i. Party and candidate 
registration index (20-100), 
imputed 
.866 
6-6i. Media coverage index (20-
100), imputed 
.758 
7-6i. Campaign finance index 
(20-100), imputed 
.876 
8-9i. Voting process index (20-
100), imputed 
.878 
9-6i. Vote count index (20-100), 
imputed 
.927 
10-5i. Post election index (25-
100), imputed 
.811 
11-5i. Electoral authorities 
index (25-100), imputed 
.943 
Notes. Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis (a. 1 components extracted). One underlying 
dimension extracted (Eigenvalue=8.019; % of Variance 72.9). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity yields significant 
results (p<.001). 
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2.5.2.1 The role of EMBs: party support and inclusion 
Electoral Management Bodies are a central component of the democratic system. They are 
not only key institutions for the delivery of elections but also play a major role in democracy 
building and consolidation. In the words of Lopez-Pintor, they are institutions of governance, “
dealing directly with the organization of multi-party elections and indirectly with governance 
and the rule of law” (Lopez-Pintor, 2000:13). First, EMBs perform a number of functions to 
ensure that elections are conducted with integrity and according to widely accepted 
international standards.  Of course, no two countries are identical but typically EMBs are in 
charge of functions such as the registration of voters, the design and implementation of 
electoral procedures, the organization and logistics surrounding voting day (from the delivery 
of election materials and the installation of voting centres to the training of polling clerks), the 
vote count and the announcement of results. Moreover, in some countries EMBs have 
acquired additional functions, such as the drawing of electoral boundaries/constituencies (like 
a number of EMBs in the Americas), overseeing campaign finance (Federal Electoral 
Commission in the US) and even the management of parties’ and candidates’ access to radio 
and television (Mexico’s National Electoral Institute). Second, EMBs can contribute to the 
legitimacy of the electoral process and to that of the political system. In the third wave of 
democracy, EMBs played very important roles in re-establishing democracy and in 
guaranteeing that elections are acceptable to all parties involved, including factions that once 
fought each other in civil wars and other conflicts. Even consolidated democracies like the 
US, the UK and Australia have in recent years set up EMBs for the conduct of credible 
elections (as late as the year 2001 with the establishment of the Electoral Commission by 
Parliament in the UK).   
It is therefore very important that the electoral institution acts and is perceived to be impartial 
and credible, so that electoral processes are recognized as legitimate (Birch, 2011; Magaloni, 
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2006; Miller, 2005; North & Weingast 1989). When an EMB is credible, the election and its 
outcome are credible and accepted. However, when citizens, political parties and others 
mistrust the electoral institution, the entire process can be challenged. An example of this is 
the general mistrust of the Philippines Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which 
contributes to tensions and creates an atmosphere that is more likely to lead to violence 
(IFES, 2004). In the 2004 elections, for example, 249 election-related violence incidents, 
including 468 casualties were reported (Rimban, 2011). As will be detailed on chapter 6, 
another key example is the 2007 elections in Kenya, which ended with significant post-
election violence. This was mostly due to the doubts surrounding the impartiality of the 
Electoral Commission, whose members were appointed only shortly before the election day 
and without consulting most political parties.  
EMB credibility is critical for the acceptance of election results (Maserumule, 2015: 85). For 
this reason, literature has focused on a number of aspects that are considered to strengthen 
election administration. These include the organizational structure of EMBs, their functional 
capacity, and their administrative ethos (Norris, 2015). With regards to the EMB structure, the 
focus has been on comparing and analyzing the advantages of three main types of electoral 
bodies: the governmental model, where elections are organized by the executive branch of 
government at the national or local level; the independent model, where the management of 
elections is done by an agency which is institutionally independent and autonomous from the 
executive; and the mixed model, which involves two levels or components, a supervisory 
agency that is independent from government and an implementation body which is part of a 
national or local government (such as a ministry or local authorities) (ACE, 2016; IDEA, 
2006).  Within this field, other studies analyse the autonomy of EMBs not from government 
but from political parties. A second condition that is believed to have an influence in the 
quality of elections is functional effectiveness and state capacity. This highlights the 
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importance of the EMB’s administrative capacity and its ability to manage and organize an 
election effectively and professionally with as little flaws as possible. Adequate managerial, 
technical, legal, human and financial resources are needed for conducting a successful 
election (Norris, 2015). A third condition that has been analysed by literature is the 
administrative culture or ethos of the EMB and its staff. This is related to the values that 
influence the way officials in the EMB see their work and how they perform. Values such as 
impartiality, efficiency, transparency and legality rather than clientelism and patronage have 
been found to have a positive impact on public service delivery.   
Although there are many conditions that are believed to have an impact on the quality of 
elections and their credibility, in this research I focus on the structural element of EMBs. I 
study the relationship between EMBs and political parties and analyse whether support from 
political parties to EMBs matters for electoral credibility. I hypothesize that party support has a 
positive impact on confidence in electoral processes. This support can take a number of 
forms. In Chapter 5 I focus on the general support to EMBs by political parties, identified as 
expressions of trust and acceptance of the electoral institution and its top staff, while in 
chapter 6 I focus on the participation of political parties in the appointment of EMB members. 
Political parties are at the heart of an election and have a unique position to either support or 
reject the election. If political parties have a role and a voice in the appointment of the EMB 
members it is more likely that they will have a good relationship with the institution and it is 
more likely that they will support its activities and decisions. On the other hand, when political 
parties are excluded and their concerns are not heard, it is more likely that they will criticise 
the EMB and its decisions. This exclusion can also provide them with grounds to question the 
impartiality of the EMB and lead them to challenge the entire electoral process. 
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2.5.2.2 Election results: transparency for credibility. 
The election results stage is very important for the credibility of an election and it’s one of the 
most sensitive areas in the electoral cycle. First, this stage, encompassing the counting, 
verification, communication and announcement of results usually lasts only a few days or 
even hours. As a result, it gets more attention than other stages that unfold during longer 
periods of time, such as voter registration, which can be a continuing and lengthy process. 
Second, this stage occurs immediately before candidates, parties, media and citizens in 
general find out who are the winners of the election. In a way, this stage is directly linked to 
the outcome of the election and therefore it is used by many as an indicator of the overall 
quality and integrity of the entire process. Third, in modern democracies, the format of the 
results stage is that of a horse race, with constant and abundant information showing who is 
ahead and who is behind, by how much, and how can this potentially change or not in the 
next few hours or even minutes. Charts, graphs and estimations of the actual and projected 
results for each candidate or political party are a key part of this process. This allows people 
to examine the election more closely and contributes to a state of heightened excitement. 
Therefore, because of its duration, timing and format, the electoral results stage can play a 
very important role in the acceptance of election results and in preventing or reducing post-
election protests or violence (especially if the climate is tense and results are close). The 
success of this stage is crucial for the entire process to work.   
The importance of the election results stage is considered in a number of books and 
guidelines directed towards democracy and electoral assistance practitioners. For instance, 
the Venice Commission’s code of good practice in electoral matters highlights that the 
transmission of results is a vital matter whose importance is often overlooked (Venice 
Commission, 2002). As a result, it suggests that – as other stages of the electoral cycle - it 
should be characterised by transparency, impartiality and independence from political 
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manipulation. In particular, it indicates the transmission of both preliminary and final results 
should be conducted in an open manner, and within short time limits, especially when the 
political climate is tense (Venice Commission, 2002). In a similar fashion, the Deepening 
Democracy report by the Global Commission indicates that transparency, inclusiveness and 
accountability in the tabulation of results can improve confidence and diminish post-election 
volatility (Global Commission, 2012: 26). In the same way, as stated by the International 
Obligations for Elections guidelines, “the respect for the free expression of the will of the 
electors (…) relies on fair, honest, conscientious and transparent management of counting 
and tabulation activities” (IDEA, 2014b). 
Reports also highlight more practical aspects of the management of election results.  The 
International IDEA Handbook on Electoral Management Design points out that the credibility 
of an election is weakened when the election results stage is flawed. As the handbook points 
out this was the case in Belarus and Ukraine in 2004 and Ethiopia in 2005, with important 
delays in the communication and announcement of election results and where the public was 
not able to access the vote count data (IDEA, 2014). A similar situation occurred in Kenya 
during the December 2007 presidential elections, where the ECK delayed announcing the 
results by two days, which lead to protests by the opposition and post-election violence 
(Global Commission, 2012).  
Several factors contribute to having good election results and thus a credible election. From 
the guidelines and cases above we can see that the public has to have effective access to 
information and that this information must be widely available and published in a timely 
fashion. More specifically, from the counting and tabulation of votes at polling stations and/or 
central offices to the official release of results, all citizens as well as candidates, political 
parties, authorities and the media must have constant access to the information offered by the 
progressive vote count and to the preliminary and final results. Moreover, this information 
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must be clear and simple, with disaggregated information down to the polling station level, 
easy to understand and use and verifiable in an independent manner by third parties, be it 
observers, political parties or independent audit agencies.  
At the core of these factors there is something that is very important for having an election 
with credibility: transparency.  Transparency has been embraced recently by a number of 
national and international organisations in their effort to improve governance and public 
service delivery.  Access to information and disclosure have now been recognised as key 
elements so that governments and public institutions can improve their performance and 
become accountable to the public (UNDP, 2010; Open Government, 2015). Transparency has 
also become an important standard in election administration. It has been recognised as “a 
basic good practice for all EMB activities” (IDEA, 2014: 23) and is one of the key elements 
that “ensures the proper administration of the election process” (Venice Commission, 2002: 
26). Transparency can help identify irregularities in EMB processes, misconduct from EMB 
officials and fraudulent practices. At the same time, it can protect the EMB, its staff and its 
activities from unfounded allegations and perceptions of fraud. As a result, transparency can 
improve citizens’ perceptions of the integrity of the electoral process.  When elections are 
open and inclusive and when information is made public in a timely fashion, confidence 
follows.  Support for elections and election institutions increases when electoral rolls can be 
accessed by the public and political parties, when procedures for candidate registration are 
clear and when campaign finances are audited. On the other hand, suspicion and doubts 
increase when information is delayed or obstructed, when procedures are not verifiable and 
when people are kept in the dark about EMB decisions. The effects of transparency in the 
realm of election results are similar. When results are transmitted in a timely fashion and 
these are widely available, easy to understand and accurate, speculation is prevented and 
parties and citizens are persuaded to accept election results. This way transparency can 
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“clarify the political scene, foster the acceptance of results and leaves little room for 
uncertainty and rumours” (Lopez Pintor, 2000: 81) 
In this research, I study the relationship between election results and election credibility. In 
particular, I analyse the role of transparency of the results in preventing post-election protests. 
This is explored through a comparison of the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections in Mexico. 
Through a paired comparison of these similar systems I attempt to show how the differences 
in the degree of transparency in several activities of the election results stage affected the 
level of post-election protests. The transparency in election results is assessed using 
Michener and Bersch’s (2013) minimal definition, which considers that transparency must 
have two essential conditions: visibility and inferability. I argue that transparency in results can 
contribute to improving perceptions of the integrity of the election and increase the cost for 
actors wanting to reject election results. With transparent results (when results are transmitted 
in a timely fashion, and information is complete, simple, widely available and verifiable) 
speculation and rumour are substituted by clarity and conviction. Uncertainty dissipates and 
this can contribute to prevent or mitigate post-election conflict. 
2.6 The aim of the thesis 
Elections are big complex operations involving thousands of different activities and people. 
Therefore it is quite common that they experience problems from their inception to the 
announcement of the official results. Even long established democracies are vulnerable to 
irregularities and malpractices. As a result, it is fairly common that election results are 
challenged. In turn, these challenges can catalyse into protests which are not always 
peaceful. An antidote for this and for increasing confidence in electoral processes is 
strengthening their integrity. Although electoral integrity involves many different processes 
and activities, this thesis focuses mainly on three key aspects: election administration, the 
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role played by EMBs and the election results stage. These have been identified as areas 
that group possible acts of violence in an election and therefore require a more careful 
attention. First, a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) will assess if these and other 
conditions have an impact on the acceptance of election results. Second, the quantitative 
analysis will drill down and focus on the role played by EMBs, showing the importance of 
including political parties in these bodies. Third, a Small-N paired comparison will highlight 
the important role of transparent election results. With these lessons, EMBs and other key 
election stakeholders will be better prepared to meet election related challenges and 
organise and deliver better elections. The ultimate goal of this research then is that these 
findings are incorporated into policy for strengthening the integrity and credibility of 
elections, and with this, contribute to democratization and the legitimacy and stability that a 
country needs to pursue its development.  
3. CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 The emerging scholarship on election administration 
Democracy, as a widespread political model, is a very recent phenomenon. According to 
Freedom House, in 1974 only 39 of the countries in the world (27 per cent of a total of 150) 
could be considered as having regimes where citizens could elect their governments 
democratically (Diamond, 2000:1). In contrast, by 2016 125 countries (64 per cent of a total 
of 195) were considered electoral democracies (Freedom House, 2016:9). Consequently, 
elections are a fairly new topic of analysis. Before the third wave of democracy most 
countries in the world did not hold free and fair elections and certainly did not have election 
commissions or similar institutions in charge of organising national elections. Moreover, 
even in long established democracies, the field of elections has been quite recent. In the 
United Kingdom it was not until the year 2000 that the Political Parties, Elections and 
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Referendums Act setting out the creation of an Independent Electoral Commission was 
passed. In turn, in the United States, this topic arguably only gained significant attention 
after the 2000 presidential election, which represented a “wake-up call to elected leaders, 
public officials and election scholars” (Atkeson and Saunders, 2007:655). However, and in 
spite of this increased attention, the US still does not have a commission in charge of 
organising elections around the country. The Federal Election Commission is only 
responsible for administering and enforcing the statute that governs the financing of federal 
elections (Federal Election Commission, 2017).   
As a result, the study of elections has only recently been incorporated as part of a 
comparative politics research programme. It was as late as 1999 when Robert A. Pastor 
proposed a research and policy agenda on the role of the administration of elections in 
explaining the success and failure of democratic transitions. Then, in 2000, Rafael Lopez-
Pintor suggested undertaking future research on the impact of Electoral Management 
Bodies (EMBs) on different governance areas, including election quality and trust. Finally, 
many others (Elklit and Reynolds, 2002; Mozzafar, 2002; Lehoucq, 2002; Birch, 2007 & 
2008) have proposed endeavours on the effect of election systems and administration on 
the legitimacy of new and established democracies. More recently, the “electoral integrity” 
agenda (Norris, 2013) has focused on when elections meet international standards and 
global norms and when they fail to do so and what can be done to mitigate these problems 
(Norris, 2013). 
3.2 Fields in the study of electoral integrity 
Several strands of research contribute to the electoral integrity agenda, derived from two 
key intellectual traditions which are especially relevant for this study. These are the micro 
level study of public opinion and political behaviour and the macro level study of systems 
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and institutions. The former focuses on people’s political and electoral behaviour. It studies 
the micro-level where a number of factors such as context, institutions, experiences and 
individual characteristics -including socialised norms and values- are expected to shape 
citizens perceptions and attitudes towards political and electoral institutions. On the other 
hand, the latter address the macro-level of electoral systems and institutions. This includes 
studying the effect of diverse election components ranging from proportional representation 
systems, to campaign funding to types of EMBs and the use of election related 
technologies 
These two areas contribute to understanding which factors contribute to the integrity and 
credibility of electoral processes. However, in spite of their contribution to the field, they do 
not address the main research question and do not analyse the conditions identified as key 
elements for the acceptance of an election and its outcome. First, this is not a study on 
public opinion. Therefore, I do not attempt to analyse how perceptions are shaped or to 
uncover which factors influence individual perceptions and attitudes. This type of research 
is useful for understanding aspects such as levels of satisfaction with democracy, patterns 
in electoral participation in different age and gender groups and likelihood of voting given 
certain personal experiences and values. The growing research on ‘loser’s consent’ is a 
good example of the value of this research strand. Second, instead of trying to explain 
electoral behaviour, this research is interested in how certain institutions contribute to the 
credibility and acceptance of an election. Therefore, the macro-level study of comparative 
systems and institutions –where the level of analysis goes above the individual - is 
especially relevant. However, as this chapter will show, this research has so far not 
systematically analysed the impact of the main factors analysed in this dissertation (political 
support to election bodies and transparency of election results).  
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3.2.1 Micro-level: Shaping citizens’ perceptions. 
A first group of scholars focuses on citizen’s perceptions and attitudes and how these are 
important for the legitimacy of the political system and its institutions (Nadeau and Blais, 
1993; Anderson et al., 2005; Estrada and Poire, 2007; Ugues, 2010; Kerr, 2013; Wolak, 
2014). In particular, this approach is centred on citizens’ views and how these are shaped 
by individual, institutional and contextual factors. Therefore these factors range from 
personal determinants including education, ideology and partisanship to how experiences 
such as winning or losing an election and different institutions can shape people’s beliefs. 
In this view, voters’ perceptual lenses are what matters for election credibility. This 
research strand is useful for understanding public opinion and how it is shaped. This, in 
turn, is also important for understanding some of the drivers of support to the legitimacy of 
the political system and its institutions.  
3.2.1.1 Individual, institutional and contextual factors and political support 
A number of individual and contextual factors can shape citizens perceptions and support 
for the political system and its institutions, ranging from personal characteristics (such as 
partisanship, ideology), to the country’s political context. 
Estrada and Poire (2007) for example examine the closely fought and highly challenged 
2006 presidential election in Mexico. Studying the determinants of voting behaviour and 
trust in elections they conclude that certain individual and political characteristics maximise 
citizens’ potential for protest. These determinants are low levels of education, high levels of 
partisanship, extreme ideological views, specific socio-demographic characteristics and 
support for a specific candidate.  For this same election, Antonio Ugues (2010) focuses on 
the determinants of public opinion on Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), the main 
body in charge of organising elections in the country. As Ugues points out, citizens’ 
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attitudes on electoral governance institutions matter for the acceptance of the process and 
for the legitimacy of the regime (Ugues, 2010). The study reaches several conclusions. 
First, it confirms the existence of a winner/loser gap where citizens who identify with the 
winning candidate have more positive evaluations of Mexico’s electoral institution. Then, 
and most importantly, Ugues finds that citizens' trust in IFE is shaped by their partisan 
identities (i.e. citizens who identified with the winning party –PAN- are more likely to believe 
IFE), their opinions of the two main candidates (i.e. citizens with a positive opinion of AMLO 
are more likely to doubt IFE) and their views on democracy (i.e. respondents who believe 
Mexico is a democracy have greater trust in the reliability of IFE).  
Institutions can also shape citizens’ attitudes and perceptions. Kerr (2013), for instance, 
studies the role of institutions in determining citizens’ confidence in elections. He suggests 
that performance evaluation of election and election-related institutions have a strong effect 
on citizens’ election quality perceptions. These institutions not only include the EMB but 
also the police, the military, the judiciary and anti-corruption agencies. Regarding EMB 
performance, the study examines citizens’ evaluations of two dimensions: capacity and 
autonomy. Capacity refers to the effectiveness and efficiency of an institution while 
autonomy is the ability to make independent decisions without being controlled by third 
parties, including the government. Testing these for the 2007 Nigerian election, he finds 
evidence that the performance of the military, the anti-corruption agency and, especially, 
the election commission is associated positively with citizen’s perceptions of election quality 
(Kerr, 2013). As for the two dimensions of EMB performance, research shows that 
evaluations of autonomy (in this case of Nigeria’s Independent National Election 
Commission –INEC), have a stronger effect than evaluations of capacity on perceptions of 
election quality. 
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Finally, other scholars look at how specific experiences determine citizens evaluations of 
their institutions and processes.  Wolak (2014), for instance, focuses on the effect of 
campaign experiences on citizens’ evaluations of the fairness of the election. Campaign 
experiences vary depending on the different levels of engagement of the people as well as 
the places and situations they are exposed to. In the US context, it is not the same to live in 
a battleground state than to live somewhere less. Furthermore, while some people might be 
very involved in the campaign, as activists, for example, others can be less attentive and 
might not even vote. From this, Wolak argues that experiencing a competitive campaign will 
contribute to perceiving an election as fair. This is as competitive campaigns signal citizens 
that there are real decisions to make, give greater opportunities for political voice, and allow 
learning about the views of others (Wolak, 2014: 207). Using data from the 1996, 2000 and 
2004 US National Election Studies, results showed that the electoral fairness evaluations of 
winners and losers are moderated by experiencing a competitive campaign. 
3.2.1.2 Losers consent and political support 
One of the main focuses of this research strand is the study of the winner/loser gap and the 
importance of ‘losers’ consent’ for the legitimacy of political systems and institutions. 
According to this view, winning and losing in an election are very different experiences 
which shape people’s beliefs about the election and the political system. While winners are 
naturally satisfied with the process and the outcome by which their candidate or political 
party was elected, these feelings are not so clear for losers. Winning and losing have 
different short and long-term consequences. Being on the winning side in an election in its 
immediate aftermath is equated to joy and happiness. Then, voting for the winning 
candidate can lead to satisfaction with the electoral process that helped to produce that 
outcome. Finally, and with some nuances depending on the type of political system, the 
winners’ views and needs will be included and reflected in the policies and discourse of the 
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new government. On the other hand, losing can bring about instant sadness, 
disappointment with the process and exclusion from government policies for the next few 
(and in some cases, many) years. In the words of Nadeau and Blais, “losers’ support is less 
obvious (and) requires the recognition of the legitimacy of a procedure that has produced 
an outcome deemed to be undesirable” (Nadeau and Blais, 1993: 553). Losers’ consent is 
very important for the maintenance and survival of the system. It is in the hands of losers to 
accept the outcome and to decide if they want to play the game next time (Anderson, et al. 
2005). If they do not, the stability of the political system could be at risk. This is especially 
true as losers are often more numerous than winners8.  
Therefore, it is very important to understand how and why losers decide to accept defeat 
and support the decision of the election and the system in general.  In one of the first 
studies on the topic, Nadeau and Blais (1993) decided to study the role of participation in 
losers’ consent. For this, they studied the 1988 Canadian general election, where the 
Conservative Party won the election by obtaining only 43 per cent of the total votes and 
where the issue of signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States seriously 
divided public opinion. This complicated election was chosen for study as in it losers were a 
majority and as, according to the authors, consent is harder to obtain in the face of an 
intense campaign.  Electoral participation is expected to enhance consent as it has been 
demonstrated to have a legitimising function. In particular, it contributes to the sense that 
authorities are responsive to citizens, even when these are temporarily dissatisfied with the 
government in turn or its policies (Nadeau and Blais, 1993). In this study, consent to the 
                                                          
8 Anderson et al. point out that, for example, of all governments formed in the 21 most stable 
contemporary democracies between 1950 and 1995, only 43.8 per cent were actually voted for by a 
popular majority, the rest were elected by pluralities. This number increases when only taking the 
percentage of eligible voters instead of the percentage of votes cast. (Anderson, et al, 2005: 8) 
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outcome is identified when citizens recognise the fact that the winning party has the right to 
proceed with the trade agreement with the US. Findings suggest that the overall level of 
consent to the election was quite high, with 76 per cent of respondents agreeing with the 
mandate of the Conservative Party. However, as expected, there were big differences 
between winners and losers, with the consent of the former reaching 93 per cent and only 
58 per cent among the latter. The findings indicated that although the most powerful source 
of consent is in fact winning the election, electoral participation – measured by voter turnout 
- can enhance the consent among losers. 
In a later work Anderson et al. (2005) analysed the ‘losers’ consent’ phenomenon in greater 
detail and explored the individual and contextual factors that shape it. A main argument is 
that the winning-losing distinction has serious implications for the stability of the political 
system. It is the attitudes and behaviours of losers which will determine if defeat is 
conceded peacefully and gracefully or if it will not be admitted at all. Winning and losing 
shape people’s beliefs and actions but these can also be modified by other factors. In this 
study, the authors focus on individual-level attitudes, types of institutions and context that 
may shape the negative effect of being a loser in an election.  
First, individual level differences matter for how citizens view the system. “Not all losers are 
created equal” (Anderson et al., 2005: 73) and their personal political characteristics can 
influence the effect of winning and losing. In particular, the study evaluates the effect of 
partisanship and ideology, as they are “lenses through which individuals interpret the 
political world around them”. Results indicate that both ‘lenses’ act as amplifiers of the 
winner-loser effect. Second, winning and losing is also shaped depending on a country’s 
political context. Losers are not the same in established democracies than in new 
democratic regimes. By examining losers’ consent in these different contexts, the authors 
find that although losing has a negative effect across all systems, its effect is larger in new 
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democracies and transitional regimes. This is as in these countries losers have not played 
the democratic game for a long time and therefore have not yet learned to lose. Third, 
political institutions also have an impact on citizen attitudes and behaviours. Different 
institutions can shape how much people lose and therefore can influence losers’ 
perceptions. Findings show that institutions that limit the negative consequences of losing 
(such as being excluded from power and from policy making) relieve its negative effects. 
Consequently, electoral systems that are more proportional, political systems where power 
is shared and arrangements such as federalism can make losers lose less and help them 
be less negative towards the system. At the end, what matters is that losers continue 
playing the game.  
This strand of literature is good at identifying and analysing all the individual, institutional 
and contextual factors that shape perceptions of elections and the political system. 
Because of this research we now know that certain experiences, characteristics and traits 
contribute to a positive perception of electoral processes and institutions. And taking into 
account the opinions of citizens is very important. Citizens’ attitudes towards electoral 
institutions and political systems matter for the acceptance of the process and can “provide 
us with a sense of the level of legitimacy of a democratic regime” (Ugues, 2010: 496). 
However, this research is not interested in studying public opinion. Citizens’ views are only 
one side behind the acceptance of election results. And although this literature has made a 
great contribution in this respect, it does not address our research questions and aims. 
Instead of focusing on the individual level, this dissertation focuses on certain institutions 
which contribute to the acceptance and credibility of an election 
3.2.2 Macro-level: Systems, institutions and procedures. 
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A second school has focused on the macro-level factors that contribute to electoral 
integrity. This school has helped to understand which types of electoral systems, 
institutions and procedures are associated with the credibility of elections. However, 
research on comparative institutions does not analyse the conditions we have highlighted 
and identified as key for the acceptance of election results.  First, this is because this 
research strand has focused on the importance of election quality from a general 
perspective, without taking into account the role of individual election components. Second, 
when focusing on specific systems, institutions and procedures this research strand has not 
yet systematically analysed the role played by the support of political parties for electoral 
institutions and the provision of transparent results in the acceptance of results.  
3.2.2.1 Overall Election Quality 
A first group of studies has focused on the important topic of election quality. Scholars and 
practitioners agree that the quality of an election contributes to its credibility and 
acceptance by political parties and citizens. In one of the first works on the subject, Robert 
Pastor (1999) identified electoral administration as one of the key variables that have been 
missing in explaining the causes and consequences of democracy. Until then explanations 
had focused on variables such as the level of economic development (Lipset, 1963) or the 
type of civic-political culture (Tocqueville, 1838 and Weber, 2001), amongst others. The 
focus was broader and it was assumed that in democratic countries with high levels of 
economic development elections were not an issue. However, since Pastor, and for 
scholars after him, the ‘administration’ aspect of elections came to play a central role in the 
development and consolidation of democracy.  
Elklit (1999), for example, argues that the quality of elections is a positive step for the 
democratization process. This is as a “fully legitimate electoral regime – which might later 
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develop into a more complete (…) liberal democracy – requires an electoral process 
acceptable to all major stakeholders” (Elklit, 1999:31). Moreover, Elklit and Reynolds 
(2002) show that in new democracies, a high perceived legitimacy of the electoral process 
has a positive impact on the legitimacy of its outcome and thereby also on supporting the 
process of democratic transition and consolidation. To complete this view, Mozzafar and 
Schedler (2002) point out that effective electoral governance is necessary for having 
credible and legitimate democratic elections. 
What do we mean by election quality? Does this concept relate to the ‘administration’ 
aspect of elections, or is it a broader concept, encompassing activities beyond the 
technical? Does it exclusively relate to the electoral process or does it also involve aspects 
taking place before the process starts and much after election day?  Does it revolve around 
elections or does it also consider a broader set of political institutions working and 
interacting to secure sustainable processes and outcomes?  
In fact, there no single definition of ‘election quality’ or even consensus around the concept.  
For example, Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) use the concept of ‘electoral governance’ to 
explain the “set of activities that creates and maintains the broad institutional framework in 
which voting and electoral competition take place” (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002:7). In turn, 
Elklit and Reynolds consider ‘election quality’ from a different perspective, “as the degree to 
which political actors at all levels and from different political strands see the electoral 
process as legitimate and binding” (Elklit and Reynolds, 2005:189). Finally, others 
conceptualise ‘electoral integrity’ as “agreed-upon international conventions and global 
norms that apply universally to all countries worldwide and cover each stage of the election 
cycle - the pre-election period, the campaign, election day itself and the post-election 
period” (Norris, Frank and Coma, 2013:128). In fact, Carolien van Ham (2014) identifies 
more than twenty different conceptualisations (from 1978 to 2013) of what she labels as 
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‘election integrity’. This is as definitions of ‘electoral integrity’ can differ in three aspects: 
whether the concept is defined positively or negatively; whether it is defined according to 
universal standards or particular conditions; and whether it is taken as a concept or as a 
process (van Ham, 2014).   
Resulting from the lack of a single, unified concept, there is also an extensive debate about 
how to measure the concept (Kelley and Kolev, 2010) and therefore many ways to do so. In 
short, the plurality of conceptualisations has led to a plurality of assessments of election 
quality. This is true even if we only focus on scholars who share the same 
conceptualisation and see election quality from a positive and process-based perspective. 
Amongst these, there are those who simply provide a description of the different 
components of the electoral process (Mozzafar and Schedler, 2002) and those who 
establish more formal methods for evaluating its quality (Elklit and Reynolds, 2005; Kelley 
and Kolev, 2010; Bland, Green and Moore, 2013; Norris, Frank and Coma, 2013). All of 
them use different data and measures.  
First, there are differences in the number and type of components of election quality. 
Mozzafar and Schedler (2002) indicate that electoral governance involves three different 
levels: rule making, or the design of the basic rules of the electoral game; rule application, 
or the implementation of those rules in the organization of the election; and rule 
adjudication, or the certification of results and the resolution of disputes. These levels are 
made up of 23 different elements, which one must consider when assessing an election. In 
turn, Elklit and Reynolds (2005) suggest a more empirical approach and propose an 
analytical framework for measuring the quality of elections. This framework is constituted 
by eleven steps that range from the legal framework of the election to post-election 
procedures. Each step includes from three to ten questions, which add to a total of 54 
questions that work as indicators. The main difference between these works lies not only 
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on the evident fact that the first approach considers 23 elements and the second 54, but 
also on their content. These two studies consist of different concepts and understandings 
that reflect the authors’ opinion as to which elements are more salient in determining 
election quality. For example, while aspects such as the electoral formula, the assembly 
size and the franchise are part of Mozaffar and Schedler’s basic rules of the game, these 
are not considered by Elklit and Reynolds. Moreover, we deal with two very different 
approaches on the topic. While Mozaffar and Schedler set out a list of the elements to 
consider when assessing election quality, Elklit and Reynolds include performance 
indicators and include more subjective aspects related to perception and to meeting certain 
democratic values. 
Second, frameworks also differ in their scope and measurements (such as employing 
different evaluation indicators, scores and sources of information, amongst others). Bland, 
Green and Moore (2013), for instance, develop an Election Administration Systems Index 
(EASI) with three electoral dimensions (participation, competition and integrity) and three 
temporal dimensions (related to the phases of the electoral cycle). This three by three 
matrix includes 48 questions which are answered by national and international experts 
(scholars, election and international organisation officials) which come up with six scores, 
one for each dimension. These are not combined into a single country score. In the pilot 
study of this method, each country gets a score for each dimension (e.g. Nigeria gets a 
0.43 pre-voting score and a 0.65 competition score). Norris, Frank and Coma (2013) 
develop a Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index that relies on 11 dimensions of the 
electoral cycle and 49 items. This index standardises answers by experts (in this case, 
domestic and international experts on the politics and elections of a country) and gives a 1 
to 100 general average or score of electoral integrity for each country (e.g. In the latest 
report, Ukraine gets a score of 51 and the United States gets 62 (PEI, 2016). Kelley and 
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Kolev (2010) introduce the Quality of Elections Dataset (QED) based on annual US State 
Department Reports on Human Rights Practices. It includes measures on election quality 
as well as on other election aspects (such as details on the type of election) and political 
system characteristics (freedom of association and freedom of speech, for example). 
Regarding election quality, the dataset includes variables based on overall assessments 
and categories of irregularities in an election. In this study, a country gets a 1 to 3 score for 
‘overall election quality’ (Where 0: acceptable; 1: ambiguous; and 2: unacceptable).  
This plurality of definitions and frameworks for the evaluation of election quality poses a 
challenge to the study of electoral credibility. As we can see all of these indices measure 
‘election quality’ in general and none focus on its specific components. An overall 
assessment of election quality or electoral governance can be useful for some types of 
research, such as evaluating the integrity of a specific election or comparing a group of 
elections. For this, for instance, the EASI and the PEI Index might be useful. Then, 
depending on the aspect or aspects we are interested in we can go for one or the other. 
The EASI, for instance, might be better for analysing the degree of competition before an 
election (e.g. financing and media rules), while the PEI would prove more useful for 
measuring and comparing the performance and impartiality of the electoral authority. On 
the other hand, the QED data set - which covers elections from 1975 to 2004 - is a better 
tool to analyse a larger sample of elections and comparing across time (The PEI for 
instance only covers elections from 2012 to date).  
In fact, a key problem with existing frameworks is that most of them take a ‘check-list’ 
approach and only provide, if anything, a very brief description of their constitutive 
elements. So far, only Elklit and Reynolds (2005) take into account the relative importance 
of their eleven election components and categorise them as ‘essential’, ‘important’ and 
‘desirable’ according to their ‘rule of thumb’ question: “if this element fails, will that cause 
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the catastrophic breakdown of the electoral process?” (Elklit and Reynolds, 2005:198). 
Then, they give the components a different weight for established and fledgling 
democracies. Therefore, what might be ‘essential’ for a new democracy might not be as 
necessary for an older and well-established polity. For scoring, the value of a component is 
multiplied by three if considered ‘essential’, two if ‘important’ and one if ‘desirable’. The 
scores are standardised and a 0-100 performance indicator score is produced. Then, this 
score is allocated to specific country elections (i.e. through their methodology the 2011 
Denmark election obtains a score of 93, while the 2002 election in Zimbabwe gets a 41).In 
spite of its positive contribution, this weighting system does not allow to individually analyse 
each of the components. This framework takes all of its eleven steps and arranges them 
according to their importance for each type of democracy. Consequently, once they are 
categorised, the components in each of the three groups weigh the same. In established 
democracies, for instance, ‘voter education’, ‘campaign regulation’ and ‘post-election 
procedures’ are all equally ‘desirable’ factors. Then, if we are interested in testing the 
impact of a specific election component (for instance, the election results stage) then this 
framework (along with other existing indices) is not appropriate.  
Therefore, while concepts and measurements of election quality can be useful for 
evaluating if an election meets international standards and how it compares to elections in 
other countries, this literature is not adequate for assessing the role played by specific 
components. First, not all the different definitions of election quality include the components 
we are interested in. Second, even if some indices do include our conditions of interest, 
they are loosely described and therefore it is not possible to analyse their individual impact. 
Third, and in relation to this, these indices have been produced for assessing the overall 
quality of an election and not the role of its specific components.  
3.2.2.2 Systems, Institutions and Procedures 
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A second group of macro-level studies has focused on how specific components can 
contribute to electoral integrity and credibility. This school has made important contributions 
to the field of elections analysis and has helped to understand which types of electoral 
systems, institutions and procedures are associated with the credibility of elections. 
However, this school has not focused on certain critical aspects (such as the support of 
political parties to electoral institutions, quality in election administration and the provision 
of transparent results) that can lead to the acceptance –or rejection – of election results. 
A first strand of this research has rightly noted that certain types of systems can influence 
the credibility of the electoral process. In one of the first works in this area, Molina and 
Hernandez (1998) developed a study on the credibility of elections in 8 countries in Latin 
America. They acknowledge that if elections are perceived as fraudulent by the citizenry – 
even if they are objectively clean - they can affect the stability of the political system. 
Therefore, they focused on analysing system factors linked to the level of trust of the 
population on the ‘honesty’ of an election (Molina and Hernandez, 1998:1).  In particular, 
the factors identified are the the degree of institutionalisation of the political party system 
(with institutionalised, non-institutionalised and transition hegemonic party systems) the 
effective number of political parties and the composition of the electoral management 
bodies. The authors suggest that having non-partisan electoral institutions and an 
institutionalised party system leads to higher levels of election credibility. The effect of the 
number of parties is not conclusive.  
More recently Sarah Birch (2007; 2008) has studied the relationship between electoral 
systems and confidence in electoral processes. In a first piece, Birch analysed the 
relationship between the type of electoral system and electoral integrity, with a focus on 
electoral malpractice. Birch argues that the type of electoral system (SMD, single-member 
district or PR, proportional representation) shapes incentives for conducting electoral 
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misconduct. She argues that whereas in SMD systems (where people vote directly for 
individuals) candidates stand to benefit more from manipulation, in PR systems (where 
people vote for party lists) political parties will protect their reputation to win an election and 
thus will try to prevent and sanction manipulation. Furthermore, she argues, manipulation is 
more efficient under SMD “because of the well-known tendency of SMD systems to 
magnify the success of large parties” (Birch, 2007: 1539). From a sample of 24 post-
communist countries, she finds that single-member electoral districts in plurality and 
majoritarian systems are more closely associated with election misconduct. Proportional 
representation systems are less likely to be the object of malfeasance. 
Birch builds on this in a more recent study (2008) where she explores the role of electoral 
systems that promote a ’level playing field’ in the perceptions of electoral fairness. The 
main hypothesis is that those institutional structures that promote and level the playing field 
enhance the confidence in electoral processes. Two such institutions are PR systems, 
which allocate seats according to parties’ proportion of the vote, and the public funding of 
political parties, which seeks to ensure that all participants have an equal chance to contest 
an election (Birch, 2008: 308). From a comparative analysis of 28 elections, she concludes 
that as they level the playing field during an election, both of these institutions contribute to 
a positive perception of the process. She also demonstrates that the formal independence 
of electoral management bodies is negatively associated to the confidence in the conduct 
of elections. 
Other scholars have focused on how different models of election systems influence the 
conduct of elections. In an early work on the subject Fabrice Lehoucq (2002) compares the 
classical model where elections are organised by the executive and certified by the 
legislature to the more recent approach where elections are organised by independent 
institutions (electoral tribunals and commissions). For Lehoucq, when two different groups 
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are in control of the executive and legislative branch, or “in a world without parties” 
(Lehoucq, 2002:31), the classical approach works at its best. Each branch of government 
acts independently of the other, there is mutual monitoring and elections are accepted. 
However, when political parties come into play the story is a bit different. This is as political 
parties always wish to maximise their power (Lehoucq, 2002: 32). Parties are naturally 
drawn to increasing their grip on power and will use state resources, undermine the 
opposition and commit electoral fraud in order to do so. Especially in presidential systems, 
they will seek to control both branches of government. When this happens and incumbents 
retain state power, the classical theory breaks down. Elections will not be fair and the 
opposition will be excluded, which can lead to protests, revolts or even insurgencies. 
However, this consequence of the classical approach can be averted when election 
governance is delegated to an autonomous third party – an election commission - that 
organises the election and settles electoral disputes. By presenting a number of historical 
examples from the US and Latin America, the author shows that this depoliticised model 
eliminates the conflict surrounding elections and generates consent around election 
outcomes, strengthening confidence in elections. 
Other studies focus on the influence of electoral institutions in having credible elections. For 
instance, Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo (2008) study the impact of electoral management 
bodies (EMBs) on the quality of elections in Latin America and seek to find out which type 
of EMB works best. As highlighted, “studies and comparative analyses (…) have pointed 
out to the centrality of professional, permanent and autonomous EMBs for the conduct of 
successful, credible elections” (Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo, 2008: 78). However, this 
argument has yet to be tested. Therefore, through a quantitative analysis of elections in 19 
Latin American countries, the authors measure the impact of the independence of EMBs in 
the probability of having an acceptable election (understood as a procedurally fair and 
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technically sound election). In particular, they analyse the degree of both partisan 
independence and formal-legal institutional independence in election institutions. The 
former relates to the partisanship of the EMB and its members (including single party 
dominated, mixed and independent EMBs) and the latter to the nature of the appointment 
process and of the tenures in office.  Results indicate that the type of electoral institution 
does impact the quality of elections, with independent, professional EMBs being “much 
more likely to oversee acceptable elections than one-party-dominant EMBs (and) close to 
being a sufficient condition for successful elections”  (Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo, 2008: 
89). In some cases, however, party-mixed agencies may also contribute to a trusted and 
successful result.  
Rosas (2010) expands on this research by analysing how different EMB types affect the 
levels of confidence in elections among citizens and the elite. Also by studying Latin 
America, the research explores whether autonomy in EMBs generates different perceptions 
in two distinct groups, citizens and political parties. In this case, EMB autonomy comprises 
both formal-professional and partisan autonomy. Professional autonomy refers to EMBs 
with independent experts, while partisan autonomy means that political parties are 
excluded from the selection and appointment of EMB members. The empirical analysis 
suggests that, in general, higher formal autonomy is positively associated with higher levels 
of trust in elections (Rosas, 2010). Then, findings point that while politically autonomous 
EMBs increase levels of confidence amongst political parties, this effect is “muted” in 
relation to citizen attitudes.  
Similarly, Barreda and Ruiz Rodriguez (2013) test the different factors that influence trust in 
electoral institutions. One of these factors has to do with their institutional design (other 
factors are categorised as the political-electoral context and the political culture). This 
includes variables on EMB specialisation and autonomy. Specialisation distinguishes 
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between electoral institutions which concentrate both administrative and judicial functions 
and those models where there are two different institutions for this (typically an electoral 
commission and an electoral court). Autonomy has two dimensions. The first refers to the 
autonomy from other state branches, where electoral institutions that can be challenged in 
their decisions against another body (such as the courts) are considered less autonomous. 
The second dimension is linked to partisanship, and is measured by the existence of a 
formal link between political parties and electoral commissioners or judges. All these 
variables are calculated for 18 Latin American democracies and are then evaluated through 
a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The QCA provides the different combinations of 
variables that lead to high and low levels of trust in EMBs. Results show that EMBs with 
high levels of trust share two characteristics: they are autonomous in so far as their 
decisions cannot be challenged against another institution (as it might give an impression 
of suspicion) and they operate in countries with high levels of institutional trust (understood 
as high confidence of citizens in key system institutions).  
A third strand of research has studied the effect of different election procedures on election 
confidence. Studies in this area have developed mainly in the US context, specifically ever 
since Bush v. Gore in 2000. After this contentious election, attention has focused on 
strengthening some of the processes, activities and technologies of elections, especially 
during election day. Alvarez and Hall (2008) point out that confidence in the electoral 
process is based on procedures that guarantee security and transparency. They propose 
the idea of a ‘chain of custody’ where, like in criminal and judicial procedures, electoral 
items are preserved and kept secure throughout the process. In particular, it is ballots that 
need to be kept secure, from their production to their transit to the local office to the 
certification of results. By giving testimony of every link and by setting up standard 
operating procedures (SOPs), the chain of custody is robust and everyone can have the 
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certainty “that the ballots cast are the official ballots and the count is correct” (Alvarez and 
Hall, 2008: 829), thus having confidence in the integrity of the voting process. Research by 
Classen et al (2013) focuses on the impact of voting technology on voter confidence. They 
study the variation in voting technology in two counties in Ohio (Summit County, which 
uses optical scan technology and Franklin County, which uses direct-recording electronic 
voting machines - DREs) and its direct and indirect effects on voters’ perception about 
having a fair election. They find that optical scan voters were more confident in having a fair 
election than DRE voters. Interestingly, however, they found that optical scan voting also 
has a negative indirect effect. Its users reported having worse voting experiences (e.g. 
more complicated method, longer queues, etc.) than DRE users. In another test, the 
authors highlight that those who reported having a pleasant experience on election day 
(shorter queues, positive encounters with poll workers, etc.) had more confidence in the 
voting process. The conclusion is that decisions about voting technology should not only 
focus on the equipment but on all of its possible consequences. Voting experience is also 
studied by Atkeson and Saunders (2007). By conducting a survey in two congressional 
districts in New Mexico and Colorado, they show that the “local factor” of direct voting 
experience influences voter confidence. Results show that citizens who enjoyed the voting 
method and found the ballot easy to understand and their poll workers helpful, are more 
confident that their vote is counted as intended. Similarly, Hall, Monson and Patterson 
(2009) examine the experience of voters with poll workers and how this affects their 
confidence. They conclude that poll workers, as street-level bureaucrats, affect the quality 
of the voting experience and voter confidence in the outcome. From four surveys in Utah 
and Ohio, they find that rating the job performance of a poll worker as excellent contributes 
to produce high levels of confidence. They also examine how this varies across 
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demographic groups but this type of analysis is only relevant for the next section of this 
chapter, which deals with individual aspects that affect voter confidence. 
This literature has made important contributions to the field of election credibility. Now we 
understand which systems, institutions and procedures can increase confidence in an 
election, and thus increase its chances of being accepted by citizens and political parties. 
First, at the system level, we now know that a highly institutionalised party system can lead 
to higher levels of election credibility. We also know that proportional representation 
systems are less likely than single member districts to provide incentives for manipulation. 
Second, we now have a better understanding of the role played by institutions. We know 
that institutions that contribute to having a level playing field, such as proportional 
representation and the public funding of political parties, increase citizens’ trust in the 
electoral process. In addition, we know that in a world where political parties exist, 
independent election commissions eliminate the conflict between executives and 
legislatures. Moreover, we now have clues on which types of election institutions work best 
and improve confidence. Finally, we have good empirical work – especially after the 2000 
presidential election in the US -  revealing that certain procedures (the chain of custody of 
election materials, voting technology and poll workers, amongst others) can influence the 
credibility of electoral processes.  
3.2.2.3 Research on political parties and election institutions and transparency in election 
results 
In spite of the wealth of research on the systems, institutions and procedures that affect the 
credibility of an election, there have been to date only very few studies on issues related to 
the relationship between political parties and election institutions and to the transparency in 
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election results. Moreover these studies have not focused directly on the issues this 
dissertation is interested in study.  
First, current research on political parties and electoral institutions has focused on a 
number of aspects that impact the credibility of Electoral Management Bodies and 
elections. Specifically, it has focused on different aspects of their institutional design such 
as their level of independence and autonomy (Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo, 2008; Barreda 
and Ruiz Rodriguez, 2013; Rosas, 2012). In general, results show that electoral 
commissions that are independent from other branches of government and are staffed by 
professional individuals are more trustworthy. Moreover, it has been also shown that, in 
some cases, partisan autonomy (a high level of autonomy occurs when political parties are 
not directly represented in the electoral institutions) may also contribute to having a higher 
confidence in elections (Rosas, 2012; Ugues, 2014; Tarouco, 2016). However, research 
has also shown some of the advantages of having political party representation in the 
election commission (Estevez, et. al, 2008). In fact – and as will be shown in detail in 
chapter 6- research has not shown any definitive and conclusive evidence on which of 
these two models is best for the credibility of elections. The question of party representation 
is still unanswered. Moreover, this existing research focuses on levels of independence but 
not on the benefits of including political parties in EMBs or in having a good relationship 
between parties and EMBs. 
Second the study of transparency in elections has been mostly contained in guidelines and 
handbooks. Moreover, research has only begun to study the impact of transparency in 
electoral processes from a more systematic approach and has been muted in the role it 
plays in the election results stage. A number of international norms, agreements and 
guidelines highlight the importance of transparency for the conduct of elections. In fact, 
International IDEA’s International Obligations for Elections provides a catalogue of all the 
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responsibilities that UN member states have ratified relevant to elections. Drawing upon 
treaties like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and mechanisms such as UN General Assembly resolutions, this 
volume emphasises the importance of transparency for holding genuine elections. In 
addition to international law, a number of guidelines such as International IDEA’s Handbook 
on Electoral Management Design and Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in 
Electoral Matters hold that transparency is a key guiding principle for elections and EMBs 
and that it should be present in the organisation of elections and in activities as diverse as 
campaign funding, electronic voting, judicial proceedings, vote counting and the 
transmission of results (Venice Commission, 2002; IDEA, 2006; 2014). 
Then, existing research has not looked at the election results stage. It has mostly focused 
on the role of election monitoring and at specific technical measures for increasing 
transparency. First, research has analysed the effect of election monitoring by different 
international and domestic organisations (Simpser and Donno, 2012; Hyde 2008; Hyde 
2010; Ichino and Shundeln, 2012; Kelley, 2012). These include the participation of 
international organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), non-governmental international organisations such as the Carter 
Center and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and a myriad of national and local civil 
society organisations. This group of studies has found that the transparency that comes 
with monitoring is helpful in reducing some types of fraud and irregularities that mostly 
occur during election day (Hyde, 2010; Simpser and Donno, 2012; Sjoberg, 2013). As an 
example, for the 2004 Indonesia presidential elections, Hyde (2010) conducted a 
randomized field experiment showing that the presence of election observers contributes to 
election quality by influencing election officials to follow regulations in regards to the 
duration of election day. Similarly, Ichino and Shundeln (2012), argue that the presence of 
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domestic observers in voter registration processes in Ghana displaced fraud. In addition, 
studies on the topic have looked at specific policies for increasing transparency in 
elections, including the drafting of standards for conducting election audits (Democracy 
International and International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2015), the use of 
crowdsourcing systems to verify the accuracy of election results (Arias, Garcia and 
Corpeño, 2015) and implementing fraud reducing technologies such as transparent ballot 
boxes (Sjoberg, 2013). In addition, literature has also compared EMB performance by 
looking at their degree of transparency and accountability (Garnett, 2015), amongst others. 
3.3 Micro and macro limitations  
3.3.1 The gap in the scholarship 
However, there is still much to be done. The literature so far has only provided a partial 
answer to the question “When, where and under what conditions are electoral results 
accepted”?  Research is still incomplete. First, this is as within the field of elections, the 
study of electoral governance and election credibility is just emerging. Second, and related 
to this, there are certain factors which have not yet been sufficiently explored and analysed 
and which are critical for this study.  
A first group of scholars has focused on the micro-level of citizen’s perceptions. It has 
identified how different values, ideology, education and experiences shape views and 
attitudes. These studies have been useful for understanding how different groups in a 
society view their institutions and their level of support for them. This, however, is not a 
study of public opinion. It goes beyond the individual level and focuses on certain 
institutions that can contribute to the acceptance and credibility of an election. A second 
group of scholars –centred on the macro-level study of systems and institutions - has tried 
to find answers to this. However, it has not yet addressed our key factors of interest. A first 
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strand of this research has analysed elections and their quality but has done so from an 
overall perspective. Different frameworks and indices help us compare the quality of 
elections in the world and across time, but unfortunately this does not allow for the study 
and analysis of individual components, such as the election results stage. Then, a second 
strand of this research has indeed focused on specific aspects of an election and how 
these can contribute to election quality and credibility. These aspects range from 
proportional representation systems to solid chains of custody and the use of optical scan 
machines for voting. However, this rich and emerging scholarship has not yet studied the 
role played by the two conditions identified by this study as key for the acceptance of 
election results: political party support for electoral institutions and transparency in election 
results. Moreover, research on these main two conditions is still incomplete. Research on 
political parties and electoral institutions has mostly focused on issues of EMB 
independence –with inconclusive evidence - and has not focused on the issue of party 
support. Then, work on transparency has mostly focused on its normative importance in 
elections in general. Moreover, research on the subject has mostly looked at the role of 
election monitoring or at certain specific measures for increasing transparency-such as see 
through ballot boxes-, without studying the role of transparency in the election results 
stage. 
3.4 An underlying assumption: strategic actors 
In short, this research is not interested in demonstrating how public opinion is shaped or 
which factors shape support to political institutions and processes. It is rather interested in 
certain institutions that contribute to the integrity of an election. Of course, these institutions 
do have an impact on individual perceptions and attitudes. For instance, clear, timely and 
accurate election results contribute to having a more positive image of the election. 
However, the aim of this dissertation is not analysing how institutions shape perceptions. 
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Rather, the goal is having strong institutions that bolster election credibility. With strong and 
credible institutions even political losers –as research shows, the least likely group to 
support an election and its outcome- will find it difficult to reject election results. 
This is supported by an underlying assumption. This research assumes that political actors 
play a very important role in determining whether an election outcome will be accepted or 
not.  First, this is because political parties are key stakeholders in the electoral process. 
Most, if not all of their activities are regulated by election laws and bodies, including their 
own survival. Election regulations determine the constituencies where parties campaign, 
their candidates’ finances and access to media and their possibilities of challenging an 
unfavorable result. Ultimately, election laws can influence their chances of winning and 
losing. Second, political parties play a key role in communicating with citizens and therefore 
can have a great deal of influence in public opinion and mobilizing the public (Dalton, 2006; 
Seltzer and Zhang, 2010; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014).  The importance of political actors is 
reflected in the core chapters of the thesis. In chapter 6 I focus on the support of political 
parties for electoral institutions. I base my analysis on the University of Salamanca’s 
Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) survey, which obtains information from 
politicians –specifically legislators-. Then, in chapter 7, I study the role of the election 
results stage in election credibility. And while the main focus is best practices for increasing 
transparency in the transmission and communication of results, I also show how this 
influences the behavior of political actors –in this case of the losing presidential candidate.  
The theoretical base for this assumption is rational choice theory. I assume political actors 
are rational and have specific goals that guide their activities. These goals can be modified 
by events that shape their attainment probability (Warwick, 1990). Actors consider risks and 
costs and ultimately, choose a course that maximizes their utility (Rogowski, 1974; Mongin, 
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1997). And, as outlined by Rogowski (1974), this also includes political decisions about 
support for the government. 
In rational choice theory, politicians seek decisions that provide them and their parties with 
the greatest expected benefit, and this can sometimes mean challenging an election and its 
results. Malpractice is not the only reason why candidates and parties reject elections. The 
rejection of election outcomes can be rational and in fact part of a wider political agenda. 
First, as Hernandez-Huerta (2015) argues, challenging electoral outcomes can be a 
negotiation strategy. In his view, in presidential democracies losers do not necessarily 
dispute results to protest or challenge fraud but to have a better position to negotiate 
political spoils and other benefits with the new government. Second, calling fraud can be 
used to contest broader problems rather than to address election related issues 
(Eisenstadt, 2004).  
Election results can be challenged because of actor’s strategic considerations, and not 
necessarily because of fraud. And a way to prevent or mitigate this is by having institutions 
and procedures that work properly and beyond any doubt. Good election institutions not 
only ensure free and fair elections, but also increase the cost of rejecting results. In short, 
strong institutions mean that actors get less ammunition for their strategic moves. An 
example of this is having transparent election results. When results are complete, timely 
and verifiable, they can create an atmosphere of certainty and can remove any suspicion, 
especially when results are really close. When citizens and political parties can access the 
results, and these are accurate and clear, they can know for themselves that elections were 
genuine (Global Commission, 2012). On the other hand, when election results are not 
transparent, doubts and confusion increase. In this context, delayed, complex or missing 
results can easily be used as part of a political strategy. Having an EMB which is supported 
by political parties is equally important. If political parties do not have a good relationship 
74 
 
 
 
with the EMB they will not support its policies and activities. Moreover, when parties are 
involved in EMBs they have a say in its decisions and it is likely they will see EMB 
decisions as their own, therefore increasing the chances of the election and its results 
being accepted.  
The following chapters will provide a more detailed account of each of these factors in the 
acceptance of election results. Chapter five will address the role of all these conditions by 
answering the question “when, where and under what conditions election results are 
accepted?”. Chapter six will then focus on relationship between political parties and EMBs 
and its effect on the confidence in electoral processes. Chapter seven will then focus on the 
role of transparency in election results in post-election protests. Chapter eight will combine 
the findings from the three core empirical chapters and draw lessons for legislators, policy 
makers and election officials for strengthening the integrity of elections. But first, chapter 
four will outline the methodology employed in each of the three main research phases of 
this thesis. 
4. CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Three research phases and three methodologies 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the theory and practice of electoral integrity. For 
contributing towards this, this dissertation seeks to address two main themes: i) when, 
where and under what conditions are election results accepted? And, derived from this: 
what can we do to increase credibility in elections? To answer these questions, this 
research will involve three different research phases. The first phase will develop a 
multivalue Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA). Two QCA Models conduct a 
systematic analysis of key factors (democratic consolidation, political party support for 
electoral institutions, quality of elections and transparent election results) and allow us to 
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identify which configurations, or specific combinations of factors, lead to the acceptance of 
election results. More specifically, it will reveal which conditions are necessary and/or 
sufficient for accepting election results. Phase two consists of a regression analysis (binary 
logistic and multilevel regression) analysing the effect of political party support for Electoral 
Management Bodies –measured through their participation in the appointment of the EMB 
members -  on election credibility. Phase three is a small-N paired focused comparison 
which addresses the role played by transparency in the election results stage in mitigating 
post-election protests. The three methods will strengthen and complement one another. At 
the end, the objective behind this combination of methods is to enhance our insight on the 
acceptance of election results, on election credibility and on some of the key factors behind 
this. 
4.2 Inspired by mixed methodology      
Mixed methods research is a third methodological movement in the social and behavioural 
sciences that has enabled us to bridge the differences between the two main research 
paradigms (the positivist paradigm, underlying quantitative methods, and the constructivist 
paradigm, which underpins qualitative research), (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). The 
debate between these two approaches, historically focused on philosophical issues such as 
the nature of reality and establishing causality, has now given way to a more pragmatic 
approach that combines whatever methods are most appropriate for a study (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 1998). Nowadays, instead of using one single methodology, research can rely 
on a combination of methods to enhance our knowledge of a particular research problem. 
The present study is inspired by mixed methodology. Although the methods used do not 
study exactly the same data, they do complement each other. The idea behind this is to 
improve our understanding of why elections results are accepted and what makes elections 
credible by combining different methods. When findings from different methodological 
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approaches are broadly consistent they enhance the robustness of research claims. The 
dissertation opens with a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) which in itself is a quali-
quantitative method that provides the initial results. This first analysis is more general and 
covers five key conditions for the acceptance of results. Then the research integrates 
quantitative and qualitative methods to improve and strengthen our knowledge of the 
findings obtained by the QCA. The quantitative study focuses on one key condition across 
a number of Latin American cases and the qualitative research elaborates a paired 
comparison of two cases within a single country, Mexico. In short, the study first generates 
macro level information which is then refined by more specific studies using diverse 
techniques. 
As a result, this research design allows for a degree of triangulation, which is one of the key 
advantages of mixed methods research. As outlined by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) 
triangulation involves using different methods and data to study the same phenomena 
within the same study or in complementary studies. The term comes from navigation and 
implies using various references to pin point more exactly the position of an object (Smith, 
1975). Following this metaphor, triangulation can lead to having more robust, complete and 
valid results. First, combining methods allows complementing their strengths while 
overcoming their limitations. Second, multiple and independent measures, when their 
results are congruent, can give us a more robust and complete understanding of the 
phenomenon (Jick, 1979). Finally, “triangulation in action” (Jick, 1979) means cross 
checking and getting external validity for our findings.  
The study design only allows for a certain degree of triangulation as its component phases 
do not measure the exact same phenomenon. While the QCA section focuses on the 
acceptance of election results, the quantitative chapter addresses credibility in elections 
and the small-N analysis focuses on post-election protests. However, the three methods do 
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measure related phenomena. As a result, the findings of one chapter become more 
suggestive when seen in the light of the evidence produced by the other chapters. This 
combination of methods therefore can produce greater confidence in the results. This is 
especially true as both the quantitative and small-N chapters support the findings of the 
more general QCA chapter. 
4.3 Three research phases 
4.3.1 QCA: acceptance of election results 
The first substantive chapter (chapter 5) asks when, where and under which conditions 
election results are accepted. In particular, it first develops one mvQCA model focusing on 
48 presidential elections held in Latin America between 2000 and 2015 and looks at the 
five following conditions: consolidated democracy, the closeness of an election, the support 
offered by political parties to electoral institutions, quality in the development of an electoral 
process, and transparency in election results. Then, in order to provide evidence of how the 
findings can travel and be generalised to contexts beyond Latin America, it develops a 
second mvQCA model, which considers 21 close elections held around the world for the 
same time period of 2000 to 2015. 
QCA is a research method that occupies an intermediary position between small-N and 
large-N analysis (Halperin and Heath, 2012). On the one hand while variable-oriented or 
quantitative approaches are good for working with a large number of cases and producing 
generalisations, they do not pay special attention to individual cases or to more concrete 
questions relevant to the causes of specific phenomena (Ragin, 1987). On the other hand, 
while case-oriented or qualitative approaches do pay attention to the complexity of specific 
cases, they are not well suited for generalising findings (Ragin, 1987). QCA combines the 
strengths of these two approaches. From quantitative research, it allows to analyse a 
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greater number of cases and to produce generalizable results. QCA requires that each 
case be reduced to a series of variables which gives it an analytical character (Rihoux and 
Lobe, 2009: 224). Moreover, as in qualitative research, in QCA each individual case is 
significant and considered as a complex combination of properties which inform the 
hypotheses and theories (Berg-Schlosser, et al., 2009: 6). In sum, QCA comes out as a 
synthetic strategy (Ragin, 1987: 84) that borrows key strengths from both Large and Small-
N research methods allowing for a thick, analytical and replicable comparative technique.   
By formalising qualitative comparative methods, QCA conducts a systematic analysis of the 
cases. This means that we can compare across-cases and address their similarities and 
differences, even if the cases are only more than a handful. This allows to identify patterns 
and make more general statements about the cases and the relations between them. In 
order to do this, QCA breaks up cases into independent and dependent variables, much 
like in quantitative approaches. In particular, QCA transforms its cases into configurations, 
which represent specific combinations of factors, causal variables or conditions that 
produce an outcome of interest (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). As such, it shows how different 
configurations of conditions can lead to the same outcome. This is refered to as multiple 
conjunctural causation, where ‘multiple’ refers to the number of possible paths and 
‘conjunctural’ expresses that each path is made up of a combination of conditions (Berg-
Schlosser, et al, 2009). 
In order to do this, this is a set theoretical method based on the language of Boolean 
algebra, which gives it a more scientific character (Ragin, 1987:x; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). 
This language is used to describe logical relations between the cases and analyse formally 
which combination of factors can lead to the outcome of interest. Cases are evaluated in 
terms of their membership to sets (supersets and subsets) (Legewie, 2013). Then, Boolean 
minimisation reduces the complex system of relations between variables and the outcome 
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to a simpler formula by eliminating redundant terms (Thiem, 2014). This allows identifying 
which of the conditions are necessary or sufficient for the production of the outcome, and 
which are superfluous. A necessary condition is always present when the outcome is 
present, while a sufficient condition alone does not produce the outcome (Berg-Schlosser, 
et al, 2009). 
Conducting a QCA requires a good research design. The research needs to rigorously 
select the cases under study, followed by a clear identification, definition and measurement 
of the independent variables and the outcome that needs to be explained. First of all, as will 
be detailed on the chapter, for the selection of cases the QCA chapter focuses on Latin 
America. This is as countries in this region share a number of historical, political and even 
electoral characteristics that facilitate comparison. In particular, these countries have a 
shared colonial legacy and nowadays have presidential political systems with elections 
organised by independent and permanent electoral institutions. Second, the research 
needs to clearly identify the conditions that lead to the outcome. This has to be driven by 
theory and for the QCA analysis, previous research has highlighted the key role played by 
five variables in obtaining an accepted election (these are the type of regime, the closeness 
of the election, the support of political parties for electoral institutions, the quality of the 
elections and the transparency of results). Third, these conditions have to be clearly 
conceptualized and measured so that the analysis and its results are reliable.  
In relation to this last point, it is important to highlight that conceptualization has been 
identified as one of the three key challenges in the construction of datasets for the study of 
democracy (Munck, 2009). Conceptualization refers to the specification of the meaning of 
the concept and its constituent attributes. Besides properly identifying the concept to be 
measured, key tasks include avoiding including too many attributes/ attributes that 
correspond to other concepts or excluding items that are actually part of the meaning of the 
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concept. For instance, several democracy indices exclude one of the key attributes of 
democracy as highlighted by Dahl: “participation” (Munck, 2009). Once researchers have 
identified which attributes will be included as components of the concept to be measured, a 
second challenge is isolating the ‘leaves’ on the concept by level of abstraction (the 
concept’s concrete attributes). This is important for having proper measurements of the 
attributes and for avoiding problems of conflation and redundancy. Conflation occurs when 
components of attributes are not placed or categorised properly under the attribute they 
belong to. Then, attribute components at the same level should describe mutually exclusive 
aspects of the concept, otherwise the logical problem of redundancy arises (Munck, 
2009:22) 
The conceptualisation challenge and its specific tasks of clearly identifying attributes are 
aimed at the construction of indices measuring democracy. In particular, these are intended 
as a framework for having a more solid assessment of a concept (democracy) and its 
subcomponents (eg. Freedom of association, freedom of the press, right to vote, fair 
elections, etc). Present research does not involve the definition and measurement of a 
concept or its constituent components. Rather, as explained above, it is about identifying 
which conditions can play a role in the acceptance (or rejection) of election results. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the concerns outlined above –and the tasks to 
overcome them- should not be taken into account when building a solid data set. Therefore, 
it is important that the conditions/independent variables used in our study are properly 
identified and isolated.  In this research all five conditions are clearly defined –either as 
contextual variables or as distinct moments and aspects of the electoral cycle- and 
conceptually and empirically different from each other. Chapter five provides further details 
of the variables under study, their definitions and measurement. 
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Once the variables have been properly identified and conceptualised, data must be 
gathered for their measurement. For this research, data was collected on the acceptance of 
election results in each country and on the key independent variables under study. This 
qualitative data then needs to be transformed into categories and numbers for the analysis 
(Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Data on cases, variables and the outcome are included in a 
table. Cases become rows and columns represent the conditions that help explain the 
outcome and the outcome itself. This raw data table is then synthetized into a more 
analytical truth table or “table of configurations” (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009). The truth 
table groups cases into subsets that share the same conditions and outcome. This 
“minimization” helps us identify which configurations or paths lead to the desired outcome. 
This is done through specialist QCA software employing Boolean minimization algorithms 
(Rihoux and De Meur, 2009).  
Boolean minimization aims to produce a parsimonious expression that reveals which 
causal conditions produce the outcome. First, all configurations with a positive outcome are 
minimized by the software. Then, all configurations linked to a negative outcome are 
minimised. The results are formulas that give a path or a combination of conditions (which 
groups several cases) associated with the presence or absence of the outcome. However 
these formulae are still quite complex. They are labelled “descriptive” formulas as they do 
not go much beyond the observed cases (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009). For this reason, 
logical remainders are included in the minimisation process. These are logically potential 
cases which have not been observed empirically. By assuming that these remainders exist 
(simplifying assumption) the software is able to produce a more parsimonious formula. This 
formula tells us which combination of conditions lead to the desired outcome, in this case 
the acceptance of election results. 
4.3.1.1 QCA variants 
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There are four different configurational comparative methods. These are crisp-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA), fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA), multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) and generalized-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (gsQCA) (Thiem, 2014). ‘Crisp set’ is the first type of 
QCA to be developed and it is the most widely used. It was developed in the 1980s by 
Charles Ragin who adapted Boolean algorithms to his own research for simplifying 
complex data structures and identifying patterns of multiple causation (Rihoux, De Meur, 
2009:33).  This technique uses conventional Boolean sets which require that all the 
variables have only two possible values to identify the presence or absence of a given 
condition. Here, a set is comparable to a binary variable where cases are either non-
members or full members of a group, true or false, and therefore coded as ‘1’ or ‘0’ 
(Halperin and Heath, 2012; Rihoux, De Meur, 2009).  
Multi-value QCA (mvQCA) originates from csQCA and shares its basic principles and aims 
to explain an outcome by simplifying complex data. This method differs from csQCA as it 
moves beyond the use of dichotomies to have a more flexible structure for classifying or 
coding cases. Therefore, instead of taking two possible values (“0” or “1), variables can 
take multiple values (“0”, “1”, “2”, “3”, etc.). These multiple values can be useful, for 
example, for a more detailed coding of the data or to incorporate scale categories into the 
research.  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis can also be conducted by using fuzzy sets. Fuzzy set 
QCA (fsQCA) also seeks to unravel causality through set theoretic relationships but does 
so in a different way. FsQCA is based on a “diversity-oriented approach” where “diversity 
exists not only in the different configurations of set memberships that social phenomena 
exhibit but also in the degree to which they belong to such sets and configurations” (Ragin, 
2000: 149). This means that while crisp set and multi-value QCA allow cases to take one of 
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two values, or one out of three or four categories (dichotomies and multichotomies, 
respectively), in fsQCA cases can take an unlimited number of values and have partial 
membership in the different sets. This results in a possible number of infinite configurations, 
which, in contrast to other QCA variants, does not allow constructing truth tables (Tiem, 
2014). Membership scores are part of a scale that ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 (allowing to have 
values such as 0.25, 0.5, 0.9, etc.) and are useful for more fine grained data, such as the 
literacy rate or the GDP per capita in a country.   
Finally, there is a fourth type of QCA, denominated generalized-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (gsQCA).  Thiem (2014) argues that crisp, multi-value and fuzzy set 
QCA are in fact not so different and can be included as part of a broader type of QCA, 
gsQCA. For this, he advances the concept of multivalent fuzzy set variable, a variable 
which includes features of all existing QCA variable types. As a result, this type of variable 
helps solving the problem of inaccurately classifying cases that, for example, have partial 
membership in different sets. In addition, this more general type of variable allows the 
construction of truth tables that was not possible under standard fuzzy-sets. However, 
although GsQCA includes all three previously existing QCA methods, it must be noted that 
it can also be identified as a variant on its own, with its own technique and notation. 
4.3.1.2 QCA and the acceptance of election results 
QCA is selected as an appropriate methodology for understanding when, where and under 
what conditions are election results accepted. First, this technique is appropriate for 
methodological reasons. QCA is especially well suited for small and intermediate-N designs 
(Ragin, 1987; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009) with medium sized samples. The cases selected for 
this research are 48 elections in Latin America and then, for the second QCA model, 21 
elections around the world. This number is limited for using quantitative research methods, 
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which require a number of cases sufficiently large to enable robust inferences. At the same 
time, the number of cases in this research is quite large for conducting small-N analyses, 
which involve the comparison of few cases, typically two or four and not exceeding more 
than a dozen or so (Halperin and Heath, 2012).  Working with 48 or 21 cases would imply 
doing many paired comparisons which complicate making a systematic analysis.  
Small-N and large-N analysis offer some advantages but also present some shortcomings 
for answering our research question. On the one hand, small N studies allow for an in 
depth analysis of case studies and allow to understand the context of the cases selected, 
leaving out neither the particular nor the general (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Moreover, 
they are useful as a source of theory and for linking theories to evidence (Keman, 2011). 
However, this method has some weaknesses that limit its usefulness for our research. Most 
importantly, with small N studies the problem of selection bias is always a risk. As is well 
known in the political science discipline, the cases we choose affect the answers we get 
(Geddes, 1990) and this is more likely to occur when we analyse just a few cases. When 
cases are not selected carefully, results can be biased and misleading. In addition, this risk 
is always present and it is more difficult to arrive to more generalizable results from only a 
small number of cases. This is connected to the issue of weak external validity. While small 
N gives us a good understanding of the mechanisms at work in the cases under study 
(internal validity) we also lose the power to extend our findings to other cases not included 
in the research (external validity). On the other hand, large N studies do not focus on the 
details of individual cases but rather abstract from these particular instances to seek 
general description (King, et al, 1994). This is referred to as “thinness” (Coppedge, 2002). 
By employing statistical techniques, large N reduces concepts into variables and therefore 
we lose the thickness of the cases, or their complexity and context. Measurements and 
numbers replace in depth analysis. 
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As an intermediate method, QCA solves some of the issues related to these other research 
methods. Small-N and large-N are not suited for discovering the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the acceptance of election results. First of all, the focus of small-N on a few 
number of cases makes it hard to reach generalizable conclusions.  Using this technique 
would be useful if the aim of the chapter was to gain an in depth knowledge and compare 
the differences and similarities of a few cases. However, the aim is to know the conditions 
that contribute to the acceptance of election results. Given this scope, one could argue that 
a quantitative comparison would be appropriate. However, the chapter is also interested in 
understanding each case individually and especially in identifying and discovering the 
specific causal mechanisms that lead to the acceptance of the electoral outcome. The 
interest lies in knowing not only the associations or relationships between variables but how 
these operate in a given context.  
This is the core reason why QCA was selected as an appropriate method. In short, the 
interest of the research is to find out which configurations generate the outcome. In 
particular, I aim to discover the causal path or paths that lead to the acceptance of results 
(multiple conjunctural causation). I hypothesise that election results are accepted not only 
when we have good quality elections, but rather that other factors are at play. In other 
words, I look at the conjuncture or combination of conditions that can lead citizens and 
political parties to accept election results. This calls for a method that follows a set-theoretic 
logic and allows identifying all the causally relevant conditions that produce an outcome. In 
fact, the aim of the research is to demonstrate a set theoretic hypothesis: that quality in the 
development of an election is not enough for its acceptance.  Therefore, it is especially 
relevant to find out both the necessary and sufficient conditions behind the outcome. This 
makes QCA, a set-theoretic method with an in-depth understanding of cases and causality, 
ideal for this research.  
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The QCA variant that is more suitable for answering this question is multivalue QCA 
(mvQCA). The QCA variant that is more suitable for answering this question is multivalue 
QCA (mvQCA). This method, although derived from csQCA, it differs from it as it moves 
beyond the use of dichotomies to have a more flexible structure for classifying or coding 
cases. Therefore, instead of taking two possible values (“0” or “1), variables can take 
multiple values (“0”, “1”, “2”, “3”, etc.), which are more useful for a more detailed coding of 
the data. In csQCA variables can only take two Boolean values (1 or 0) and therefore 
options are limited. For example, with csQCA an election can only be either completely free 
and fair or not. However reality is more complex and we require more values for classifying 
the quality of an election (what if for example, an election has some problems, but these 
are not sufficient to change the outcome/the will of the people). Therefore CsQCA was 
discarded as it does not capture properly the richness of each condition. MvQCA option is 
more relevant for the analysis. 
After applying mvQCA to the research question, the analysis finds the configuration that 
shapes the outcome and unveils which conditions are necessary and sufficient. Results 
show that there are two paths that lead to the acceptance of election results. The first path 
requires a consolidated democracy and a high quality election that meets international 
standards, provided that election results are not close. The second path that leads to the 
acceptance of results requires political parties that support electoral institutions and 
transparent results (regardless of having a close election). If election results are close, then 
their acceptance requires more than a good election and a democratic context. So, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, for results to be accepted, elections not only have to be of good 
quality. Political party support and transparent results are also needed. Therefore, 
whenever one of these conditions is not met, results are rejected.  
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4.3.2 Quantitative analysis: The role of political party support  
4.3.2.1 Quantitative studies and the level of participation of political parties in EMBs 
The findings provided by the QCA analysis reveal there are two paths that lead to the 
acceptance of electoral results. In particular, they show that elections are accepted when 
there is support of political parties for the electoral institution and transparent election 
results. Then, in order to improve our insight on these conditions, in the subsequent 
chapter (chapter 6) I decide to focus on one of them: the political party support for electoral 
institutions. The aim is to drill down on this condition for the acceptance of results and 
analyse its influence. For doing so, the chapter hypothesises that party support, identified 
by the participation of political parties in the appointment of the members of the Electoral 
Management Body (EMB), is important for achieving confidence in elections. The research 
uses an innovative four point scale to identify the level of participation of political parties in 
the appointment of the EMB members. These four categories are: EMBs where political 
parties have no role in the appointment of their members; EMBs where parties have an 
indirect participation; EMBs with partial direct participation of political parties; and EMBs 
with full direct participation. This is demonstrated through large-N analysis of results from 
the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) survey, in particular from 5,261 
questionnaires from 18 Latin American countries from 1997 to 2015. 
Large N studies use quantitative analysis to look for patterns in a large number of cases. 
This method has many advantages. First, it is based on the analysis of many cases, which 
reduces the risk of selection bias and allows us at the same time to reach more robust 
conclusions. Large enough samples can cover the entire population of interest and as a 
result allow generalisations and have a strong degree of external validity. Second, this type 
of analysis is useful for testing different hypothesis and systematically examining the impact 
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of many variables in an outcome (Halperin and Heath, 2012).  It is also helpful to unravel 
how all these variables interact with each other. Large N methods examine relationships 
between variables and can evaluate which of these influence the outcome and how much 
so. They can consider alternative and complementary explanations and rule out those that 
are not relevant for the outcome. 
As a result, this methodology is ideal to explore if political parties play a role in election 
credibility. More specifically, it is especially suited to determine if there is a relationship 
between the participation of political parties in EMBs and confidence in electoral processes. 
First, a quantitative study is appropriate for the size of the sample, which consists of a 
survey of 5,261 congressmen and women from Latin America. Second, quantitative 
methods allow having and testing multiple variables, which is especially relevant for this 
research. As expected, many other factors besides party support for EMBs have an 
influence in election credibility. These are included as variables and controls in the 
research and include, amongst others, the level of economic development, corruption and a 
number of other factors associated with the ideology and perceptions of individual 
members of congress. Third, the key independent variable in the study is presented as an 
innovative four point scale, showing different levels of participation of political parties in the 
appointment of EMB members. With this design, only with a quantitative approach can we 
know the relation between each of these levels and the outcome and if there is some sort 
of trend between them. It is expected that greater participation of political parties in EMBs 
yields greater confidence in electoral processes. For estimating this, this research employs 
binary logistic and multilevel regression through three different models. 
It is important to note that the dependent variable used in this research (confidence in 
electoral processes) is a slight departure from the variable used in the QCA study 
(acceptance of election results). Using confidence in electoral processes as an outcome 
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variable allows covering a longer period of time and a larger number of electoral processes 
per country. Whereas the QCA study focused on specific election processes (for a total of 
48 individual elections for the first model, and 21 for the second), this new variable from the 
PELA surveys allows having information from many more elections. The five waves under 
study cover all elections from most Latin American countries from 1997 to 2015. Moreover, 
the survey question asked is ‘How much do you trust the last electoral processes that have 
taken place in [country]?9 Therefore responses to this question are not limited to a single 
election event, but rather constitute an average of the perceptions of the last few elections 
in a country. 
4.3.2.2 Binary logistic and multilevel regression 
First, this research employs binary logistic regression to estimate the effect of the different 
levels of support of political parties for the EMB on the credibility in electoral processes. 
This is a type of multiple regression that allows analyzing binary outcomes from continuous 
or categorical predictors (Field, 2013; Pampel, 2000). This method was chosen as the 
dependent variable in the research takes the form of a dichotomous indicator (1= 
confidence in electoral processes, 0= lack of confidence in electoral processes). The 
original form of this variable was a Likert 5 point scale, ranging from minimum confidence 
(1) to maximum confidence (5). However, this presented a problem of interpretation. The 
appropriate method of analysis for categorical outcomes is ordinal logistic regression, 
which considers the effects of the explanatory variables for each of the categories in the 
scale. Therefore, results would have shown the odds of the different explanatory variables 
of achieving category 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of confidence in electoral processes. To illustrate this, 
using this method would show us how likely it is to get a level 2 confidence in electoral 
                                                          
9 For some cases, the question asked is: ‘How much do you trust the electoral processes that have taken 
place in [country] in the last decade?  
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processes when, for example, political engagement is intense and constant or when there 
is high support for democracy. This is not very intuitive. We are not interested in 
understanding the effect on category 2 or category 3 (besides, it is difficult to identify the 
difference between category 1 and 2, or 2 and 3) but if the variables have an effect on 
confidence in electoral processes or not. For this reason, the dependent variable was 
dichotomised (1= high trust in electoral processes, 0=low trust in electoral processes) and a 
binary logistic regression was employed. 
Binary dependent variables are not suited for traditional multiple regression and pose 
problems of interpretation. Traditional multiple regression assumes that probabilities take a 
straight line for the values of an independent variable, but this is not true for dummy 
dependent variables. As a result, two main sorts of problems are faced, the first one being 
conceptual and the second statistical in nature (Pampel, 2000). The conceptual problem is 
that dummy dependent variables violate the assumptions of linearity and additivity found in 
traditional multiple regression. In linear models, the regression line extends upward and 
downward indefinitely and therefore can produce values that exceed the two limits of a 
binary variable, 0 and 1. This means ending up with probabilities below 0 and above 1, 
which make no sense at all.  Moreover, with binary outcomes the influence of all the 
variables is non-additive (Pampel, 2000). This means that the effects of the independent 
variables are interactive and change depending on the levels of other variables. This is 
relevant for our study as we expect all variables to interact. For example, we do not expect 
that the effect of having no participation of political parties in EMBs is identical regardless of 
other independent variables like economic development and corruption, which can also 
contribute to explain the phenomenon of having confidence in electoral processes. In 
contrast, in traditional multiple regression the effects stay the same regardless of the 
influence other variables might have. Second, there are also problems of statistical 
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inference as ordinary multiple regression rests on normality of distribution and 
homoscedasticity and binary outcome variables violate these assumptions. With only two 
values in dummy variables, 0 and 1, standard errors will be incorrect and significance test 
are invalid (Pampel, 2000). 
The use of odds ratios in logistic regression is especially suited for our research. Due to the 
nature of dichotomous dependent variables and its issues of nonlinearity, probabilities need 
to be transformed into odds (Pampel, 2000). Odds tell us the probability of an outcome 
occurring given the levels of the independent variables. Traditional probabilities predict the 
likelihood of an event occurring or not occurring. In contrast, odds express the likelihood of 
an event occurring relative to the likelihood of a non-occurrence (Pampel, 2000; NCRM, 
2016). This is extremely useful when some of the independent variables have different 
levels or categories and are nominal or ordinal, as these can be compared (NCRM, 2016). 
This is done through reference categories against which we can compare.  In this research, 
for example, odds can tell us if EMBs with full direct participation of political parties are 
more or less likely than EMBs where political parties have no participation to yield 
confidence in electoral processes. In this case EMBs with no party involvement are the 
reference category.  
In this thesis Models 1 and 2 are single level models that employ logistic regression. Model 
1 tests if the participation of political parties in the appointment of the EMB is more likely 
than EMBs with no party participation to yield higher levels of confidence in elections. For 
doing so, I take the four point scale used to identify the levels of participation of political 
parties in the appointment of EMB members and convert it into a dummy variable where “1” 
represents countries where parties participate in the appointment process and “0” 
represents countries where parties do not have a role in this. The latter is taken as the 
reference category.  Model 2 expands on this and tests the effect of the four different levels 
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of participation of political parties in the appointment of the members of the EMB. In this 
model the reference category used is also “No participation of political parties in EMB 
appointment”.  
Then, in order to have more robust findings, this research employs multilevel regression. 
This type of regression is an extension of the linear model and allows analysing data that is 
structured hierarchically. This occurs when data is presented at more than one level where 
cases are nested within a context. This structure is employed as individuals interact with 
their social contexts and as a result are influenced by them (Hox, 2002; Field, 2012). In this 
research, it is the different Latin American countries that act as a contextual variable for 
individuals. Individuals, in this case the congressmen and women interviewed by the PELA 
survey, live and work in different countries and therefore are exposed to different 
backgrounds and values. Congressmen are nested within their national units. This is 
defined as a two-level hierarchy. Individual is the variable at the bottom of the hierarchy, or 
level 1 and the country is the variable at the upper level, or level 2. As a result, this type of 
regression allows incorporating country-level characteristics and estimating relationships 
across levels (Field, 2012; Lee, Gabarino and Lerman, 2007; Wong and Mason, 1985). The 
multilevel regression thus considers data taken from the 5,261 questionnaires to legislators 
from 17 countries and four survey waves, which produces a total of 47 dyads or country-
waves, which constitute the unit of analysis for Model 3. 
As a result, multilevel regression allows factoring in contextual variables. When contextual 
variables are present in the analysis this leads to dependency in the data, which means 
that individuals at the bottom of the structure are influenced by the context at the upper 
level. Multilevel regression can analyse dependent data, thus solving the assumptions of 
independence and independent errors of traditional linear models (Field, 2012). In 
hierarchical levels individuals are influenced by their countries. As such, individuals from a 
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particular country will be more similar to each other than they are to individuals from 
another country. This, naturally, has an effect on the outcome and this can be estimated 
through multilevel modelling. In addition, this type of regression allows working with models 
with random intercepts and slopes (which is expected in this case as slopes and intercepts 
can vary across countries). 
Multi-level regression is used in Model 3 of the research. As it considers the structure of our 
data, where individual congressmen and women are nested within their national units, 
multi-level analysis produces more robust findings. In particular, this model tests – as in the 
binary logistic regression used in model 2 - the different levels of participation of political 
parties in the EMB appointment process and their impact in the confidence in electoral 
processes. Its results partially support the findings from models 1 and 2. Moreover, in this 
model I calculate marginal effects and the predictive margins for the four levels of political 
party participation in election institutions.  
4.3.3 Small-N comparison: the role of election results in preventing violence. 
Then, in chapter 7 we turn our attention to another of the key conditions identified by the 
QCA for the acceptance of an election, which is the transparency in its results stage. 
Specifically, this last chapter studies the relationship between election results and election 
credibility through a small N analysis. It analyses the role of transparency in election results 
in preventing post-election protests and conducts a paired comparison of the 2006 and 
2012 presidential elections in Mexico. The 2006 election came to be known as “Mexico’s 
disputed election” (Rubio and Davidow, 2006). It was followed by massive demonstrations 
with more than one million protestors, a civil disobedience campaign, a two month long sit-
in in Mexico City and a symbolic proclamation of the runner up as the country’s true and 
“legitimate president”. In contrast, the protests after the 2012 elections were considerably 
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smaller, short lived and did not get as much attention or support. It is hypothesised that a 
crucial difference between these outcomes is the degree of transparency in the 
communication of election results. This is assessed by comparing three mechanisms used 
by Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) to process and communicate results: the 
preliminary election results programme (PREP), a parallel vote tabulation system and the 
official tabulation and communication of results. The degree of transparency was assessed 
considering Michener and Bersch’s (2013) two essential conditions for transparency: 
visibility and inferability. 
The Small-N analytic method involves the comparison of two or more cases. There is no 
fixed upper limit for the number of cases studied via this method, but no more than a dozen 
is the rule of thumb (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Specifically, this method is employed when 
the researcher needs to obtain an in-depth knowledge of significant cases and the 
circumstances surrounding them, in order to explain similarities and differences with a 
degree of precision and nuance. Historical context and the specifics of the case are both 
crucial variables to consider in Small-N comparisons (Ragin, 1987: 35). Small-N studies, 
also termed “case-oriented” (Ragin, 1987: 35) because of their focus on the details of a 
handful of cases rather than interpreting patterns within large data sets as is Large-N 
studies, are grounded in the historical interpretive method (Ragin 1987, 35). What this 
methodological approach offers is a comprehensive explication of the relationship between 
noteworthy events and other relevant phenomena (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 43-44). 
One of the central aims of most case oriented approaches is: “to produce limited 
generalizations concerning the causes of theoretically defined categories of empirical 
phenomena” (Ragin 1987, 35). Small-N studies rely on detailed observations in order to 
inductively develop some theoretical explanation of cause and effect.  
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Therefore, since our aim is to unravel how transparency in election results works, a small N 
methodology is especially suited for this chapter of the research. In contrast to Large-N 
methodologies, case studies provide a ‘thick’ description of events and allow analysing 
phenomena rigorously (Caramani, 2008; King, Keohane & Verba 1994).  This enables us to 
gain a deeper understanding of the context and to establish causality more precisely. While 
case studies do not allow testing many variables at once, they do work well when we are 
interested in one or two main causes and in fully understanding them. This is relevant when 
we try to answer why and how having transparency in election results can prevent post-
election protests.  In the QCA chapter this variable is binary and coded as either “1” when 
results are transparent and “0” when they are not. In contrast, the small N analysis provides 
a richer description of the variable, grasping its full complexity and all its nuances. This 
includes the careful analysis of the different stages of election results and their respective 
processes and systems. This ‘unfolding’ or ‘unpacking’ of the variable gives us better 
insight on the issue. 
Having a rich description is not enough to develop good hypotheses and establishing 
causality. In the words of King, Keohane & Verba, “just as causal inference is impossible 
without good descriptive inference, descriptive inference alone is often unsatisfying and 
incomplete” (1994: 75). However, one way to attempt obtaining causal inference is by 
undertaking a structured focused comparison of the small N analysis. This is a technique 
which offers a disciplined way of analysing data that can yield more solid inferences. In 
particular, it is ‘structured’ as it requires writing a few questions that guide the data 
collection and ‘focused’ as it zooms in on very concrete aspects of the cases under study 
(George and Bennet, 2005). More specifically, it involves a controlled comparison and the 
systematic collection of the same information across carefully selected cases (King, 
Keohane & Verba 1994). In this research, five different questions are used to both identify 
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and measure the degree of transparency in the processing and communication of election 
results and to estimate their relation to post-election protests. Then, guided by these 
questions, I systematically draw the same information from both cases. This information is 
related to the processing, transmission and communication of results in both elections. 
Fortunately, the election results phase, as rolled out by Mexico’s electoral institution, has 
the advantage of presenting itself naturally as a clear cut three stage sequence. These 3 
stages consist of a) the preliminary results programme, b) the parallel vote tabulation 
system and c) the official tabulation of results.  
In addition, to reach more reliable inferences, and as mentioned above, it is crucial that the 
cases for analysis be selected very carefully. Small N analyses by definition deal with a 
small number of cases and that is why selection bias is an important consideration for 
researchers employing comparative methods. This means that the cases can neither be so 
similar that comparison produces very little of interest, nor so dissimilar that comparison is 
inappropriate (Halperin & Heath, 2012: 209). The cases analysed in this study were 
selected using the Most Similar Systems Design approach (MSSD), which locates variables 
that differ across similar systems, accounting for the observed outcomes (Keman, 2008). In 
other words, this approach takes cases that share many characteristics but differ on a key 
independent variable that helps explain the outcome. Then, the characteristics in common 
are used as controls to isolate the effect of the variable that is different between the cases. 
For this study, since both elections occurred in the same country during a relatively short 
period of time, they naturally have a number of aspects in common. In particular, they are 
similar in terms of the country, the level of economic development, the political system and 
the institution in charge of running elections and processing election results. Other more 
specific variables are also shared. These include the overall quality of the election and the 
type of election campaign. These variables are the controls, hold the context constant and 
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therefore cannot explain the differences in the outcome. However, both elections differ 
significantly on how election results were processed and communicated. And this, as the 
main variation across the cases, should explain why the 2006 protests were massive and 
disturbed everyday life in the country for a period of two months while the 2012 protests 
were small and did not attract attention. Of course, any two cases being compared cannot 
be exactly the same in all aspects except for the independent variable. Such cases do not 
exist in real life. Admittedly, our two cases have some other differences. These are 
accounted for and an explanation of their possible influence is provided in chapter 7. 
4.4 Large, intermediate and small-N and the acceptance of results 
A number of problems and malpractices can occur before, during and after an election. 
Ballot boxes can be stuffed, radio and television stations can favour the incumbent 
disproportionately, political finance can be unregulated and opaque, electoral registers can 
be out of date, election observers can be banned, gerrymandering can shape districts, 
voting stations may have very long queues and voting ink might not be indelible, amongst 
many others. When this happens, the credibility of the election suffers and protests may 
erupt and may even have instances of violence. This is why it is important to protect and 
secure the integrity of elections worldwide. If any single link in the election process is 
broken, it is capable of undermining the legitimacy of elections and of weakening 
democracy (Norris, 2013).  
This research does not aim to cover all of the aspects that affect election integrity. 
However, it does try to shed some light on some key factors that can contribute to having 
more trusted and accepted election processes and institutions.  The research starts with 
the question: when, where and under what conditions are election results accepted? By 
conducting a QCA analysis across a number of emerging democracies we find that a good 
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quality election is not all we need. Specifically, when election results are close, and 
tensions high, two key conditions contribute to the acceptance of the results: a political 
party support to electoral institutions, and transparency in election results. Therefore, 
subsequent research focuses on two of these factors. Quantitative analysis looks at the 
role of political party support to electoral institutions, especially on their degree of 
participation in the appointment of EMB members. For doing so, it studies the opinions, 
background and perceptions of congressmen and women in Latin America. Results reveal 
which kinds of institutional designs can strengthen trust in EMBs and confidence in 
electoral processes. Then, small-N paired analysis compares the 2006 and 2012 
presidential elections in Mexico, with emphasis on the processing and communication of 
election results and its impact on the level and magnitude of post-election protests. 
Findings detail how transparency in election results can improve the quality of the process 
and contribute to reduce post-election tensions and protests. 
As we can see, these topics are complementary pieces of the puzzle of election credibility. As 
a result, the research and its structure were inspired by mixed methodology and employed a 
combination of methods to enhance our knowledge on a specific topic. However, and unlike in 
mixed methods, the different chapters in this research do not necessarily use the exact same 
data or variables. The QCA analysis focuses on the acceptance of election results, the 
quantitative analysis studies confidence in electoral processes and the small-N paired 
comparison concentrates on post-election protests. Nonetheless, the studies are related and 
in a way complement each other and allow for a certain degree of triangulation, offering 
several ways to look at associated phenomena. In short, by employing this combination of 
methods, the findings of one chapter support the findings of the other and vice versa, 
therefore linking better all the cogs in the machine and providing more suggestive findings. 
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5. CHAPTER 5: WHEN, WHERE AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS ELECTION 
RESULTS ARE ACCEPTED? 
5.1. Is a good quality election enough for the acceptance of election results? 
Conventional wisdom holds that having a good quality election is enough for it to be 
accepted. This belief, shared by many election officials, legislators and politicians around 
the world, argues that if all or most aspects of election administration are procedurally 
sound, the acceptance of results by citizens and political parties will automatically follow. 
For this prevailing wisdom it is only objective factors which determine the acceptance of an 
election. Election management and its components are the most important piece of an 
electoral process: election materials, electoral logistics and voting operations become the 
key ingredients of a successful election. Therefore, this wisdom does not pay attention to 
other underlying factors that go beyond the technical and logistical aspects of 
administration. Examples of this are the level of democratic consolidation and the support 
of political parties for electoral institutions. Some of these have been included in research 
(Rosas, 2010; Barreda and Rodriguez, 2013) but have not been used yet for explaining the 
acceptance of election results. 
The acceptance of election results has to do with the objective performance of election 
administration but also with its credibility in the eyes of citizens and political parties. 
Therefore, research on this topic must focus both on the technical aspects of the election 
and also on the contextual and the subjective aspects that contribute to having a positive 
perception and therefore trusted election processes and results. Quality in election 
administration is important but alone is not sufficient for the acceptance of election results. 
Empirical reality shows that quite a few elections classified as technically accurate and 
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“free and fair” have not been accepted and have been followed by riots and protests 
claiming vote fraud.   
Recent examples include Mexico 2006 and Zambia in 2008. The 2006 election in Mexico 
was observed by international organizations such as the European Union (EU), the 
Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA) and the National Democratic Institute 
for International Affairs (NDI), who praised the conduct of the electoral institutions and the 
organisation of the electoral process. The EU Election Observation Mission, for example, 
concluded that the presidential and parliamentary elections were “competitive, transparent, 
well administered and celebrated in an environment of respect to freedoms of expression 
and assembly, demonstrating the firm commitment of the Mexican citizens to the 
strengthening and consolidation of democracy” (EU, 2006b: 1). This overall positive 
assessment was shared by COPA and NDI, amongst other national and international 
election observation mission reports. Nonetheless, the election was followed by “protracted 
public demonstrations that questioned its cleanliness and the putatively partial role of 
Mexico’s Instituto Federal Electoral, an ostensibly autonomous electoral agency” (Rosas, 
2010: 75). Similarly, the 2008 presidential election in Zambia was observed by the Electoral 
Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA). The EISA observation mission 
used the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO), 
which outline standards and best practices for the conduct of elections in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region. Based on these standards, the mission 
concluded that given the circumstances that surrounded the election (a time frame of only 
90 days for their development following the sudden death of President Levy Mwanawasa), 
it was smoothly run and “conducted in a transparent manner and in a way that allowed the 
people of Zambia to freely express their will” (EISA, 2010:ix). However, soon after official 
results were announced, this “smoothly run” election led Michael Sata, runner-up from the 
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Patriotic Front party (PF) to reject the election results. His followers organised protests in 
Lusaka and Kitwe, the two largest cities in the country, and violence and riots soon broke 
out (Ethiopian Review, 2008; Shacinda, 2008).  
These two examples show that having a procedurally sound electoral process or an 
electoral process that is generally characterised as “free and fair” is not enough for the 
acceptance of election results. Acceptance is not only about the technical quality of the 
electoral process but also how it is perceived. Therefore, and especially in emerging 
democracies, where citizens and political parties have only experienced a few electoral 
contests, election quality needs to happen in combination with other factors.  
This research hypothesizes that there are five conditions which contribute to the 
acceptance of election results. A first explanatory variable is the level of democracy, and 
particularly consolidated democracy. This is identified by whether a country has passed the 
‘two turnover test’, where democracy can be considered consolidated when power has 
changed twice resulting from free elections. In consolidated democracies, parties lose 
elections and citizens know that even if their preferred candidate or party did not win office, 
the process and outcome can be trusted. In particular, in countries where democracy has 
become more institutionalised it is more likely that election results will be accepted. A 
second variable is the closeness of an election. Close elections, identified as contests 
where there is a 5% or less margin of difference between the winner and the runner up, 
increase attention, engagement, scrutiny and tension and are more likely to result in fraud 
allegations. When the margin is so small, it is easier for candidates, parties and the people 
to challenge an election. In contrast, elections won by a wide margin are less likely to be 
questioned and/or rejected. A third variable is the support of political parties for electoral 
institutions. This is identified by the trust and acceptance of the electoral institution’s top 
staff (i.e. Councillors or Commissioners) by political parties. If political parties support the 
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election administration institutions there are higher chances for them to accept election 
results. Fourth, we focus on the overall quality of the election. An election with quality is 
one where international standards for election administration have been largely met. These 
are elections characterised completely or generally  “free and fair” by international Election 
Observation Missions. This variable is included, as described above, since conventional 
wisdom holds that high quality elections lead to accepted results. A final variable pays 
attention to the transparency in election results. This is as the election results stage is 
particularly critical for the acceptance of the outcome and where having accurate, clear and 
widely available results can make a difference between acceptance and rejection. When 
results are visible and inferable it is more likely that doubts and confusion will be dissipated 
and the outcome will be accepted. 
In order to test the effect of these independent variables on the acceptance of election 
results, I use multi value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA). This is a comparative 
methodology that helps discovering the different combinations that lead to a specific 
outcome. By doing so, QCA allows to find out which are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the acceptance of election results (and therefore also for their rejection). This 
is especially helpful as it allows knowing if having a high quality election is sufficient for the 
acceptance of election results or if there are other factors at play. My cases are 48 
presidential elections held in Latin America between 2000 and 2015.  
To answer the question of when, where and under what conditions election results are 
accepted this chapter is organised as follows. The first section considers the framework of 
analysis. It defines the dependent variable (the acceptance of election results) and details 
all the conditions expected to have an impact on it.  For each variable, this section provides 
a description, a justification and sets out its measurement and operationalization. It also 
provides the research hypotheses. Section 2 briefly describes multi value Qualitative 
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Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) and the data and cases used in this analysis. Then, 
section 3 presents the results, including the “truth table” and the Boolean formulae which 
outline the different configurations that lead to the acceptance of results. It then interprets 
these results in the light of various empirical cases. Section 4 analyses whether the results 
from the mvQCA are generalizable to other contexts around the world and thus introduces 
a second QCA model looking at cases from Europe, Africa and Asia, showing consistent 
findings. The final section concludes.  
5.2 Variables and sources of information 
5.2.1 The dependent variable: Acceptance of election results. 
When votes are cast in an election and a candidate or a party is declared winner, losers 
can react in three different ways: they can accept election results, they can challenge the 
results, or they can turn against democracy (Lago and Martinez i Coma, 2016).  And while 
candidates and parties that accept the verdict of the ballot box are good for a democracy, 
rejecting election results can be potentially harmful for it. The non-acceptance of election 
results can take many forms and ranges from verbal expressions to legal and extra-legal 
actions. First, a party can take legal action by filing a petition to another electoral body or 
the judiciary (such as the Supreme Court) and ask for a recount, an election repeat, or to 
nullify election outcomes. Second, a party can choose to go for extra-legal actions and can 
decide “staging a post-electoral mass protest, refusing to recognize the newly elected 
legislature by not taking its seats or even boycotting the second round of elections” 
(Chernykh, 2013: 1362).  
This study will focus on extra-legal action.  This is as not all types of challenges are harmful 
for the credibility of the election or the health of the political system. First, legal actions, as 
part of the electoral justice system, are at the cornerstone of democracy (IDEA, 2010) and 
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in fact must be encouraged as conflicts must be resolved through the law. In addition, 
citizens, candidates, political parties and other stakeholders have the right to seek redress 
of grievances. Second, verbal claims, statements and declarations are not sufficient to be 
considered as a rejection of results. This might be part of a political strategy (Eisenstadt, 
2004) and used as a way to push for electoral reform or maintain a candidate’s or a political 
group’s influence (Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo, 2008). What is more, it is frequently the 
case that “losing parties concede defeat while also making allegations that fraud was 
committed” (Chernykh, 2013:4). 
Therefore, for this research, the rejection of elections relates to extra-legal action. This 
comes in different shapes and sizes. Building on Chernykh (2013), the rejection of elections 
and its results includes the following actions: boycotts (of the entire election or parts of it, 
such as the second round), civil disobedience (road blockages, occupation of public spaces 
and buildings, such as government and election institutions), refusal to take seats in the 
legislature or resignation of seats, and mass election protests (requiring the involvement of 
security forces). These have to be related to the election process and or its outcome. 
Protests, boycotts or civil disobedience held against the government or for broader or 
different issues are not considered as instances of election rejection.  
For the purposes of this study, the acceptance of results involves expressing consent to the 
outcome and forgoing any of the actions described above as a way to challenge the 
election or its results.  An election is “rejected” when there are boycotts, civil disobedience, 
refusal to take legislative seats and/or significant10 election protests. An example of this is 
                                                          
10 The use of the term ‘significant’ election protests derives from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) data set, which, for modules 3 (2006-2011) and 4 (2011-2016) asks “To what extent was 
there protest following the election?” with three possible answers: “No protest”, “Significant protest” and “
Sporadic protests”. Only significant protests are considered as instances of rejection of results as they 
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the 2016 presidential elections run off in Haiti, which were boycotted by all major political 
parties as a result of major irregularities in legislative elections earlier that year. Another 
example is the 2006 elections in Mexico which were followed by nation-wide protests and a 
civil disobedience campaign involving seizures of highways (including an international 
bridge with the US), blocking offices and banks and clashes with the police. Both are 
classified as cases of rejection. As mvQCA requires the dichotomization of variables for 
conducting an analysis, acceptance will be coded as “1” while rejection will be coded as “0”.  
I measure the dependent variable primarily with information obtained from Election 
Observation Mission Reports. In addition, I rely on the following sources: Elections in the 
Americas: a data handbook edited by Dieter Nohlen11; CIA World Factbook; Pro-Quest 
Newspaper database. Two data sets are used to support the information from these 
sources. The first one is Yale University’s National Elections Across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA), which uses different documentary sources that range from election 
handbooks and archives to data from international organisations. The second dataset is the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). CSES is a common module of survey 
questions on political systems and elections that is implemented by the leading 
investigators in various democracies12.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
involve a larger and more coordinated and protracted participation. Sporadic protests are not too extensive 
around the time of the election. 
11
 For the second QCA model I also rely on Elections in Europe/ in Asia and the Pacific/ in Africa: A Data 
Handbook by Dieter Nohlen. 
12 From NELDA I draw on responses to questions 14, 29 and 30. Item 14 asks Did some opposition leaders 
boycott the election? Item 29 asks Were there riots and protests after the election?”, followed by Item 30: If 
(yes) did they involve allegations of vote fraud?  From CSES I use items 10c and 10 d. 10c asks “To what 
extent was there violence following the election?” 10d asks “To what extent was there protest following the 
election?” 
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5.2.2 Independent Variables: Conditions for the acceptance of election results. 
5.2.2.1 Defining the variables 
This research looks at 5 key variables: democratic consolidation, the closeness of the 
election, the support of political parties for electoral institutions, quality in the conduct of the 
election and the provision of transparent results. A clear identification and definition of 
these variables is required. For this reason, this research follows Munck’s (2009) guidelines 
for the construction of a democracy data set (2009) 
One key challenge in this task is the conceptualisation of the variables under study. Having 
a clearly defined concept with sharp boundaries is a first step for good data analysis as it 
affects the entire process (Munck, 2009). From there the research is able to have proper 
measurement and aggregation. Conceptualisation thus “provides the anchor for all 
subsequent decisions” (Munck, 2009:16) 
Once the concept has been defined, two tasks are required. First, the attributes that make 
up the concept need to be identified. Not too few but not too many, avoiding minimal and 
maximal definitions of a concept are required. Second, once these constituent components 
are defined and included, the analyst must consider how these are related to each other 
and ensure they are properly organized by level (e.g. Democracy is integrated by a certain 
number of components, which in turn are made up of subcomponents or indicators). The 
aim is avoiding repetitions and/or overlaps. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, two 
key issues are conflation and redundancy.  
This framework is made for the construction of indices for measuring a concept such as 
democracy. It is useful for clearly identifying its constitutive components, how these are 
related to each other, and how these are organised by levels of abstraction. And while the 
present research is not aimed at identifying and delimiting the constituent attributes of a 
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concept, it still draws from this framework for properly isolating the variables we are using 
and measuring as conditions that lead to the acceptance of election results –so they can be 
distinguished conceptually and empirically from each other-. 
In this research, regime type and closeness of the election are clearly defined as contextual 
variables. Whether a regime is democratic or not is highly important for the acceptance of 
results. Democracies –and particularly institutionalised democracies- are loser friendly: in 
them losers wait and live to fight another day. In emerging democracies or non-democratic 
countries, in turn, it is more likely that citizens will protest the outcome of the election. Close 
election results –as opposed to elections with big comfortable margins for the winner- 
gather a number of characteristics that make them more explosive.  In turn, party support, 
election quality and transparency in election results are identified as distinct moments and 
aspects of an electoral cycle. Party support or lack thereof, refers to the relationship 
between political parties and EMBs and how the latter are perceived by the former.  
Election quality is related to the administration of the electoral process (the logistics and 
organization behind an election) up to election day. Election results are linked to what 
happens after polling stations close and after poll workers count the votes and are related 
to the communication and announcement of results. Further details of the variables under 
study and their measurement are provided below. 
5.2.2.2 Democratic consolidation 
A common notion is that in a democracy, losers accept election results. In this type of 
political regime, citizens and candidates accept and respect the rules of the game and 
therefore its outcome, even if they do not agree with it. This is also supported by the fact 
that elections in established democracies are seen as “routine events that produce results 
outside the unacknowledged ‘margin of error’ that exists in all democratic elections. As a 
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result, democracies are “loser-friendly”. This follows Przeworski’s (1991) view that in a 
democracy, losers choose to comply with the results because they believe elections are 
free and fair and therefore they will have a sufficient chance of winning an election in the 
future. In a democracy candidates and citizens are graceful –or they ought to. How can one 
forget Al Gore’s acceptance of the United States Supreme Court ruling, even after a very 
close election that experienced a number of irregularities in voting. Similarly, how to forget 
George H.W. Bush’s 1993 letter to president elect Bill Clinton -–resurfaced during the 2016 
US presidential campaign-, shortly after losing the election against him and wishing him 
success and calling him his president (Abrams, 2016). To illustrate this point, below is an 
abstract of Gore’s address after the Court’s ruling: 
Now the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken. Let there be no doubt: While I strongly disagree 
with the court's decision, I accept it. I accept the finality of this outcome, which will be 
ratified next Monday in the Electoral College. And tonight, for the sake of our unity of the 
people and the strength of our democracy, I offer my concession. (Barbour and Wright, 
2014 : 516) 
However, not all democracies are the same and not all of them can be considered systems 
in which parties lose elections and where everyone happily accepts elections and their 
outcome. Countries that have only recently made their transition to democracy are more 
vulnerable to coups and other authoritarian reversals. Holding a first and historical free and 
fair election does not necessarily guarantee that elections will be the new normal in the 
country. In new democracies, democracy has not yet become ‘the only game in town’ and 
some groups, when losing, might still consider other non-democratic ways of holding or 
achieving power. The transition to a consolidated democracy comes with a number of 
challenges (Coleman and Lawson-Remer, 2013) 
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On the other hand, in consolidated democracies people and elites are more likely to value 
democracy and to support the system (Voicy and Peral, 2012). Here, democracy has 
effectively become “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan, 1996), resulting in a more 
mature and stable regime. Moreover, it is not only about how much participants appreciate 
democracy as a regime and a way of life. In consolidated democracies, actors are more 
likely to accept election results because of their own strategic calculations. It is actors’ 
rational calculations that explain their commitment to the rules of the game. In a democracy 
–understood as a system of uncertain outcomes – participants have sufficient chances to 
win future contests, which acts as an incentive for them to accept election results 
(Przeworski, 1991; Anderson et al, 2005; Lago and Martinez i Coma, 2016). The belief of 
having a chance to win in the future –that only comes with a democracy - is what makes 
participants ‘wait and live to fight another day’, i.e wait until the next election. 
This variable is measured by using the ‘two turnover test’: democracy is consolidated when 
power has changed twice resulting from free and fair elections, demonstrating the 
commitment of political elites to be defeated by the ballot (Huntington, 1991;  Bakke and 
Peters, 2009).  In particular, a country in the sample is considered to have passed the ‘two 
turnover test’ after having held two free and fair elections after its transition to democracy 
or, if the transition has been interrupted, counting two elections after the resumption of 
democracy. For instance, while Peru’s transition to democracy first occurred in the year 
1978, I start counting after the year 1992, when President Fujimori announced a ‘self-coup’, 
dissolving the legislative and judiciary branches of government with military backing.  
Other measurements for democracy, including Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ 
(FIW) Report13 and Polity IV individual country regime trends14 are not used. First, this is as 
                                                          
13
 Freedom House (2017) Freedom in the World Report https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-
world 
110 
 
 
 
being classified a ‘democracy’ is not the same as being a ‘consolidated democracy’. For 
instance, Polity IV considers Mexico a democracy from the year 2000. This is when the 
country had a historic election voting in for the first time in 71 years an opposition party into 
the presidency. However, all elections before that where won by the same party. While both 
indexes consider Mexico a democracy in the year 2000, the country would not have passed 
the ‘two turnover’ test. A democracy requires more than a single election to consolidate. 
Second, using these indexes risks equating democracy to holding ‘free and fair’ elections. 
Using the example above, Mexico did hold ‘free and fair’ elections in the year 2000 and this 
is an important factor for its classification as an electoral democracy by Freedom House 
and Polity. Therefore, the problem in using any of these indexes for measuring democracy 
would be one of multicollinearity as they have a big overlap with the election quality 
variable, measuring the extent to which elections in the country where ‘free and fair’ and 
held according to international standards of election quality. 
5.2.2.3 Close elections 
Close elections gather a number of characteristics that make them more likely to lead 
citizens and political parties to be dissatisfied with or even reject the election outcome. 
First, close elections as opposed to elections with big and comfortable margins between 
candidates are more charged with emotions and can spark high levels of anxiety among 
the voters (Howell and Justwan, 2013). They naturally increase voters’ attention and 
cognitive engagement (Kam and Utych, 2011), especially when presented in a horse race 
format. Second, they are an indication of the competitiveness of an election (Howell and 
Justwan, 2013: 336). In a close election “differences of campaign resources, structural 
advantages, and even fraud most show themselves” (Grimmer, et. al; 2011). Every vote 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14
 Polity IV (2017) Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
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counts and as a result all candidates with a chance of winning will increase their efforts to 
win it. Finally, closer races draw greater attention in the elections and their integrity 
(Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002; Birch, 2008). Moreover, they can accentuate the effects of 
electoral errors and emphasize problems with the election, as it happened in Florida for the 
2000 presidential contest (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002).  
Increased attention, engagement, competitiveness and scrutiny result in a powerful 
combination that can derive in allegations of fraud, and in citizens and parties challenging 
or rejecting election results. Therefore, it is expected that elections with close results - 
defined as contests with results where there is a 5% or less margin of difference between 
the first and the second place- are more likely to lead to rejection of results. Elections with 
broader margins of victory are expected to be easier to accept. Information for identifying 
close elections was obtained from IFES’ “Election Guide” Country profiles (IFES, 2014). 
This variable is binary and coded “1” when election results are not close (>5% margin) and 
“0” when results are close. 
5.2.2.4 Political party support  
Political parties are at the heart of an election and play a very important role in the 
confidence in electoral processes and institutions. First of all, parties constitute a key link 
between citizens and the political system (Dalton, 2006; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). They 
can influence public opinion and also are influenced by it. In fact, parties adopt a “two-way 
symmetrical model” of public relations, where they use communication not just to influence 
the public, but also to understand its interests (Seltzer and Zhang, 2010). Therefore, parties 
and citizens can share the same views and attitudes on a number of topics. As an example 
of this, in a study on the credibility of elections in Latin America, Rosas (2010) 
demonstrates there is a high correlation between the level of trust in electoral processes 
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shown by political elites and that expressed by ordinary citizens (p= 0.52). Moreover, 
political parties use public relations strategies to establish and maintain their relationship 
with the public and “produce desirable attitudinal and behavioral outcomes (that) not only 
have consequences for the party and its supporters, but also for the larger political-social 
system” (Seltzer and Zhang, 2010:26).  
Second, political parties, as the main object of regulation of an Election Management Body 
(EMB) are at the centre of many of its processes. As a key stakeholder, political parties are 
in a strategic position to either support or undermine most of its decisions and activities. 
Boundary delimitation, voter registration, voter education campaigns, the location and 
staffing of polling stations, campaign oversight, and the validation of election results, 
amongst others, are some of the tasks carried out by EMBs that can potentially be 
supported – or rejected - by political parties.  
Consequently, it is very important that political parties support the EMB and have a good 
relationship with its members.  In fact, a good relationship with, and confidence from, 
political parties supports the programmes and policies of electoral institutions (IDEA, 2006: 
202). Moreover, it has been shown that EMBs that establish inclusive and collaborative 
relationships with parties play decisive roles in the reduction of post-election violence 
(Opitz, et al, 2013). Therefore, when political parties support electoral institutions the 
legitimacy of the electoral process and that of the entire political system is maintained or 
even strengthened. However, when political parties do not support or reject electoral 
institutions, it is likely that electoral processes and their results will be challenged, 
potentially leading to instability and conflict. What follows is that if parties support electoral 
institutions it is less likely that they will challenge these institutions and their decisions. 
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Political party support is a critical factor for the acceptance of election results. Sometimes 
highly trusted elections can be flawed while accurate elections are rejected. On this topic, 
Judge Johann Kriegler, former Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of 
South Africa, mentioned that while South Africa’s “messy” 1994 election was successful, 
Mexico’s “technically perfect” presidential election that same year ended in months of 
protests (Bosley, 2013). The reason behind this is that in South Africa, “incompetent but 
honest elections were accepted because people believed in it. And people believed in it 
because the electoral management bodies had the support of the political parties” (Bosley, 
2013). Therefore, it will be argued that the more political support there is for election 
administration institutions, the higher the chances of the election and its results being 
accepted. 
Election Observation Mission reports include a section on electoral authorities/electoral 
administration. This section describes their mandate, functions and composition as well as 
their relationship with political parties. This and other sections also illustrate the 
performance of the EMBs and how they are perceived by relevant stakeholders. A good 
relationship and support from political parties to electoral institutions is almost never 
accounted for. However, criticism and rejection of political parties for the national EMB 
never go unnoticed. This variable is identified by expressions of rejection to the EMB and/or 
to its top staff (EMB board members) by political parties. This includes accusations of bias 
in the electoral institution, of government control of the institution or of exclusion of some or 
all of the political parties/the opposition. For instance, for the 2006 presidential elections in 
Mexico, the left wing PRD party consistently accused the Federal Electoral Institute of lack 
of impartiality, of serving the interests of the PAN party and the government and of 
systematically acting against the PRD. In 2003 this major party was excluded from the 
Councillor appointment process in Congress, where it traditionally played a role. Not 
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surprisingly this party and its losing candidate rejected the 2006 election and its outcome. 
This variable is coded as “0” if political parties expressly reject the electoral institution and / 
or its top staff. Political party support, on the other hand, identified as the lack of rejection 
and/or by the expression of acceptance of this institution or its top staff is coded as “1”. As 
outlined, information regarding the support of political parties for EMBs and its top staff was 
taken from International Election Observation Mission Reports.  
5.2.2.5 Quality of elections  
An election with quality is one is identified as one where international standards for election 
administration have largely been met, and where errors or mistakes may have occurred but 
in a degree so low that they do not threaten the overall integrity of the electoral process. 
This means that all or most aspects in an election (voter registration, the registration of 
candidates and parties, campaigning, the training of polling staff, Election Day logistics and 
polling, amongst others) are procedurally sound. These are elections which allow 
competition between candidates and give citizens a real choice between several options. In 
essence, an election with quality is “free and fair” and is one that reflects the will of the 
people. The hypothesis that follows from this is that the greater the quality of an election, 
the greater the acceptance of results. 
For the coding of this variable, I rely on assessments by informed and trained international 
Election Observation Missions. In particular, ‘election quality’ is presented as an ordinal 
variable which can take three values. This approach has been used in previous research 
for measuring the quality of elections. First, Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo’s (2008) use 
statements and opinions contained primarily in domestic and international observer reports 
for measuring the quality of elections in Latin America. For the authors, an election is 
acceptable if the basic elements for procedural fairness and technical soundness are 
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present to an important degree. An election is categorized as flawed if it presents major 
procedural or technical issues but these are not sufficient to change the outcome of the 
presidential election.  A process is unacceptable if it is procedurally or technically deficient 
and its results do not reflect the will of the people (Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo, 2008).  The 
Quality of Elections Data (QED) by Kelley (2010) follows a similar approach considering the 
extent of problems in an election and whether said election is acceptable, ambiguous or 
unacceptable.  Following, Hartlyn and others (2008) I present ‘election quality’ as an ordinal 
variable with three values. This variable is coded with the lowest value, ‘1’ if it is not free 
and fair, presenting significant flaws that prevent the results from reflecting the will of 
voters, ‘2’ if the election is free and fair with major problems –which are not sufficient to 
change the outcome of the election and ‘3’ if the election is completely free and fair or free 
and fair with minor problems. 
5.2.2.6 Transparent results 
Transparency is considered one of the guiding principles of election administration 
(Goodwin-Gill, 1994, 1998; Lopez-Pintor, 2000). Electoral Management Bodies and 
institutions related to the electoral process should promote transparency at all stages of the 
electoral process and be accountable to its stakeholders, including citizens and political 
parties (Lopez-Pintor, 2000, IDEA, 2006). Transparency can not only shed light on the 
activities of the election management bodies and the procedures of the election, it can also 
expose wrongdoings and fraud, and most importantly, it can help dispel doubts and 
uncertainty and strengthen the legitimacy of the election and that of the winners. In fact, 
without transparency, there is no way for citizens to know for themselves that elections are 
genuine (Global Commission, 2012)  
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I focus on the transparency of election results. To assess this, I follow Michener and 
Bersch’s (2013) minimal definition of transparency, which considers two essential 
conditions: visibility and inferability. To be visible, information must meet two conditions. It 
must have a high degree of completeness, which means it should offer a full picture, 
without major omission; and it must be easy to locate, which translates into being easy to 
come across even without looking for it. To be inferable, information provided must be of 
high quality. This means it should possess three key attributes: disaggregation, verifiability 
and simplification. Disaggregation means that it should be presented as it comes, without 
mediation; verifiability means it should be able to be audited by third parties and 
simplification is related to its accessibility and user friendliness (Michener and Bersch, 
2013) 
When information on the results is not available or blocked, when this is not clear or is 
transmitted with major delays, elections are questioned and more likely to be rejected. 
When the vote tabulation is delayed, when results only trickle in or are postponed, tensions 
and suspicions increase, potentially leading to challenges and protests. In the first round of 
the 2010 presidential elections in Haiti, the preliminary results were widely questioned and 
their announcement was followed by violent protests across the country. Problems in the 
tabulation of votes and the review of tally sheets by the Vote Tabulation Centre (CTV) 
fuelled suspicions about the integrity of the process. An OAS expert mission that verified 
the work of the CTV concluded it could not support the preliminary results of the 
presidential elections (OAS CARICOM, 2010: 93). From this, the hypothesis which follows 
is that an election is more likely to be accepted if election results are transparent. When 
results are not transparent and available they can create confusion and suspicion among 
the citizenry and political parties. In turn, this tension can easily lead to serious challenges 
to the election and its legitimacy.  
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Transparency in election results can take three values, depending on their degree of 
transparency. If election results are completely transparent or if the conditions of visibility 
and inferability are present to a large degree they are coded with a ‘3’. If, for example, there 
are minor issues with the communication or announcement of results, such as a small 
delay or a short lived technical problem, results are considered as transparent and fall into 
this category.  Then, if results are moderately transparent they are coded with a ‘2’. This is 
when election results present some issues and are only somewhat visible and inferable. 
Then, election results with low transparency (that are completely flawed and neither visible 
nor inferable) are coded as “1”. This occurs when election results present major issues 
(information blackouts, major delays, restriction of access to parties or citizens, etc.)  
Examples of this include the 2006 election in Haiti, where international observers were 
refused access to the tabulation centre (European Parliament, 2006) and the 2009 election 
in Ecuador, where considerable delays in the transmission of results, lead to up to 40% of 
tally sheets being delayed and to different information provided by the official website and 
that offered to political parties (European Union, 2009). Information for measuring this 
variable is obtained from Election Observation Mission Reports, which typically include a 
section on election results. This section describes the procedures and activities for vote 
counting, tabulation, aggregation, transmission and announcement of results and notes any 
irregularities and mistakes that affect this process. 
5.2.3 Sources of information: International Election Observation Missions. 
There are a number of methods that can help us obtain information about a specific 
election. These include election forensics, expert and mass surveys and even scientific 
experiments. However none of these methods are appropriate as they do not provide in 
depth information about our three key conditions of study: political party support to EMBs, 
election quality and the transparency of election. Only the assessments conducted by 
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informed and trained international Election Observation Missions (EOMs) are relevant for 
this analysis.  
Post-election forensics check the accuracy of election results and aim to detect incorrect 
results arising from deliberate or unintentional malpractice, either by polling officers, 
election administrators or computer programmers. These are useful for ensuring the 
accuracy of the vote count, of voting machines, or even the accuracy of the election 
outcome (Dopp, 2009).  However, these studies are only designed as an audit of results. 
With them we can check and certify if the outcome and results offered by the government 
or election authorities is real. However, these studies do not provide information on aspects 
such as the quality of the election or the transparency of its results.    
Surveys can be a useful tool for obtaining information about an election. First, mass 
surveys are useful for assessing the perceptions of citizens about the entire electoral 
process and about its specific components. However, information provided by mass 
surveys is a bit general. Furthermore citizens are not specialists and therefore the depth we 
can reach with these surveys is limited as there are certain technical aspects such as 
campaign finance or electoral district delimitation that are difficult to grasp (Martinez I 
Coma, Norris and Frank, 2015). Second, expert surveys can overcome this challenge and 
provide more detailed and specialised information about an election. An example is the 
Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index (Norris, Frank and Martinez i Coma, 2013), 
which asks experts to evaluate the quality of elections worldwide by using 49 indicators 
grouped into the eleven components that make up the election cycle. Here, experts are 
defined as social scientists with demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a 
particular country (such as through publications, university employment or membership of 
relevant groups or networks). However, expert surveys are also limited as the information 
they provide is restricted to the indicators/questions contained in the survey. If the 
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researcher needs further and more detailed information then other methods might be more 
appropriate. 
Election experiments allow examining the effects of interventions applied to treatment and 
control groups. Randomized Control Trials (RCT), for instance, can determine whether 
there is a cause and effect relation between certain mechanism and an outcome. The study 
of the impact of treatments in electoral behaviour is quite popular. Examples include 
analysing the impact of festivals featuring music and free food on voter turnout (Addonizio, 
Glaser and Green, 2016), the effect of exposing voters to candidate information during 
Japan’s 2004 Upper House Election (Horiuchi and Taniguchi, 2007), the effect of 
conditional cash transfers on electoral behaviour in Mexico (De la O, 2013) or the 
effectiveness of robocalls in Texas (Green, Gimple and Gerber, 2012). While experimental 
methods are useful for estimating causal effects and testing interventions, they are not 
relevant for obtaining information about our key variables. Moreover, election experiments 
also present some limitations as treatments cannot be applied to all types of situations 
given ethical, material and practical considerations.  
As shown above, election forensics, mass and expert surveys and election experiments are 
not adequate for obtaining information on key aspects surrounding an election such as the 
support of political parties for election institutions, the overall quality of the election or the 
degree of transparency of election results. While these sources are relevant when auditing 
results, gauging opinions and perceptions or identifying causal effects and measuring the 
impact of treatments, they do not provide systematic, comprehensive and in depth 
information about what happens before, during and after election day.   
Therefore this research relies on the information contained in Election Observation 
Missions (EOMs) reports. First, EOMs are systematic analyses of the election and its main 
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components, including the three key aspects we are interested in studying.  As Lean (2004) 
indicates, election observation in the Americas has evolved from missions consisting of a 
limited and mostly diplomatic international presence, to systematic and integral evaluations 
of the process. ‘Integral’ evaluations cover activities taking place before, during and after 
election day and include monitoring aspects such as voter registration, media coverage, 
voter education, EMB performance, training of poll workers, vote transmission/tabulation, 
announcement of election results and post-election disputes, to name a few.  Second, 
these activities are covered in depth, which is ideal when the research requires detailed 
information about a specific activity or process. Third, EOMs in the Americas are becoming 
increasingly professional with rising resources, personnel and length of stay of observers 
(Lean, 2004). For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) has developed and 
incorporated a number of tools and methodologies for conducting a detailed, impartial and 
professional observation of an election. These include general guidelines such as the 
‘Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions’ and the ‘Criteria for Electoral Observation’ 
along with guides for observing specific aspects such as the ‘Methodology to Monitor the 
Integration of New Technologies in Electoral Processes’ and the ‘Methodology for Media 
Observation’ (OAS, 2012d) 
However, using EOMs as an information source also has some potential issues. First, as 
Daexcker and Schneider (2014) point out, not all election observation missions and their 
assessments are top quality and sometimes, for the same election, assessments by 
different delegations can be quite dissimilar or even contradictory. This happened in the 
2004 legislative elections in Kazahstan, where the Council of Europe (COE) and the OSCE 
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) criticised the election, while the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) minimised its irregularities. Second, and in 
relation to this, we can have a large number of EOMs –domestic and internal- producing 
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different reports for the same election. Moreover, these reports tend to be very different as 
EOMs vary in resources, staff and agendas.  
To minimise this risk, all election observation mission reports used in this research come 
from organizations that have endorsed the Declaration of Principles for International 
Election Observation (United Nations, 2005). This Declaration, commemorated on October 
2005 at the United Nations, outlines the importance of holding genuine democratic 
elections and sets out requirements, principles and objectives for election observation. In 
addition, the Declaration is accompanied by a Code of Conduct for International Election 
Observers. This code ensures that observers maintain strict political impartiality at all times, 
respect the laws of the country and the authority of electoral bodies and the integrity of the 
International EOM, do not obstruct electoral processes and maintain accuracy of 
observations and professionalism in drawing conclusions. As a result, these guidelines 
contribute to having more comprehensive, accurate and impartial observations. 
5.3 Case selection 
To test the hypotheses outlined above, I conduct an analysis of presidential elections in 
Latin America from the year 2000 to date. This includes 48 elections in 15 countries. The 
case selection is explained by the following reasons: 
First, the cases selected are countries from Latin America. This focus has been employed 
as this is a region with similar levels of democracy (all countries in the region are 
considered part of the “Third Wave” of democratization), and as countries in the region all 
have presidential political systems as well as other similar control variables (e.g. former 
Spanish or Portuguese colonies).  
Second, this study focuses on presidential elections. In these elections stakes and 
engagement are high (Howell and Justwan, 2013) and they are most likely to find a low 
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acceptance of the outcome. Moreover, they allow controlling for the type of electoral 
system. Presidential elections are majoritarian games with a winner-takes-all logic. The 
candidate with the most votes is declared the winner and as results are not proportional; all 
other candidates are excluded from the spoils of office. There is only one seat available 
and the winner not only gets the presidential office but also gets to control the cabinet15, 
keeping out the losers. In short, “winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire 
period of the presidential mandate” (Linz, 1978:56) and the supporters of a particular 
contender “know that they will not be represented at the highest levels if their preferred 
candidate/party loses” (Howell and Justwan, 2013: 334). This exclusion, which is more 
present in majoritarian than in proportional and consensual regimes, leads to lower levels 
of system support and satisfaction with democracy amongst losers (Anderson and Guillory, 
1997).  
In addition, selecting presidential elections means focusing on one election, rather than on 
tens or hundreds of elections, as would be the case for parliamentary/legislative elections. 
Election Observation Mission reports for legislative contests consider the activities 
surrounding all the elections held in that contest. This can be a large number; depending on 
the size of the national Congress (e.g. The lower house in Argentina has 257 deputies 
while the Chamber of Deputies in Mexico has 500 seats). Therefore, it is not possible to 
pinpoint if a particular issue is related to one election or another. In contrast, EOMs about 
presidential elections only focus on that election and its components.  
Third, elections in this study were all organised by independent and permanent electoral 
institutions. Independent EMBs are characterised by being institutionally at arms-length 
                                                          
15  Although members from other political parties might be included in the cabinet, I agree with Howell and 
Justwan (2013) when they argue that the president and the winning political party are the main source of 
power within the executive branch in presidential elections. 
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from the executive branch and separate of the structure of the government (ACE, 2014c). 
This allows controlling for other institutional designs. It is also relevant for this study since in 
government based EMBs, it is not possible to independently assess the support of political 
parties to the electoral institution. Finally, cases selected are all elections where the popular 
will counted. As a result, for example, the 2002 presidential election in Bolivia was not 
included as the second round between Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and Evo Morales was 
decided by the National Congress and not by a direct popular vote.  
Fourth, all elections included in this study have been monitored by international election 
observation missions and particularly by organizations that have endorsed the Declaration 
of Principles for International Election Observation (United Nations, 2005). This is as EOMs 
are the primary source of information for this chapter and, as discussed above, this allows 
relying on professional and impartial observations. In order to check for this, I used the 
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, which includes a “regions and countries” section 
providing lists with several election observation mission reports. EOM reports included in 
this website are conducted by organisations who have endorsed the Declaration of 
Principles. However, in order not to limit the sample of reports to those available on one 
single website (ACE), I use all EOM reports by organizations that have endorsed the 
Declaration of Principles. Therefore, when existing reports were not found on ACE, I used 
the website of the specific organisation conducting the observation (such as the 
Organization of American States) to retrieve it. 
The application of these criteria produces 48 elections in 15 Latin American countries 
between 2000 and 2015: Haiti (2000), Dominican Republic (2000), Mexico (2000), 
Venezuela (2000), Peru (2000), Honduras (2001), Nicaragua (2001),  Peru (2001), 
Colombia (2002), Ecuador (2002), Guatemala (2003), Paraguay (2003), Dominican 
Republic (2004), El Salvador (2004), Panama (2004), Honduras (2005), Bolivia (2005), 
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Haiti (2006), Mexico (2006), Nicaragua (2006), Colombia (2006), Costa Rica (2006), 
Venezuela (2006), Ecuador (2006), Peru (2006), Guatemala (2007), Dominican Republic 
(2008), Paraguay (2008), Bolivia (2009), Honduras (2009), El Salvador (2009), Panama 
(2009), Ecuador (2009), Costa Rica (2010), Colombia (2010), Haiti (2011), Guatemala 
(2011), Nicaragua (2011), Peru (2011), Dominican Republic (2012), Mexico (2012), 
Venezuela (2012), Honduras (2013), Paraguay (2013), Venezuela (2013), Ecuador (2013), 
Salvador (2014) and Costa Rica (2014). 
5.4 Qualitative Comparative Analysis.  
5.4.1 Data and Measures 
The above mentioned variables and their effect on the acceptance of election results are 
tested using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). As described in the methodology 
section, QCA has been characterised as a third or intermediate research approach that 
combines the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative research (Halperin and 
Heath, 2012; Ragin, 1987). As such, this approach allows having a deep understanding of 
cases while also being able to test variables and conduct formal analyses. Therefore, this 
technique can compare across cases and identify the combination or different combinations 
of conditions that produce certain result. Moreover, as a set-theoretic method QCA allows 
us to find out both the necessary and sufficient conditions behind the outcome. This is 
relevant for this research as it can illustrate if high quality elections are sufficient for the 
acceptance of election results or if there are other factors at play. 
There are four different techniques for conducting a QCA, widely discussed in the 
methodological chapter. These depend on how many values the different variables take 
and are labelled as crisp set, multi-value, fuzzy-set and generalized-set QCA. Out of these 
techniques, the most appropriate choice for this research is multi-value QCA (mvQCA) 
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which involves ordinal variables. This allows this method to capture additional dimensions 
of complexity over classical binary choice models (Haesebrouck, 2016). With crisp set QCA 
variables need to be dichotomized and cases need to be either completely inside or outside 
the set. This might be useful for some variables in our study, but not for all. For instance, a 
democracy passes the ‘two turnover test’ or not, election results are close or not (more or 
less than a 5% difference between candidates) and political parties either support or reject 
the EMB. However, this is not the case for out other variables. An electoral process not 
necessarily is either completely free and fair or completely flawed and not free; while 
election results are not completely transparent or completely opaque, intermediate options 
are needed. This is where the value of mvQCA is shown, allowing for greater depth and 
variation.  As for the dependent variable, in multi-value QCA it must be binary, which is 
relevant to our study. This is as although it is true that the reaction to election results can 
take many forms, in this case we are only interested in their acceptance or rejection. This 
coding is summarized in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1 Description and Coding of Variables. 
Variable name 
/Abbreviation 
Description  Coding 
Acceptance of election 
results: ACCEPT 
Announcement of acceptance of results 
and/or no post-election mass protests. 
Acceptance of results = 1. 
Rejection of results = 0. 
Consolidated 
Democracy:  
DEMOCRACY 
Countries passing the ‘two turnover test’ of 
democratic consolidation 
Consolidated democracy = 1. 
Non-consolidated democracy  = 0. 
Close Elections: 
CLOSE 
Elections with a 5% or less margin of 
difference between the first and the second 
place. 
Close election = 1. 
Not close=0 
Political Party Support: Acceptance of political parties of the Acceptance of the electoral institution by 
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PARTY electoral institution and/or its top staff. political parties = 1. 
Rejection of the electoral institution = 0. 
Quality of Elections: 
QUALITY 
Meeting of international standards for 
election administration. Quality election: “
Completely free and fair” and “free and fair 
with minor problems”. Flawed elections: “
Free and fair with major problems” and “Not 
free and fair”. 
Completely free and fair or free and fair 
with minor problems= 3. 
Free and fair with major problems=2 
Not free and fair= 1.  
Transparent results: 
RESULTS 
Transparent (visible and inferable) election 
results. 
 
High transparency (completely 
transparent  or transparent with minor 
issues) = 3 
Moderate transparency  (some issues) 
=2 
Not transparent with major issues = 1 
 
5.4.1.1 The Data  
For undertaking the mvQCA analysis, a data table must be constructed. This table needs to 
include all the cases, conditions (independent variables) and outcomes (dependent 
variable). The first column of this table includes all cases to be analysed. The following four 
columns refer to the causal conditions that help explain the outcome. The outcome is 
included in the last column. The different rows contain the values (presence or absence) for 
each of the conditions and outcome. They also contain all their possible combinations. Data 
for this table were collected through qualitative research and then coded to illustrate the 
cases that meet the conditions and those that do not.  
In this table (see Table 5.2 below), the first column is labelled as “ELECTION” and contains 
a name code for each of the forty eight elections to be analysed. The code employed is the 
127 
 
 
 
officially assigned ISO 3166-1  three letter english country code16, followed by the year of 
the election. For instance, HND2005 refers to the 2005 Honduran presidential election. 
Column two refers to whether a country is classified as a consolidated democracy and is 
labelled as “DEMOCRACY”. A country that passes the ‘two turnover test’ is identified by a 
“1” while countries that do not pass the test are coded with “0”.  Column three contains 
information about the closeness of the results and is identified as “CLOSE”. Cases with 
ample victories are coded with a “1” and cases of close elections (<5% margin between 
winner and runner up) are coded with a “0”. Column four describes the support of political 
parties to electoral institutions and is identified as “PARTY”. Cases of political support to 
electoral institutions are coded with a “1” and cases where political parties do not support 
electoral institutions are identified by a “0”. Column five speaks about election quality and is 
identified by the label “QUALITY”. When an election is completely free and fair or free and 
fair with minor problems it is coded with a “3”; when it presents significant problems but 
there are not sufficient to change the outcome of the election, it is coded as “2”; and when it 
is not free and fair with significant flaws it is coded as “1”. ”. Column six refers to the 
provision of transparent results and uses the label “RESULTS”. This is coded as “3” if 
election results are completely transparent (visible and inferable) / or only present minor 
issues; “2” if they are somewhat transparent with some issues and “1” if they are not 
transparent. Column six contains the value of the outcome for each of the forty eight 
elections and is labelled as “ACCEPT”. When an election is accepted, it is coded as “1”, 
when it is rejected it is coded as “0”.   
 
 
                                                          
16 United Nations (2016) Country codes: ISO 3166 [Online]: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/Country-Code 
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Table 5.2 QCA data table 
ELECTION DEMOCRACY CLOSE PARTY QUALITY RESULTS ACCEPT 
HTI2000 0 1 0 1 1 0 
DOM2000 1 1 1 3 2 1 
MEX2000 0 1 1 3 3 1 
VEN2000 1 1 0 2 2 0 
PER2000 0 1 0 1 1 0 
HND2001 1 1 1 3 2 1 
NIC2001 1 1 1 3 2 1 
PER2001 0 1 1 3 3 1 
COL2002 1 1 1 3 3 1 
ECU2002 0 1 1 3 3 1 
GTM2003 1 1 1 3 3 1 
PRY2003 1 1 1 3 3 1 
DOM2004 1 1 1 3 3 1 
SLV2004 1 1 1 3 3 1 
PAN2004 1 1 1 3 3 1 
HND2005 1 0 0 3 1 0 
BOL2005 1 1 1 3 3 1 
HTI2006 0 1 1 2 1 0 
MEX2006 0 0 0 3 1 0 
NIC2006 1 1 0 3 2 1 
CRI2006 1 0 1 3 3 1 
COL2006 1 1 1 3 3 1 
VEN2006 1 1 1 3 3 1 
ECU2006 0 1 1 3 1 0 
PER2006 0 1 1 3 3 1 
GTM2007 1 1 1 3 3 1 
DOM2008 1 1 1 3 2 1 
PRY2008 1 1 1 3 3 1 
BOL2009 1 1 1 3 2 1 
HND2009 0 1 0 3 2 0 
SLV2009 1 0 1 3 3 1 
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PAN2009 1 1 1 3 3 1 
ECU2009 1 1 1 3 1 0 
CRI2010 1 1 1 3 3 1 
COL2010 1 1 1 3 3 1 
HTI2011 0 1 0 2 2 0 
GTM2011 1 1 1 3 3 1 
NIC2011 1 1 0 2 1 0 
PER2011 1 0 1 3 3 1 
DOM2012 1 0 1 3 3 1 
MEX2012 1 1 1 3 3 1 
VEN2012 1 1 1 3 3 1 
HND2013 1 1 1 3 1 0 
PRY2013 1 1 1 3 3 1 
VEN2013 1 0 0 2 3 0 
ECU2013 1 1 0 3 3 1 
SLV2014 1 0 0 3 2 0 
CRI2014 1 1 1 3 3 1 
 
5.4.2 Accepting (and rejecting) election results 
5.4.2.1 First results 
a) Truth table 
The next step in the QCA is to synthetize this data table into a more analytical “truth table”. 
This is a mathematical table that uses Boolean algebra to summarise the raw information of 
the data table and sort cases according to their characteristics. As such, individual cases 
are grouped together into subsets of cases that share the same conditions and are 
associated to the same outcome. These combinations of conditions are known as 
configurations and are the basic structure of the truth table. Therefore, if two or more cases 
same the same configuration, they are grouped together. The purpose of this is to look for 
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configurations that are sufficient for the outcome and therefore to discover which paths lead 
to either the acceptance or rejection of election results. This “table of configurations” 
(Rihoux and De Meur, 2009:44) is shown below (table 5.3) and displays the 18 
configurations yielded by the 48 observed cases.  
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Table 5.3 QCA truth table. 
ELECTION DEMOCRACY CLOSE PARTY QUALITY RESULTS ACCEPT 
COL2002, GTM2003, PRY2003, 
DOM2004, SLV2004, PAN2004, 
BOL2005, COL2006, VEN2006, 
GTM2007, PRY2008, PAN2009, 
CRI2010, COL2010, GTM2011, 
MEX2012, VEN2012, PRY2013, 
CRI2014 1 1 1 3 3 1 
DOM2000, HND2001, NIC2001, 
DOM2008, BOL2009 1 1 1 3 2 1 
MEX2000, PER2001, ECU2002, 
PER2006 
0 1 1 3 3 1 
CRI2006, SLV2009, PER2011, 
DOM2012 
1 0 1 3 3 1 
ECU2013 1 1 0 3 3 1 
NIC2006 1 1 0 3 2 1 
ECU2009, HND2013 1 1 1 3 1 0 
VEN2000 1 1 0 2 2 0 
NIC2011 1 1 0 2 1 0 
SLV2014 1 0 0 3 2 0 
HND2005 1 0 0 3 1 0 
VEN2013 1 0 0 2 3 0 
ECU2006 0 1 1 3 1 0 
HTI2006 0 1 1 2 1 0 
HND2009 0 1 0 3 2 0 
HTI2011 0 1 0 2 2 0 
HTI2000, PER2000 0 1 0 1 1 0 
MEX2006 0 0 0 3 1 0 
N=48 (total number of cases = 48).  
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In this truth table, cases are identified by “ELECTION” and variables by their uppercase 
labels: “DEMOCRACY”, “CLOSE”, PARTY”, “QUALITY” and “RESULTS”. The outcome is 
“ACCEPT”. Each row represents a configuration which contains a subset of cases with the 
same characteristics that lead to an outcome. The first row groups together several 
elections (from Colombia 2002 to Costa Rica in 2014) which were held in consolidated 
democracies, where political parties supported the electoral institutions, where the electoral 
process was of a high quality and election results were transparent. In addition the result 
was not close, as the margin of victory of the winner was comfortable (more than 5%).  This 
configuration has a “1” outcome, which means that election results were accepted. The 
second row groups five cases (Dominican Republic 2000, Honduras 2001, Nicaragua 2001, 
Dominican Republic 2008 and Bolivia 2009) with very similar characteristics (not close 
elections held in consolidated democracies with political party support and good election 
quality). Here, however, election results presented some issues and were only partially 
transparent.  Row number three (Mexico 2000, Peru 2001, Ecuador 2002 and Peru 2006) 
is very similar to the first row as well, with the exception that this happened in a country 
which had not yet changed power twice through free and fair elections. Row four (Costa 
Rica 2006, Salvador 2009, Peru 2011, Dominican Republic 2012) also describes a 
configuration leading to the acceptance of results, with strong party support to electoral 
institutions, high quality election and the provision of transparent results. In this case 
however, results were quite close. Rows five and six (Nicaragua 2006 and Ecuador 2013, 
respectively) show cases of high quality elections with no political party support where 
election margins were wide and acceptance followed.  
Then, rows 7 to 18 describe paths that lead to the rejection of results. At a glance, we can 
see that most elections contained in these rows presented significant problems, low 
transparency in election results and a lack of political party support for electoral institutions. 
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This includes cases of elections with very low integrity and highly questioned such as the 
ones that took place in Haiti in 2000 and Peru in 2000 and Nicaragua 2011 (row number 
17). These were held in non-fully democratic countries were political parties doubted and/or 
rejected electoral institutions and were the electoral process and the production, 
transmission and communication of results was plagued by irregularities. As a result, 
election results were rejected. These are, of course, extreme examples and other rows 
show other cases of rejection. To provide an example, in the Haiti 2011 election (row 16) 
although the organisation of elections improved from the first round to the second round 
from a technical, organisational and security point of view, the impartiality and ability of the 
CEP was highly questioned and there was a long delay in the tabulation and 
communication of results (OAS-CARICOM, 2011), leading to protests and violence. 
Most importantly, this table illustrates which configurations lead to a “1” or “0” outcome. Six 
different configurations (the first six rows in the table, representing 34 cases: Dominican 
Republic 2000, Mexico 2000, Honduras 2001, Nicaragua 2001, Peru 2001, Colombia 2002, 
Ecuador 2002, Guatemala 2003, Paraguay 2003, Dominican Republic 2004, Panama 
2004, Salvador 2004, Bolivia 2005, Colombia 2006, Costa Rica 2006, Venezuela 2006, 
Nicaragua 2006, Peru 2006, Guatemala 2007, Dominican Republic 2008, Paraguay 2008, 
Bolivia 2009, Panama 2009, Costa Rica 2010, Colombia 2010, Salvador 2009, Guatemala 
2011, Peru 2011, Dominican Republic 2012,  Ecuador 2013, Mexico 2012, Venezuela 
2012, Paraguay 2013 and Costa Rica 2014) lead to the acceptance of election results, 
while twelve configurations (the last twelve rows in the table, representing 14 cases: Haiti 
2000, Peru 2000, Venezuela 2000, Honduras 2005, Haiti 2006, Ecuador 2006, Mexico 
2006, Ecuador 2009,  Honduras 2009, Haiti 2011, Nicaragua 2011,  Honduras 2013, 
Venezuela 2013 and Salvador 2014) produce a rejection of results. There are no logical 
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contradictions or contradictory configurations in this truth table, which means there are no 
configurations that lead to a “0” outcome in some cases and to a “1” outcome in others. 
b) The formulae 
The truth table provides a good first synthesis of the information. It shows which cases and 
configurations lead to the acceptance of results and which do not. However, it does not tell 
us how the different causal conditions interact to produce a result. Therefore, the 
configurations need to be compared to each other and then simplified so that we can 
identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a specific outcome. This process is 
known as Boolean minimization and it is carried out by specialist QCA software17. 
Configurations can be reduced to arrive at more parsimonious solutions. For doing so, QCA 
relies on Boolean algebra, which reduces the different configurations into a minimal formula 
that describes more generalised combinations of conditions that lead to an outcome (“0” or 
“1”).  This reduction means that “if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal 
condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the 
two expressions can be considered irrelevant and be removed to create a simpler, 
combined expression” (Ragin, 1987:93 in Rihoux and De Meur, 2009:35). 
5.4.2.2 Results 
This research presents its results in two steps. First, it provides the results using a ‘complex 
solution’. Then, a second formula will further reduce this to get a ‘parsimonious solution’. 
Both solutions are presented using the following notation: each variable (name in 
uppercase letters) is followed by a number corresponding to the specific coding of that 
variable (e.g. Quality {3} would refer to generally free and fair elections, quality {2} to 
                                                          
17 This research employed Tosmana software Version 1.302.  
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elections with major issues and quality {1} to elections that are not free and fair). The 
logical operator “AND” is represented by a multiplication symbol (*), while the logical 
operator “OR” is represented by an addition symbol (+). The connection between the 
different variables and the outcomes (or causal link) is represented by an arrow symbol (→). 
(Rihoux and De Meur, 2009:35)  
a) The formulae 
The complex solution.  
First, we ask the software to minimise the configurations contained in the truth table to a 
complex solution. This solution does not allow for any simplifying assumptions to be 
included. These are based on counterfactuals and used to theorise whether a configuration 
of conditions not present in the data would lead to the outcome or not (Legewie, 2013). In 
short, simplifying assumptions are those remainders which are not present in the data but 
are logically possible. Excluding logical remainders (in short, cases which have not been 
observed empirically), we obtained the following formulae: 
DEMOCRACY{1} * CLOSE{1} * QUALITY{3} * RESULTS{2}  
+ CLOSE{1} * PARTY{1} * QUALITY{3} * RESULTS{3}  
+ DEMOCRACY{1} * PARTY{1} * QUALITY{3} * RESULTS{3}  
+ DEMOCRACY{1} * CLOSE{1} * QUALITY{3} * RESULTS{3}  
 
→ACCEPTANCE 
It has four terms, separated by the notation “+” (OR), each describing a combination of 
conditions that lead to the “1” outcome. These terms can be read as: 
A consolidated democracy (DEMOCRACY1) AND non-close election results (CLOSE1) 
AND a high quality election (QUALITY) and somewhat transparent results (RESULTS2) 
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OR 
Non close election results (close) AND political party support (PARTY1), AND a high quality 
election (QUALITY3) and transparent results (RESULTS3), 
OR 
A consolidated democracy (DEMOCRACY1) AND political party support (PARTY1) AND a 
high quality election (QUALITY3) and transparent results (RESULTS3), 
OR 
A consolidated democracy (DEMOCRACY1) AND non close election results (CLOSE1) 
AND a high quality election (QUALITY3) and transparent results (RESULTS3) 
Lead to the acceptance of electoral results (ACCEPT). 
The parsimonious solution 
This first formula is still quite complex and needs to be further minimised into a more 
parsimonious solution. This is a streamlined version of the complex solution which gives 
the minimum conditions required for the outcome (Ragin, 2007). To arrive at this, the QCA 
software needs to use simplifying assumptions. This brings logical remainders into the 
analysis. After including logical remainders the QCA software gives the following 
parsimonious expressions:  
DEMOCRACY{1}CLOSE{1}PARTY{0}QUALITY{3} 
 
PARTY{1}RESULTS{2,3}+  
 
→ACCEPTANCE 
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This formula can be read as: 
A consolidated democracy (DEMOCRACY1) AND non-close election results (CLOSE1) 
AND no party support (PARTY0) AND a high quality election (QUALITY3) 
OR 
Political party support (PARTY) AND the provision of moderate or highly transparent results 
(RESULTS2,3), 
Lead to the acceptance of electoral results (ACCEPT). 
This parsimonious solution presents the paths that lead to the acceptance of results. As we 
can see, no condition by itself leads to the acceptance of results. Rather, it is a combination 
of conditions that can lead to this. The first path shows that holding free and fair elections in 
a consolidated democracy is sufficient for the acceptance of results, as long as the election 
result is not close. This is observed in the cases of Nicaragua in 2006 and Ecuador in 2013. 
A second path of minimally necessary and sufficient conditions illustrates that elections are 
accepted when there is support of political parties for the electoral institution and moderate 
to highly transparent election results. This is observed in the cases of Dominican Republic 
2000, Honduras 2001, Nicaragua 2001, Dominican Republic 2008, Bolivia 2009, Mexico 
2000, Peru 2001, Ecuador 2002, Peru 2006, Colombia 2002, Guatemala 2003, Paraguay 
2003, Dominican Republic 2004, Salvador 2004, Panama 2004, Bolivia 2005, Colombia 
2006, Venezuela 2006, Guatemala 2007, Paraguay 2008, Costa Rica 2010, Colombia 
2010, Guatemala 2011, Mexico 2012, Venezuela 2012, Paraguay 2013, Costa Rica 2014, 
Costa Rica 2006, Salvador 2009, Peru 2011 and Dominican Republic 2012. It is important 
to note that all of these cases, with no exception, also held elections that met international 
standards of election administration. However, this condition is not a part of the formula as 
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having a free and fair election does not necessarily lead to accepting the election. As 
shown by the truth table, high quality elections are sometimes followed by rejection.  
It is important to mention that, although not included in the final QCA model, in my research 
I originally tested an additional control variable. In order to strengthen the rigour of the 
analysis I thought about including another variable based on rational choice theories. I 
decided to include a condition related to the degree of institutionalisation of the regime and 
its political institutions. This is potentially relevant for the analysis as it is related to the 
stability of the regime (Huntington, 1968; Panebianco, 1988). In this view, relationships and 
processes become more institutionalised and, more importantly, political organizations 
sacrifice their short term objectives –such as challenging an election’s results for strategic 
reasons- for long term goals. 
To measure institutionalisation I use V-DEM’s Party Institutionalisation Index, which covers 
173 countries from 1900 to 2015 and thus all the countries in the QCA model (Bizzarro, 
Hicken and Self, 2017). Other indices do not cover all cases selected for the QCA as they 
are not as comprehensive in terms of time and geographical span. The index asks ‘to what 
extent are political parties institutionalized’  and takes  into account various attributes of 
political parties in a country such as level and depth of organization, coherence of party 
platforms and party-line voting among representatives within the legislature, amongst 
others. It is measured on a 0 to 100 scale, where higher scores relate to higher levels of 
institutionalization. 
Testing this variable, however, presented two main problems, leading to it being removed 
from the analysis. First, there was not enough variance in the dataset. I first divided the 0-
100 Institutionalization Index into 3 levels (<0.33 of institutionalisation, from 0.34 to .66 and 
> .66), however no cases fell in the first category. I also tried coding it as binary variable 
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with two values, 1 for >50 and 0 for <0, however most cases (43 out of 48) formed part of 
the group with values over .50. Second, and most importantly, using this control variable 
did not add anything to the model. Testing the model with this variable yielded the same 
results as the original model which did not include the variable. When ‘party 
institutionalisation’ was included in the model, the QCA software dropped it from the 
parsimonious formula, therefore yielding the same result as when the variable is not 
included (DEMOCRACY{1}CLOSE{1}PARTY{0}QUALITY{3} + PARTY{1}RESULTS{2,3}). 
‘Party Institutionalization’ was superfluous and had no impact in the outcome. I therefore 
removed it from the analysis to make it more parsimonious and straightforward. 
5.4.2.3 Interpreting the results 
Two paths that lead to the acceptance of election results. The first path that leads to the 
acceptance of the outcome requires a consolidated democracy context (a country that has 
passed the two turnover test) along with a high quality electoral process. If an election 
meets these two conditions, provided that election results are not close, then it is likely that 
election results will be accepted. This was the case of the Nicaragua 2006 and Ecuador 
2013 elections. In relation to the 2006 elections in Nicaragua, the OAS Election 
Observation Mission concluded that the country’s electoral system is inclusive, free and 
fair. It also highlighted that the elections were competitive, transparent and legal (OAS, 
2013a). In addition, Daniel Ortega of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN), 
obtained victory with a margin of almost 10% over his closest rival. Any doubts surrounding 
the composition of the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) were dissipated after this 
comfortable result. The outcome of the 2013 general election in Ecuador was quite similar. 
Before the election the CNE was criticised by different election stakeholders, including the 
main opposition political parties. In particular, and as noted in the final report of the OAS 
Election Observation Mission, political parties called into question the composition of the 
140 
 
 
 
board of the electoral institution and raised issues about its impartiality (OAS, 2013b). 
However, the ample margin of victory allowed clearing all doubts. In the first round, Rafael 
Correa obtained 57.17% of the votes, whilst Guillermo Lasso the runner up received only 
22.68%. A second round was not needed.  
However, if the margin of victory is narrow, then the chances of people not accepting the 
results increase. If we consider the doubts about the electoral institutions in both Nicaragua 
and Ecuador, a narrow margin might have complicated things. Therefore, if results are 
close, then their acceptance might require more than a democratic context and a high 
quality election. The cases of Salvador in 2009 and Peru in 2011 (row four in the truth 
table) provide good examples if this. In Peru a very intense election campaign ended with a 
very narrow margin between the winner and the runner up. In the second and final round, 
Ollanta Humana from the party Peru Wins, obtained 51.49% of votes, while Keiko Fujimori, 
from Force 2011 received 48.51% of the total. This heated campaign ended peacefully, 
with both sides accepting the election results. This was achieved because of a very 
successful organisation of the election by the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales 
(ONPE) and by the effort made to shorten the times for transferring official tally sheets and 
for transmitting election results (OAS, 2011). In addition, the OAS observation mission 
commended the work of the ONPE by keeping public opinion well informed throughout the 
electoral process (OAS, 2011).  The Salvador 2009 election was quite similar.  In this 
election, Mauricio Funes from the FMLN defeated Rodrigo Avila from ARENA by just 
70,000 votes (a 3% margin). This could have easily led to serious challenges in what was 
labelled the ‘most polarised and uncertain election campaign since the signing of the 1992 
Peace Accords’ which ended the civil war in the country (OAS, 2009:28). However, a high 
quality election, paired with support from political parties to the Tribunal Supremo Electoral 
141 
 
 
 
(TSE) and a clear and transparent communication of results played a key role in the 
acceptance of election results. 
These last two cases give a clue about the second path that leads to the acceptance of 
election results. This second path occurs when there is support of political parties for the 
electoral institution   and when election results are moderately or highly transparent. 
Individually, these conditions are important, but taken together, they form a necessary and 
sufficient combination. Then, if a given election has all these conditions present, it is very 
likely that electoral results will be accepted. In fact, if an election gathers these conditions it 
does not matter if the results were close or not.  Therefore, for this path, we can interpret 
that this condition is superfluous to this path and does not have an impact on the 
acceptance of results. A good example for describing how these elements work together to 
produce a successful process is the Colombia 2010 election. In this election, the well-
respected and trusted 9 board members of the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
organised an exemplary election. Learning from the mistakes of previous elections, and 
especially from the March parliamentary process, they improved a number of key logistical 
aspects for the smooth running of the election (including the setting up of polling stations, 
training of polling officials and improved systems for filling tally sheets and counting). In 
addition, the OAS election observation mission praised the communication of election 
results. For instance, only two hours after the polls closed, almost 98% of the information 
had already been received (OAS, 2010). Finally, this election was considered the less 
violent in the last few decades (OAS, 2010:54). At the end, it also helped that results were 
decisive, as in the second round, Juan Manuel Santos from the U party obtained 69.1% of 
votes, in comparison to the 27.5% reported for Antanas Mockus, from the Green Party.  
As indicated, when these conditions are met, little it matters that the election results were 
close. This can be illustrated by the Costa Rica 2006 presidential election, a closely fought 
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election which was accepted in spite of a very narrow margin of victory (less than 20,000 
votes).18 The acceptance of the election began with the high degree of support from 
political parties to the Supreme Tribunal for Elections (TSE) and continued with an electoral 
process described by international electoral observers as “orderly, free, clean and civic” 
(CAPEL, 2006:6). Then, a few hours after the election had ended, preliminary results (after 
88.45% of stations were counted) showed that the difference between the two candidates 
was of only 3,250 votes. This close margin created tensions amongst citizens and political 
parties; anyone could win. Therefore, and in order to defuse these tensions and eliminate 
all possible suspicions, the TSE ordered the manual count of each and every vote from the 
remaining 712 polling stations (11.55% of the total). This recount, along with all other the 
aspects of the results phase, was characterised by being clear, accurate and transparent. 
The TSE established clear rules for the manual count and partial and final results were 
widely available for political parties, citizens and the media (Valverde, 2008). Acceptance 
followed. 
The conditions behind the acceptance of results 
Looking deeper into the second path that leads to the acceptance of results, we should 
analyse each of the key conditions. As recalled, individually these conditions do not 
guarantee the acceptance of election results. By themselves, they are necessary, but they 
need to act together in order to be sufficient.  
First, political party support is a necessary condition for the acceptance of results. If political 
parties trust the electoral institution and its top staff it is more likely that election results will 
                                                          
18 This election is not considered in the sample of cases used for the QCA analysis as the Election 
Observation Report is not found on the ACE website. However, it can still be considered a good example 
as it meets our eligibility criteria. It was monitored by the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Assistance 
(CAPEL), who is one of the signatories of the UN’s Declaration of Principles for International Election 
Observation. 
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be accepted. However, political party support by itself does not explain the acceptance of 
results. For the Haiti 2006 elections, the support of political parties for the Conseil Electoral 
Provisoire (CEP) was not enough for having a peacefully accepted outcome. At the same 
time, there were significant problems with the administration of the election. Even though 
there were some improvements from the first to the second round, there were serious 
concerns regarding the administrative and organisational capacity of the CEP and Election 
Day was marred with many logistical and technical issues (European Parliament, 2006).  
Moreover, there were important problems in the process of communicating election results. 
First, the decision to centralise of the tabulation of results in Port-au-Prince resulted in 
major delays. Second, publishing preliminary results without having a representative 
sample of the voting population contributed to the idea of a large victory by Rene Preval, 
which was not supported when official results came in. The delays and the confusion from 
the preliminary results lead to a lack of trust in the election which translated into protests 
(European Parliament, 2006). Having a trusted election commission was not enough. 
Second, having transparent election results means that it is more likely that results will be 
accepted. However, this is a necessary but insufficient condition for the acceptance of 
results. This is true even when an election is technically accurate and considered free and 
fair. This was the case of the Honduras 2009 presidential election which was held just a 
few months after president Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a coup d’état. This coup resulted 
after Zelaya planned to hold a constitutional referendum which was seen as many as an 
attempt by the president to enable his own re-election, which was so far not allowed by the 
country’s constitution.  This represented the first military coup in Central America since the 
end of the cold war (Malkin, 2009). This divided the country between those who believed 
the coup was illegal and undemocratic and those who claimed the coup marked the legal 
replacement of a president who had violated constitutional provisions (NDI, 2009). In the 
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context of this political crisis, the government of Honduras decided to organise fresh 
elections. These were classified as free and fair and election monitoring organisations did 
not report any significant or systematic political, organizational or technical problems 
affecting the election process or Election Day (NDI, 2009). As for the election results stage, 
NDI reported that the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) implemented a significant technical 
effort to generate confidence in the results, taking measures to try to achieve faster and 
more transparent transmission” (NDI, 2009:12). Amongst other measures, the TSE reduced 
the time for the delivery of preliminary results, facilitated the presence of observers and 
political party representatives into the centre where the national tabulation took place and 
refined the official tabulation system. However, in spite of the high quality of the election 
and especially of the faster and more transparent communication of results, the election 
was not widely accepted. The coup did not contribute to creating an atmosphere where the 
outcome would be trusted.  First, a number of candidates decided to leave the race as they 
did not trust it would be fair (including one of the presidential candidates). Second, people 
in general did not believe the election as legitimate because of the coup and by the fact that 
the same people were in control of the government and the election (Hyde and Marinov, 
2012). Some even claimed that organising an election in this situation amounted to 
legitimising a coup (NDI, 2009). The coup created an atmosphere of lack of trust which 
affected the government and the support for many institutions, such as the TSE. Without 
this basic legitimacy, little it mattered that elections were run smoothly and results were 
transparent.  
Having transparent election results is not sufficient for the acceptance of election results 
but it is still a very important component in this. In Honduras in 2005 for example, not 
having transparent results lead to unrest, confusion and challenging the election. Here, an 
unexpected decision taken the day before the election changed the mechanism for the 
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transmission of preliminary election results. This affected the preliminary results 
transmission system (TREP), causing severe delays so results were not ready until 72 
hours after the election, creating “uneasiness amongst the population” (OAS, 2005:11).   
Finally, it is important to indicate that in spite of conventional knowledge, having a high 
quality election is not sufficient for the acceptance of election results. It is only the 
combination of strong political party support for electoral institutions and transparent 
election results which leads to an accepted election. This does not mean that having a high 
quality election is not important. In fact, as highlighted above, all cases of acceptance held 
elections that met international standards of election administration. A good election is 
more likely to lead to acceptance.  
However, having a well-managed election by itself does not assure that results will be 
accepted. The main example for this is Mexico, where the country’s internationally 
recognised electoral management system was not able to stand the test of the razor-thin 
presidential election in 2006 (Estrada and Poire, 2007) This election, considered by 
international observers as competitive and transparent with high levels of impartiality and 
professionalism (EU, 2006: 1) and the “best organized and cleanest in modern Mexican 
history” (Estrada and Poire, 2007: 74), ended in months of street protests calling fraud, 
rejecting the results and naming the main opposition candidate as Mexico’s ‘legitimate 
president’.  
This can be explained by the lack of support of one of the main political parties for Mexico’s 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and by a poor job in the communication of election results. 
Firstly, the appointment of Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute’s (IFE) General Council 
raised questions about its impartiality (NDI, 2006). In 2003, the PRD party was excluded 
from the appointment of IFE’s councillors. In this case, as Schedler (2007) points out, “the 
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lack of inter-party consensus did not mean that IFE officials were ready to violate their 
duties of professionalism and impartiality, but it did mean that the PRD would have an easy 
time dismissing them as agents of its adversaries” (Schedler, 2007: 98). Then, after a 
successful election day, the election results phase presented major problems. First, IFE 
was not able to clearly explain the two preliminary results systems it used, the Preliminary 
Electoral Results Programme (PREP) and a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), also known as 
Quick Count (Conteo Rapido), which lead to confusion amongst the public (EU, 2006b) 
This was aggravated by IFE’s decision not to release the quick count results as these were 
‘too close to call’, which gave an impression of lack of transparency. This, in a context were 
one of the main political parties was excluded (and coincidentally, the party that was only 
0.56% behind in the final presidential results), served as the spark that lead the runner up 
to rally his supporters and take the streets.  
5.5. Accepting election results worldwide: A second QCA model 
The first QCA model showed us that at least in Latin America, there are two paths that lead 
to the acceptance of election results. The first path requires a consolidated democracy 
context and a high quality electoral process – provided that elections are not close. Then 
the second model shows that when elections are close, then their acceptance requires 
more than that: it requires political party support for electoral institutions and the provision 
of transparent results. Moreover, a number of other international cases seem support to 
this claim. However, in order to demonstrate that these findings are also generalizable to a 
larger sample of countries, another QCA model is needed. 
The second model derives from this fact (that close elections are especially difficult and 
tense and therefore require more than the usual to be accepted). Therefore, it focuses on 
all close elections around the world. Close elections are now criteria for case selection 
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rather than an independent variable in the light of the findings of the first QCA model. This 
is as the first model showed us that when election results are close we need to be 
extremely careful. The first path yielded by QCA Model 1 showed that a high quality 
election in the context of a consolidated democracy is sufficient for the acceptance of an 
election, provided that election results are not close. However, when the margin of victory 
between the first and second place narrows things become more complicated. Uncertainty 
and excitement combine to fuel citizen engagement and scrutiny while electoral processes 
get more attention and election institutions are under increased pressure. The second path 
showed that when there is support of political parties for the electoral institution and when 
election results are transparent, an election will be accepted even if the results are close.  
Therefore, in order to test if political party support and the provision of transparent results 
are also key conditions globally in the case of difficult elections (i.e. with close results), a 
second QCA model was built. 
This second model considers all close elections around the world between 2000 and 2015, 
which corresponds to the same period under study by the first QCA. Case selection 
remains the same (presidential elections organised by independent permanent electoral 
institutions), with the exception that now the sample broadens to include elections across 
the world.  The variables to be tested are also the same: consolidated democracy, political 
party support, election quality and transparency in election results. The outcome is the 
same: acceptance of election results. 
Close elections are identified from IFES’ “Election Guide” (IFES, 2014). The application of 
these criteria yields 21 elections held in Africa, Asia and Europe. In particular, the cases 
under study are the following: Zambia 2001, Philippines 2004, Ukraine 2004, Honduras 
2005, Costa Rica 2006, Mexico 2006, Kenya 2007, Ghana 2008, Serbia 2008, Zambia 
2008, El Salvador 2009, Romania 2009, Ukraine 2010, Peru 2011, Dominican Republic 
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2012, Ghana 2012, Serbia 2012, Montenegro 2013, Maldives 2013, Venezuela 2013 and 
El Salvador 201419. These cases are coded in the table number X below using their 
officially assigned ISO 3166-1 three letter code.  
Table 5.4. QCA Model 2 Data Table. 
ELECTION DEMOCRACY PARTY QUALITY RESULTS ACCEPT 
MEX2006 0 0 3 1 0 
CRI2006 1 1 3 3 1 
SLV2009 1 1 3 3 1 
HND2005 1 0 3 1 0 
PER2011 1 1 3 3 1 
ROU2009 1 1 3 3 1 
MNE2013 0 1 3 1 0 
SRB2008 1 1 3 3 1 
SRB2012 1 1 3 3 1 
UKR2004 1 0 1 1 0 
GHA2008 1 1 3 3 1 
GHA2012 1 1 3 3 1 
KEN2007 0 0 2 1 0 
ZMB2008 1 0 3 2 0 
PHL2004 1 0 2 2 0 
UKR2010 1 1 3 3 1 
SLV2014 1 0 3 2 0 
DOM2012 1 1 3 3 1 
                                                          
19  Between 2000 and 2015 a number of other presidential elections had close results. However these were not included 
since there was no international election observation mission or as the information was not sufficient to evaluate each of 
the key conditions. Specifically, the cases that were not included in the analysis were the following: Taiwan 2000 as 
there is no information regarding an international election observation mission; Taiwan 2004 as there was no 
international election observation mission for the presidential elections; Cape Verde 2001 as there is no information 
available; Romania 2004 as the OSCE election observation mission was of a limited character and therefore not 
sufficient to draw general conclusions; Cape Verde 2006 as  the Economic Community Of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Election Observation Mission Report for the 2006 presidential elections is not publicly available; Palau 2008 
as no information is available; Chile 2000 and 2010, as law 18.700 on Public Voting and Elections does not establish 
the participation of election observers in presidential, parliamentary, regional, municipal elections or plebiscites; South 
Korea 2002 and 2012, as no international organizations conducted observations for the presidential election; and 
Mongolia 2009 as both election reports available do not have enough information for the different values.  
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VEN2013 0 0 2 3 0 
MDV2013 0 1 3 3 1 
ZMB2001 0 0 2 1 0 
 
As in the first model, a second step in the QCA analysis is synthetizing the data table into a 
truth table showing the configurations (groups of cases) leading to the acceptance or 
rejection of election results. The truth table is displayed below (Table 5.5) and displays 10 
configurations yielded by the 21 cases. The first two rows show configurations which lead 
to the acceptance of results. In particular, the first row shows the acceptance of results in 
cases of consolidated democracies, where political parties supported the electoral 
institutions, where the electoral process was of a high quality and election results were 
transparent. The second row is very similar, requiring party support, election quality and the 
provision of transparent results (albeit not requiring a consolidated democracy). The 
remaining 8 rows show different paths leading to rejection. Most of these cases display a 
lack of political party support for electoral institutions, low quality in the organization of the 
electoral process and/or issues in the election results stage.   
Table 5.5 QCA Model 2 Truth Table 
ELECTION DEMOCRACY PARTY QUALITY RESULTS ACCEPT 
CRI2006, SLV2009, 
PER2011, ROU2009, 
SRB2008, SRB2012, 
GHA2008, GHA2012, 
UKR2010, DOM2012 
1 1 3 3 1 
MDV2013  0 1 3 3 1 
ZMB2008, SLV2014 
 
1 0 3 2 0 
HND2005 1 0 3 1 0 
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UKR2004 1 0 1 1 0 
PHL2004 1 0 2 2 0 
KEN2007, ZMB2001 0 0 2 1 0 
VEN2013 0 0 2 3 0 
MEX2006 0 0 3 1 0 
MNE2013 0 1 3 1 0 
 
While the truth table provides a general idea of which combinations of conditions lead to 
the acceptance of election results, it is necessary to rely on the QCA software for obtaining 
the formulae with the solutions. After the Boolean reduction conducted by Tosmana, we 
first obtain a complex solution, which does not allow for including logical remainders or 
simplifying assumptions. This complex formula is the following: 
PARTY{1} * QUALITY{3} * RESULTS{3}  
 
→ACCEPTANCE 
This can be read as Political party support (PARTY) AND a high quality election (QUALITY) 
AND the provision of transparent results (RESULTS), lead to the acceptance of election 
results (ACCEPT). 
This formula is then further minimised by bringing in logical remainders into the analysis. 
This results in the following parsimonious solution: 
PARTY{1} * RESULTS{3}  
 
→ACCEPTANCE 
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Political party support (PARTY) AND the provision of transparent results (RESULTS), lead 
to the acceptance of election results (ACCEPT). 
Political party support and the provision of transparent election results are especially 
important for the acceptance of an election outcome. Here as in Model 1, the quality of the 
election does not appear in the formula. Also as in the first model, it is important to highlight 
that while it is not part of the formula, all cases leading to acceptance held a free and fair 
election meeting international standards. This, again, does not mean that all free and fair 
elections lead to acceptance, but signals that it is more likely.  
More importantly, these findings confirm the results from Model 1 as these conditions are 
not only relevant for the acceptance of election results in Latin America, but also across the 
world. Even in the face of tensions and close election results, support from political parties 
for election institutions and transparent results help the acceptance of an election. A good 
example is the Ghana 2008 presidential election, which was highly praised by the 
international community and by the international organizations that conducted election 
observation in the country. In the words of the Commonwealth Observer group “Ghana’s 
maturing democracy has become a good reference point for the African continent and the 
Commonwealth as a whole” (Commonwealth, 2008:37). First of all it was a free and fair 
election. As stated by the EU election observation mission, the election was “conducted in 
line with the country’s international and regional commitments (…) and key international 
and regional standards for elections were generally met” (EU, 2008a:4). Second, political 
parties generally supported the Electoral Commission and expressed confidence in it. The 
implementation of an Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) contributed to the support of 
political parties to the Commission as it allowed them to participate in election management 
decisions, discuss their problems and observe all aspects of the election. Third, the 
aggregation, transmission and announcement of results were characterized by being open, 
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clear and transparent.  This was especially true for the run-off election, where the Election 
Commission strengthened the training for its staff. This combination of conditions 
contributed to the acceptance of results and to Ghana’s reputation as a case study of best 
practices in the conduct of elections in Africa. In fact, a number of international 
organizations decided to hold the “Colloquium on African Elections” in 2009 in Ghana 
“because its 2008 elections were viewed as credible despite heated political tensions and a 
razor-thin margin between the presidential candidates” (NDI, 2009).   
On the other hand, knowing the combination of conditions that is necessary and sufficient 
for the acceptance of results, also sheds light on how election results might be rejected. 
Therefore, whenever one or two of the conditions are absent, rejection will follow. If, for 
example, there is no support from political parties for the electoral institutions and the 
results are not transparent, problems ensue even if the election did not present many other 
problems or irregularities. In addition, it is also likely that results will be rejected if, even in 
spite of having political party support and high quality processes, the communication of 
results is unclear, messy and opaque. An example of this is the 2013 presidential election 
in Montenegro. In Montenegro, the members of the State Electoral Commission (SEC) are 
appointed by the parliament from nominations by political parties. In particular, the law 
guarantees the participation of both ruling and opposition parties and of representatives of 
each presidential candidate. This contributes to a good relationship and support from the 
political parties to the electoral institution. However, as demonstrated in the 2013 election, 
this was not sufficient for the acceptance of results. On the night of the election, the SEC 
decided not to release preliminary results, which “caused public uncertainty and raised 
doubts about the integrity of the process” (ODIHR, 2013:3). As a result, the opposition 
lodged street protests calling fraud and against President Vujanovic’s re-election. This 
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happened even after the election was “professionally and efficiently administered” (OSCE, 
2013:1). 
5.6 Conclusion 
QCA Model 1 highlighted the importance of political party support for electoral institutions 
and of the provision of transparent election results in Latin America. If an election meets 
these two conditions, even in the face of close results, then it is likely that it will be 
accepted. QCA Model 2 focused on elections with close results and confirmed these 
findings for a range of cases from Africa, Asia and Europe. This configuration is especially 
important as it contributes to the acceptance of election results not only in ‘normal’ 
conditions with wide and comfortable margins between candidates, but also in the face of a 
high pressure event when margins are narrow and tensions are widespread.  
The path that leads to the acceptance of election results is a combination of political party 
support and transparent election results. By themselves, these conditions are necessary; 
together they are sufficient. This reinforces the view that elections are not only about 
technical aspects. As Johann Kriegler put it, “Elections are not about mathematics, 
elections are not about law. Elections are about people, about perceptions, about beliefs” 
(cited in Bosley, 2013:1) Election quality must happen in combination with other conditions 
that play a big role in people’s and political parties’ perception of the election.  
First, this research has shown the importance of the support of political parties to electoral 
institutions. The findings make a point that political parties matter for the organisation of 
elections. Ideally, they should participate in the appointment of the top staff of the electoral 
institutions and if not, at least their opinions should be considered in the discussions 
regarding this appointment. Commissioners, Councillors and Chief Election Officers are 
persons that should be supported by political parties or at least not vetoed by them. After 
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all, political parties must trust the institutions and people that regulate them. Therefore, this 
political element should be part of future discussions on the institutional design of EMBs. 
The next chapter will focus on this aspect, and specifically on the level of participation of 
political parties in the appointment of EMB members and the impact this can have on 
confidence in electoral processes. 
Second, having clear and transparent results is also fundamental. So far, the election 
results phase is considered one of the many stages that make up the electoral process. As 
described in a previous chapter, different research (Elklit and Reynolds, 2002; Norris, 2014) 
outlines a number of key steps or components in an electoral process which are critical for 
their quality20. This research, however, shows that there are certain components of the 
electoral process which merit more attention than others when focusing on the acceptance 
of election results. The results phase is especially important as it is highly visible and since 
it concentrates and intensifies all the electoral process in a period of a few hours. 
Therefore, a potential area for further investigation is the role each of the different 
components of the electoral process play in the credibility of elections. In addition, the 
findings of this research give a practical lesson: EMB managers and officials should pay 
close attention to the results phase and be especially careful for delivering clear, 
transparent and timely election results.  
However, can these findings be applied beyond the selection of cases and parameters of 
this research? I.e. can these results be generalised to parliamentary regimes? There is 
abundant literature that stresses the differences between parliamentary and presidential 
regimes (Linz, 1985; Lijphart, 1992; Jones, 1994; Di Palma, 1990; Stepan and Skach, 
                                                          
20 These include, amongst others, the legal framework, voter registration, campaign media and finance, 
vote counting and the election authorities. 
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1993).  More importantly, this research shows how these differences are critical for the 
stability and survival of a regime, which is especially relevant for this research.  
As highlighted by Jones (1994) presidential systems have been criticized by the academic 
community, with only a few voices raised in their defense. Some have even gone as far as 
labelling presidentialism as ‘dangerous’ for democracy and its consolidation (Di Palma, 
1990). It all started with Linz’s influential work on presidential and parliamentary systems 
(1985), where he argued that presidential regimes have certain characteristics that make 
them more unstable and more likely to be challenged. In his view, presidential systems are 
not flexible as in them presidents are elected for a fixed term and cannot be easily 
dismissed. Moreover, these regimes define winners and losers for the entire period of the 
mandate, ‘introducing a strong element of zero sum game’ which makes presidential 
elections winner takes all contests. This raises the stakes, increases tensions and 
polarization and reduces incentives for accepting the outcome of the election (Linz, 1985).  
Other scholars have further demonstrated this point. Lijphart (1992) argues that power-
sharing models such as parliamentary regimes are better for reaching consensus and 
avoiding breakdowns. Similarly, Stepan and Skach (1993) argue that parliamentarism is 
more conducive to consolidation as these regimes are more stable, less susceptible to 
military coups and have prime ministers that can be easily removed, without destabilizing 
the regime. More recently, Norris (2008) tests Linz’s thesis and shows not only that 
parliamentary regimes are more democratic than presidential regimes but that they have a 
better record at democratic consolidation and are less associated with political crises.  
However, this does not mean that presidential regimes are inherently unstable and prone to 
lead to coups and conflict. As always, the devil lies in the detail and scholars have shown 
that not all presidential regimes are the same (Shugart and Carey, 1992). They indicate 
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that presidential regimes vary in their roles and formal powers and argue that some 
institutional choices are more conducive than others to democratic longevity- including the 
timing of the electoral cycle and the level of concentration of presidential powers. Cheibub 
and Limongi (2002) also believe that the functioning of the political system cannot be solely 
attributed to its nature (parliamentarian or presidential). Instead, they argue that other 
provisions –legislative majorities, incentives for cooperation and centralization of the 
decision-making process- can shape the likelihood of regime stability and survival. 
In spite of this, it is clear that there are important differences between both types of 
regimes. As a result, we cannot automatically translate the findings of this research. 
However, as shown above, there are some aspects and provisions that can contribute to a 
regime’s consolidation and stability (and counteract presidential systems’ ‘natural’ tendency 
to be ‘dangerous’). In relation to this –and as our findings show- there is reason to believe 
that certain institutions can contribute to having improved confidence in elections, 
regardless of the type of political system. When parties support electoral institutions and 
election results are transparent it is likely that citizens and parties will trust and accept 
results, lending legitimacy to the outcome. In fact, having political party support and clear 
and transparent election results is probably not only important for presidential elections. 
The 2005 parliamentary elections in Ethiopia –a parliamentary regime- can be a good 
example of this. Then, what began as a peaceful and open campaign with an orderly voting 
process was followed by post-election protests and incidents of violence that ended the 
lives of dozens of people (Carter Center, 2009:1). A major reason behind these tensions 
were the significant irregularities and delays in vote tabulation and the postponement of the 
announcement of official results by over a month. 
Similarly, our findings could also help to shed some light on other cases beyond the QCA 
analyses. Political party support and transparent elections might also be useful in other 
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types of elections. The 2006 parliamentary elections in Dominican Republic are a good 
example of this. In this case, the appointment of the members of the Central Electoral 
Board (JCE) was highly questioned. This process was controlled by the ruling party and did 
not receive the support of all major political parties. Then, a series of problems related to 
the counting of votes and the revision and scanning of poll station certificates lead to a 
“chain of delays” that had a significant impact on the transmission and announcement of 
results (OAS, 2006b). As a result, the JCE was able to deliver preliminary results (for 90% 
of the electoral boards) only until one week after Election Day. This generated tensions 
amongst political parties and citizens and eventually led to violent episodes around the 
country, with several dead (El Nuevo Diario, 2006). With the support of political parties to 
the JCE and an improved system for the transmission of results, the post-electoral phase 
might have been quieter and more peaceful. Other examples that come to mind are the 
Haiti 2010 first round presidential election and the mayoral elections in El Salvador in 2006. 
Much remains to be done in the area of electoral governance. However, this configurational 
analysis has contributed to this field by identifying some of the key aspects that lie behind 
the acceptance of election results. With these findings in mind, Electoral Management 
Bodies should be able to pay close attention to the results stage and aim at providing clear 
and transparent results to all stakeholders in a timely fashion. Moreover, legislative bodies 
should realise the importance of having the support of political parties for electoral 
institutions, and start to think about institutional designs that facilitate this. Finally, both 
EMBs and legislative bodies should recognise that having elections with quality is important 
and necessary but not enough for the acceptance of election results. EMBs should 
guarantee well managed elections but acknowledge that in order to accept election results 
more than technical quality is needed.  
 
158 
 
 
 
6. CHAPTER 6: TO INCLUDE OR NOT TO INCLUDE? PARTY REPRESENTATION IN 
ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF LATIN AMERICA. 
6.1 Political parties and electoral institutions  
Political parties play a key role in the success and credibility of an election. A few years 
ago, Judge Johann Kriegler, former Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission 
of South Africa, mentioned that while South Africa’s “messy” 1994 election was successful, 
Mexico’s “technically perfect” presidential election ended in months of protests. The reason 
he gave for this is that in South Africa, “incompetent but honest elections were accepted 
because people believed in it. And people believed in it because the electoral management 
bodies had the support of the political parties” (Bosley, 2013). As argued in the last chapter, 
a good quality election is not enough for guaranteeing confidence in elections and for the 
acceptance of election results. The perception and credibility of an election is as important 
as the soundness of its procedures. And for this, political support to electoral institutions 
and processes is fundamental. 
This chapter focuses on this support, identified by the participation of political parties in the 
appointment of the members of the Electoral Management Body (EMB). I hypothesise that 
parties must be included in this process. When political parties are included they are given 
a chance to voice their concerns and interests and make themselves heard. When their 
views are incorporated it is more likely that they will accept the decisions and activities of 
the EMB, even if they do not benefit them directly. On the other hand, when political parties 
do not have a role in the appointment of the EMB members, it is more likely that they will 
criticise or reject those members (and most importantly, the decisions they make).  The 
inclusion of political parties is measured by a scale with four EMB models which illustrate 
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the different levels of participation of parties in the appointment of EMB members (EMBs 
with no participation from parties, EMBs where parties have an indirect role in the 
appointment, EMBs where some members are party representatives are others are 
selected by another method and EMBs where all members are party representatives) 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 1 highlights the role of political parties in 
election credibility. Section 2 introduces the dependent variable and details the value of this 
research to the field of elections. Section 3 focuses on the independent variables 
considered here, and specifically on the role of political parties in the appointment of EMBs. 
It outlines the four different EMB models mentioned above. It also provides the research 
hypotheses. Section 4 explains the data and measurements used in the analysis. Section 5 
presents the quantitative analysis and its results. 
6.2 Political parties and election credibility 
When political parties support Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) the credibility of the 
election is strengthened. However, when political parties do not support electoral 
institutions, it is likely that elections will be challenged, potentially leading to instability and 
conflict. The December 2007 presidential, parliamentary and local elections in Kenya 
ended in tragedy with thousands dead and many more internally displaced. This happened 
as the runner-up in the presidential election claimed fraud and refused to accept the 
results. One of the main reasons for this was the complete lack of trust in the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK). This was because most of the members of its governing body 
(19 out of 22) were appointed shortly before the elections and without any inter-party 
consultation, leading stakeholders to believe the ECK was biased and not a legitimate 
arbiter for the election (Elklit, 2011:5).  
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Political parties are at the heart of an election and play a very important role in the 
confidence in electoral processes and institutions. First of all, parties constitute a key link 
between citizens and the political system (Dalton, 2006; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). They 
can influence public opinion and also are influenced by it. In fact, parties adopt a “two-way 
symmetrical model” of public relations, where they use communication not just to influence 
the public, but also to understand its interests (Seltzer and Zhang, 2010). Therefore, parties 
and citizens can share the same views and attitudes on a number of topics. As an example 
of this, in a study on the credibility of elections in Latin America, Rosas (2010) 
demonstrates there is a high correlation between the level of trust in electoral processes 
shown by political elites and that expressed by ordinary citizens (p= 0.52). Moreover, 
political parties use public relations strategies to establish and maintain their relationship 
with the public and “produce desirable attitudinal and behavioral outcomes (that) not only 
have consequences for the party and its supporters, but also for the larger political-social 
system” (Seltzer and Zhang, 2010:26).  
Second, political parties are at the centre of many of the policies and activities of the EMB. 
As a key stakeholder, political parties are in a strategic position to either support or 
undermine most of its decisions and activities. Boundary delimitation, voter registration, 
candidate registration, the location of polling stations, campaign finance oversight, and the 
validation of election results, amongst others, are only some of the tasks carried out by 
EMBs that that can potentially be supported – or condemned - by political parties. Electoral 
institutions are political structures and as such they can help some interests and hurt 
others, depending on who has the power to impose their will (Moe, 2005). Therefore, 
political parties have a special relationship with EMBs. They are both principals 
empowering electoral institutions to carry out election regulation on the one hand, and the 
main subjects of said regulation on the other. They are “authors and actors” (Tarouco, 
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2016). As a result, political parties have an interest in controlling the electoral institution and 
its procedures. However, and despite their vested interests, at the same time they need the 
electoral institution to be perceived as impartial, so that the process through which they are 
elected is legitimate (Birch, 2011; Magaloni, 2006; Miller, 2005; North & Weingast 1989). 
This underscores a delegation dilemma.  
6.3. Expert and multi-party EMB models 
There are two models for ensuring the impartiality of an EMB, and these have to do with 
the mode of appointment of their top members. These are the “expert” “and “multi-party” 
EMB models. In the first model, the management of elections is delegated to experts at arm
’s length from political parties. These individuals do not belong to any political party and are 
appointed because of their professional expertise. It is expected that agents will not be 
representative of the principals’ interests and will act in an impartial manner. In the “multi-
party” model, the function of elections is not delegated to an expert agency.  Instead, 
political parties nominate their own representatives to sit on the board of the EMB. This is 
so they can protect the nominating parties’ interests and ensure that other members do not 
unduly favour their own parties (ACE, 2015b). Party agents behave as watchdogs on each 
other. Impartiality is obtained by the collection of multiple partisan interests.  
There is no agreement on which of these two models is the best for the credibility of 
elections. In one of the first studies on the topic, Molina and Hernandez (1999) suggested 
that – for 8 Latin American countries - trust in elections is associated with non-partisan 
EMBs with no political appointment. However, as the authors themselves noted, there are 
important exceptions to this association. Hartlyn and colleagues (2008) find that having an 
independent EMB or a partisan-mixed EMB improves the likelihood of having an 
acceptable election over one-party-dominant EMBs. However, they also indicate that EMBs 
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with party representation can too provide the confidence needed for a successful result 
(Hartlyn, et al, 2008). Rosas (2010) concludes that in countries with low levels of 
democracy, partisan autonomy is better. However, he also notes that in countries with high 
levels of democracy EMBs appointed by parties can increase trust among political elites 
(Rosas, 2010). Birch (2011) recognises the lack of consensus as to which model is better 
and asks whether EMBs should be completely free from the influence of political parties or 
whether political parties should be represented in the EMB. However, the results are mixed. 
While the multiparty approach has a negative impact on the quality of electoral 
administration it also has a positive effect as it can decrease the exclusion of political 
parties and candidates from the electoral contest (reducing the manipulation of electoral 
contestation).  
Other scholars have emphasised the benefits of both types of models. Supporting the 
autonomy argument, Ugues (2014) looks at EMBs in Central America and finds that the 
selection of EMB members based on expertise strengthens institutions and improves their 
performance (in terms of autonomy and impartiality). For him, selection based on 
partisanship can lead to politicization, which can lead to infighting and deadlock and affect 
the activities of the EMB. Similarly, Tarouco (2016) finds that partisan EMBs are more 
vulnerable to fraud and manipulation and can increase concerns about the quality and 
fairness of the election. On the other hand, Estevez and colleagues (2008) argue that a 
partisan model can facilitate credible elections and accepted outcomes as “parties 
anticipate that their interests will be guarded by their sponsored councillors and can be 
reasonably sure that agency losses will be minor [and are] willing to obey the occasional 
ruling that hurts their short-term interests” (Estevez, et. al, 2008: 270).  
So, which EMB model contributes best to having confidence in electoral processes? There 
is no consensus: while some scholars favour partisan autonomy and some argue for 
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partisan EMBs, others present mixed evidence. This is consistent with the fact that both 
models ultimately seek impartiality and represent the two sides of the delegation dilemma: 
while political parties want to control electoral procedures to advance their interest, they 
also need the process to be credible, especially if they attain office. Moreover, both models 
offer certain key advantages. On one hand, expert based models are more professional 
and specialised. This is as they are made up of individuals that are selected because of 
their legal and/or technical expertise (ACE 2016; Birch 2011; Hartlyn et al, 2008). 
Furthermore, in several cases appointment is based on the public reputation of these 
individuals, which in turn can bolster the credibility of the institution (ACE, 2015b). On the 
other hand, multi-party EMBs are more sensible to political parties, allowing them to 
express their interests and needs. At the same time, by including parties they can foster 
negotiation and increase the transparency of electoral procedures and can prevent some 
forms of manipulation (ACE, 2015b; Birch, 2011; Estevez et al, 2008). This shows that both 
models have advantages that we can benefit from. As a result, instead of asking which 
model is superior, we should focus on obtaining the best of both worlds and ask which 
combination of the two models is best. I argue that although some aspects from the expert-
based model are desirable (such as professionalism, for example), it is also important to 
include political parties in the selection process of EMB members.  
6.4 Including political parties: appointment of EMB members 
I hypothesise that the inclusion of political parties in electoral institutions contributes to 
having confidence in electoral processes. If political parties have an opportunity to express 
their views and concerns it is more likely that these will be taken into account. Therefore, it 
is more likely that they will accept the EMB and its decisions. Particularly, political parties 
should be consulted for election-related activities and especially in a vital process such as 
the appointment of the members of the electoral body (Lopez-Pintor, 2000:105). Their 
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participation in this process is key as this is one of the foundational stages of the election 
cycle. Months or sometimes even years before election day, the board of the EMB starts to 
prepare every aspect of the election, from updating the electoral register to choosing the 
design of the voting booths. And if political parties do not have a role or a voice in the 
appointment of the EMB, this can lead them to criticise its members and their decisions. 
Exclusion from such a process can lead parties to challenge every decision made by EMB 
members. For instance, in Mexico in 2003 the process for selecting the members of the 
Federal Electoral Institute’s General Council broke down (Rosas, 2010). The Partido de la 
Revolucion Democratica (PRD) was excluded from this process and accused the Council of 
not being impartial and incapable of organising the 2006 election. In a foreseeable manner, 
this political party organised massive protests rejecting that election’s results.    
This chapter extends existing work in several ways. First, it separates the issue of EMB 
autonomy from the appointment powers of parties for EMB membership, considering the 
latter an explanatory variable in itself. Therefore, it does not focus on the choice between 
having a partisan or non-partisan EMB, but on the value of having an EMB where political 
parties are included. Second, it complements current research. Existing indexes do not 
measure this aspect and need to be modified to describe the degree of participation of 
political parties in the appointment of the EMBs top staff.  
So, what is the right level of involvement of political parties in the appointment of EMBs? To 
answer this question, I propose a four point scale of EMB models depending on the level of 
participation of political parties in the appointment of their members: 
 EMBs with no participation from political parties 
 EMBs where political parties have an indirect role in the appointment 
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 EMBs where some members are party representatives and others are selected by 
another method 
 EMBs where all members are political party representatives.   
The aim is to test the extent to which these four categories affect trust in electoral 
processes. The analysis is based on the University of Salamanca’s Parliamentary Elites of 
Latin America (PELA) survey. Data is taken from 5,261 questionnaires to legislators from 
18 Latin American countries and four survey waves21 producing a total of 47 dyads or 
country-waves, which constitute the unit of analysis. I employ binary logistic and multilevel 
regression to estimate the effect of the different levels of participation of political parties in 
the appointment of EMBs on the credibility in electoral processes.  
This survey is relevant as it provides information from Latin America on issues related to 
the political system and its institutions, amongst others. Moreover, its findings can be 
generalised to other regions as the opinions, perceptions and values of political elites are 
important for the conduct of electoral processes anywhere. This is an elite survey answered 
by legislators from the continent. Elite opinion cannot directly be taken as direct evidence of 
mass opinion or mass confidence in elections. However, it is still relevant in so far as elite 
confidence is a likely precondition of mass confidence. As argued above, political parties 
have a strong influence on public opinion and constitute a major channel between the 
public and the political system (Dalton, 2006). Therefore, if elites do not feel that the EMB is 
legitimate, then they might well lack confidence in the electoral process – and if the elites 
lack this confidence, then there is a fair chance that they will say so loudly, which can be 
expected to stir up public protest from their grassroots supporters.  
 
                                                          
21 I employ waves two, three, four and five, which roughly cover a period of time from 1997 to 2015. 
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6.5 Dependent variable: confidence in electoral processes  
The legitimacy of electoral institutions and processes has become part of a new and 
promising research agenda. Many scholars and practitioners have focused on this topic as 
a necessary ingredient for maintaining and strengthening democracy (Banducci and Karp, 
2003; Birch, 2008; Bratton, 1998; Elklit and Reynolds, 2002; Lopez-Pintor, 2000; Mozzafar 
and Schedler, 2002; Molina and Hernandez, 1998; Norris, 1999), especially in emerging 
democracies (such as in Latin America) where highly regarded electoral processes can 
support the process of democratic transition and consolidation (Elklit and Reynolds, 2002). 
In particular, confidence in an election is essential in a democracy as it is tied to the 
legitimacy of the outcome, to the support of the political system and even to the viability of 
electoral democracy (Nadeau and Blais, 1993). 
I use data from the University of Salamanca’s Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) 
survey, which contains information on the opinions, attitudes and perceptions of 
congressmen and women from 18 Latin American countries since 1994. In particular, I 
employ the second, third, fourth and fifth waves which roughly cover a period of time from 
1997 to date.22 Wave 1 is not used as at that time several countries in the region were not 
classified as democratic or had not completed their transition to democracy.23 Wave 6 is 
also excluded as it is currently underway and only contains information for two countries. In 
total, the waves selected provide information from 5,261 questionnaires. In particular, the 
questionnaire asks parliamentarians about their degree of confidence in the last electoral 
processes that have taken place in their country. The question is: ‘How much do you trust 
                                                          
22 The different waves of this survey are grouped according to legislative periods, which are not the same 
for all countries. Therefore, the dates provided are approximate. For example, while wave 1 in Argentina 
corresponds to 1995 - 1997, in Ecuador it goes from 1996 to 1998. The last wave used in this study (wave 
5) covers the current legislative period for some countries but not for others. For instance, it covers the 
2006-2009 legislative period for Mexico and the 2010-2016 period for the Dominican Republic.  
23 A case in point is Peru under Fujimori, or Mexico and Paraguay before their transition to democracy. 
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the last electoral processes that have taken place in [country]? , using a 5 point scale 
ranging from minimum confidence (1) to maximum confidence (5). Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of frequencies for confidence in electoral processes in Latin America. As we 
can see, politicians in general have a positive view of electoral processes in the region, as 
illustrated by a relatively high mean score of 3.84 out of 5 (with a standard deviation of 
1.155). 
 
Figure 6.1 Distribution of confidence in electoral processes in Latin America. Waves 2-5. 
 
Responses to the question “How much do you trust the last electoral processes that have taken place in 
[country]?”, where “1” represents “minimum trust” and 5 “maximum trust”. 5,233 respondents. Waves 2 to 
5, Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) survey. Mean=3.84, Std Dev=1.15 
 
Figure 6.2 presents the mean level of trust in electoral processes for each country-wave. 
As respondents are nested within surveys, the unit of analysis is a specific survey wave for 
a specific country. Country-waves correspond to legislative periods. The graph shows that 
politicians in general have a positive view of electoral processes and that there is 
considerable variation across countries and across time, which allows having a richer 
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analysis.  For example, on the lowest end of the scale we have the cases of Venezuela and 
Peru for wave 2. In the case of Venezuela, this corresponds to wave 2, implemented in the 
year 2000 following a period of permanent crisis and a feeling of discontent, starting with 
the 1989 ‘Caracazo’24 and Hugo Chavez’s coup attempt in 1992 and ending with his 1998 
victory as a promise of the change needed by most Venezuelans. Moreover, it was a period 
with a deep dissatisfaction with the performance of the established political parties and with 
the political system in general (Molina and Perez, 2004). Similarly, Peru (2001-06) scores 
below 2. This survey was conducted in 2001, capturing the sentiment and perception of 
electoral processes in the country in the decade of the 1990s. This was a time where 
Alberto Fujimori rigged elections, increasingly concentrated power in his own hands and 
even suspended constitutional rule (Mauceri, 1995). On the other side of the graph, the 
highest score was found in Uruguay (2010-15), with a mean score very close to 5. This 
may be explained by the country’s long experience with democracy. Except for the period 
of military rule between 1973 and 1984, Uruguay has held uninterrupted elections since the 
late 19th century (Lopez-Pintor, 2000). Moreover, Uruguay’s Corte Electoral enjoys high 
levels of public esteem and a certain “cumulative legitimacy” which have strengthened 
credibility in electoral processes (Lopez-Pintor, 2000). 
 
While Figure 6.2 takes the mean trust in electoral processes by dyad (country-wave), figure 
6.3 shows the results by country. Here, results are displayed taking into account all the 
waves available in the PELA survey for each individual country. The differences here are 
also important. Taking two of the previous examples illustrate this. In this figure we can see 
that Venezuela obtained a mean score of only 2.69, with 15.5% of respondents gave 
                                                          
24 A series of violent protests in the nation’s capital, Caracas. The protests started as a reaction against 
austerity measures announced by the government, as a result of an economic crisis. The protests resulted 
in over 300 deaths, after the army intervened. 
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elections in their country a rating of 1 or minimum trust, 22.7% a rating of 2, 43.3% a rating 
of 3, 14.4% a rating of 4 and only 4.1% of respondents gave elections in their country the 
highest raging (5 out of 5, or maximum trust). In contrast, if we average results for Uruguay 
for waves two, three and four25 the mean score is 4.81, with 82% of respondents giving 
elections the highest rating and 97.5% gave it ratings of 4 and 5. None of the respondents 
have elections in their country a rating of 1 or minimum trust. 
                                                          
25 Wave five is not available but wave four does include the 2009-2014 legislature. 
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Figure 6.2 Mean trust in electoral processes in Latin America by legislative period
 
 
Mean trust in electoral processes per legislative period (several waves per country). Standard deviation is shown by vertical error bars. Waves 2 to 5, Parliamentary Elites of 
Latin America (PELA) survey 
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Figure 6.3.  Distribution of elite opinions on electoral processes in Latin America. PELA, waves 2, 3, 
4 and 5. 
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Notes: 1 to 5 scale where 1= minimum confidence and 5= maximum confidence in electoral processes. 
6.6 Independent variables  
What is the appropriate level of involvement of political parties in EMBs? To address this 
question, a four point scale of EMB models is used which is based on the different levels of 
participation of political parties in the appointment of the members. The aim is to test the extent 
to which these four categories affect trust in elections. This four point scale ranges from EMBs 
where political parties do not play a role whatsoever in the appointment of the institution to 
EMBs where all members in the governing board are party representatives. The first category 
is no participation from political parties in the appointment of the members of the EMB. It is 
rather the judiciary, the executive or another body which participates. This is the case in Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru. In Brazil, five of the members of the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 
(TSE) are selected by the judiciary (two by the Ministers of the Supreme Justice Tribunal and 
three by the Ministers of the Supreme Federal Tribunal) while two are nominated by the 
President from a pool of members of the judicial branch. Another example is Ecuador, where 
since 2008 members of the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) are appointed by a Citizen 
Participation and Social Control Council. This Council makes a public call for constituting 
Citizen Selection Committees which are responsible for evaluating the profile of all the 
candidates for the CNE (CPCCS, 2015). In EMBs with indirect participation, parties participate 
through the legislative branch (through a majority vote, for example) in the appointment 
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process. The most common example is where members of the EMB are selected by a two-
thirds majority in Congress (examples include the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico and 
Venezuela). Other examples include Guatemala, Nicaragua and Paraguay where other actors 
are also involved. In Guatemala, for example, the five magistrates of the Tribunal Supremo 
Electoral (TSE) are selected by a two-thirds majority in Congress from a list of forty candidates 
presented by a Nomination Commission integrated by representatives of several public and 
private universities. A third category is labelled partial direct participation, where political 
parties directly select a part of the members of the EMB as party representatives but the rest of 
the members are appointed by another method. In El Salvador, three magistrates of the 
Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) are directly selected by the three political parties or 
coalitions that obtained the most number of votes in the last election, while the remaining two 
are selected by a two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies, from lists presented by the 
Supreme Court of Justice. In Uruguay, four members of the Corte Electoral are political party 
representatives while the remaining five members are selected by a two-thirds majority by both 
Houses of Parliament. The final level is full direct participation, where all the members of the 
EMB’s governing board are directly selected by political parties and are in fact party 
representatives. Nowadays, the only country in the region which belongs to this category is 
Colombia, where all the officials of the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) are political party 
representatives. This was also the case of Ecuador’s Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) before 
the implementation of the 2008 Constitution. Table 6.1 shows the classification of EMBs in 
Latin America using this scale. 
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Table 6.1 Latin American EMBs according to level of party participation in appointment. 
Country EMB  EMB members selected by: 
Political parties 
participate in the 
appointment 
process? 
Participation 
level 
Argentina Cámara Nacional Electoral Executive and Legislative Yes Indirect  
Bolivia Corte Nacional Electoral Executive and Legislative Yes Indirect  
Brasil Tribunal Superior Eleitoral Executive and Judiciary No 
No 
participation 
Chile Servicio Electoral Executive and Legislative Yes Indirect  
Colombia Consejo Nacional Electoral Legislative Yes Full direct  
Costa Rica Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones Judiciary  No 
No 
participation 
Ecuador Consejo Nacional Electoral Civil Society No 
No 
participation 
El Salvador Tribunal Supremo Electoral Judiciary and Legislative  Yes Partial direct  
Guatemala Tribunal Supremo Electoral Civil Society and Legislative Yes Indirect  
Honduras Tribunal Supremo Electoral Legislative Yes Indirect  
Mexico Instituto Nacional Electoral Legislative Yes Indirect  
Nicaragua Consejo Supremo Electoral 
Executive,  Civil Society, 
Legislative Yes Indirect  
Panama Tribunal Electoral 
Executive, Judiciary and 
Legislative Yes Indirect  
Paraguay 
Tribunal Superior de Justicia 
Electoral 
Executive, Judiciary and 
Legislative Yes Indirect  
Peru 
Oficina Nacional de Procesos 
Electorales Judiciary No 
No 
participation 
Republica 
Dominicana Junta Central Electoral Legislative Yes Indirect  
Uruguay  Corte Electoral Legislative Yes Partial direct  
Venezuela Consejo Nacional Electoral Legislative Yes Indirect  
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The literature has developed different measurements of the partisan autonomy of EMBs. 
However, these measures need to be more refined to properly reflect the different levels of 
participation of political parties in the appointment of EMB members. Hartlyn, McCoy and 
Mustillo (2008) use a partisan score with four types of EMBs depending on their degree of 
independence from parties: single party dominated, partisan mixed, independent/partisan 
mixed and independent. The index used here is different in substance. First, the authors’ first 
category (single-party dominated) is no longer relevant for contemporary Latin America. They 
provide a cross-national analysis that starts in the year 1980. Back then, transitions to 
democracy were only beginning and in several cases electoral institutions were still under 
control by the ruling party. The subsequent analysis takes place later and considers a context 
where EMBs are no longer dominated by ruling parties. Second, the index does not accurately 
describe the participation of political parties in EMB appointment. As a result, the authors miss 
some nuances that are relevant for the current study. For them, the category “independent of 
parties” includes EMBs with two different appointment methods (“indirect participation” and “no 
participation” in my index)26. Rosas (2010) provides a scale with three types of EMBs. EMBs 
with the most partisan autonomy are those selected by the judiciary. The least autonomous 
ones are where political parties select their own representatives for the board of the institution. 
EMBs which do not fall into any of these two categories are classified as intermediate. This 
                                                          
26 This is further demonstrated by a cross tabulation between my own Index and Hartlyn and colleagues 
(2008).Out of all the cases considered as “independent of parties” by Hartlyn et al, 23.17% are considered by 
my index as cases of “no participation of political parties” while the remaining 76.83% are classified as cases of 
indirect appointment. Out of all cases considered as “independent/partisan mixed” 62.76% are cases of 
“indirect participation” and 37.24% are “partial direct participation”. Then, out of all the cases in the “partisan 
mixed” category, 24.03% are cases of “indirect participation”, 38.47% are “partial direct participation” and 
37.50% are “full direct participation”. Finally, as discussed, the category “single party dominated” is not relevant 
for the timeframe of this study. 
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index needs to be disaggregated: instead of three I consider four categories. The “least 
autonomous” category can be split into two as in some cases all board members are party 
representatives while in others only some members are party agents while the rest are 
selected through other methods. 
This research also includes other measures that have been used in the literature as controls 
that have an impact in the confidence and quality of electoral processes. These are the overall 
levels of economic development, democracy and corruption (Anderson, et. al, 2005; Anderson 
and Tverdova, 2003; Birch, 2008; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo, 
2008; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1959; Molina and Hernandez, 1998; Rosas, 2010; 
Voicu and Bartolome Peral, 2012). The first of these variables is the level of socio-economic 
development. Modernisation theory indicates that high living standards, high education levels 
and a strong middle class are prerequisites of democracy and are supportive of its processes 
(Lipset, 1959). More recently, different scholars (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2005) have highlighted that economic performance affects support for democracy. 
Moreover, in countries with higher levels of education people are expected to have more and 
better information about electoral institutions and processes and are therefore more likely to 
trust elections. Finally, high income countries can also dedicate more resources to election 
administration, resulting in a greater professionalism and capacity (Birch, 2008). Second, more 
established democracies should have deeper reservoirs of trust.  Evans and Whitefield (1995) 
conclude that the experience of living under democratic politics also explains higher levels of 
support for democracy. Moreover, Voicy and Bartolome Peral (2012) argue that people 
socialised in fully democratic regimes grow up in a society where democracy is “the only game 
in town” (Linz and Stepan, 1996) and thus are more likely to value democracy more than 
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people socialised in other regimes. Furthermore, democratic countries that are more stable are 
more likely to be exempt of severe election-related problems and violence that can affect trust 
in electoral processes. Corruption is also a relevant variable. In their study of corruption, 
political allegiances and attitudes towards government in contemporary democracies, 
Anderson and Tverdova (2003) find that the performance of the system matters and that 
citizens in countries with high levels of corruption have more negative evaluations of their 
political system. Moreover, in clean societies it is expected that election institutions and 
processes are more transparent, professional and accountable, thus generating more 
credibility.  
Credibility in electoral processes is also affected by the attitudes and background of the 
members of the political elite. Micro-level variables used include: the level of support for 
democracy and elections, the perception of the level of political engagement in political parties 
as well as certain individual characteristics - political experience, winner/loser status, ideology, 
gender, age and education.  Support for democracy has been found to be an important factor 
in explaining trust in electoral processes (Molina and Hernández, 1999). In the same fashion, 
we can expect that people who have higher levels of support for elections will have a positive 
evaluation of them. It is also expected that when citizens are more involved they will have more 
positive evaluations of the political system (Almond and Verba, 1965). When people participate 
in parties it is a sign of a society where levels of civic engagement are generally high. With 
political experience, the expectation is that those who have held public office before are better 
acquainted with election processes and are more familiarised with the realities of winning and 
losing. Therefore, more experience leads to more credibility in elections. Ideology, understood 
as a self-placement on a left-right scale, has also been found to be a relevant variable for trust 
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in elections. Scholars have found that as people are more ideologically conservative they are 
more likely to have greater confidence in electoral processes and institutions (Anderson, et. al, 
2005; Ugues, 2010). In addition, studies have found that citizens who support a losing 
candidate or party are less likely to trust the political system than winners (Banducci and Karp, 
2003; Nadeau and Blais, 1993), this is especially true in in non-established democracies 
(Anderson et al., 2005). This literature has demonstrated that being part of the winning or 
losing team in an election shapes citizen attitudes and has important consequences. Winning 
is not all joy and happiness, but also translates into higher levels of support for the system and 
its institutions, including the electoral process. On the other hand, “losers’ consent” can 
determine the maintenance and even survival of the system. Other aspects such as gender, 
age and education are also controlled for. Figures 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 provide a simple profile 
of the main characteristics (age, education, experience and ideology) of the parliamentarians 
from the 18 Latin American countries used in this research. 
Figure 6.4 Age of Latin American Parliamentarians, PELA survey waves 2-5  
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Figure 6.5 Education of Latin American Parliamentarians, PELA survey waves 2-5 
 
Figure 6.6 Ideology (left-right) of Latin American Parliamentarians, PELA survey waves 2-5 
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Figure 6.7 Political Experience of Latin American Parliamentarians, PELA survey waves 2-5 
 
 
There are potential issues of endogeneity that need to be addressed. Studies have suggested 
that lack of confidence in elections and election administration might lead political elites to 
change the EMB model (Lopez Pintor, 2000; IDEA, 2006; Hartlyn et al, 2008). In Mexico, for 
example, the “crisis of confidence” following the 1988 presidential election led to the creation of 
an independent election  body (Navarro, 2016). However, empirical evidence shows that within 
the period of time covered by this study (1997-2015) electoral institutions had already 
consolidated in terms of their structure, including their appointment procedures. Most changes 
to electoral institutions had already occurred one or two decades before, following the 
transition to democracy. This suggests that for our period of study causality goes from the type 
of EMB to confidence in electoral processes, and not the other way around. The only two 
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exceptions are Ecuador and Honduras. In Ecuador, the 2008 constitution created the Consejo 
Nacional Electoral (CNE) whose members are selected by Citizen Commissions. This change, 
however, was not motivated because of falling levels of confidence.27 Rather, it came as part of 
a process involving a new constitution aimed at increasing citizen participation in all state 
levels. In Honduras, the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) was created in 2002 as part of a 
much wider reform programme initiated by civil society after an insufficient state response to 
the effects of hurricane Mitch in 1998 (Paz Aguilar, 2006).28 In short, taking confidence in 
electoral processes (or similar measures of diffuse support such as trust in political institutions) 
as causally prior is not relevant for this particular study. 
 
6.7 Data and measures 
Information for the different variables was obtained from several sources. First, I employed 
waves 2-5 of the PELA survey. As a result, information for the variables not only varies across 
countries but also across time. Second, indices developed by international organisations are 
used to measure corruption, level of democracy, and economic development. Third, I relied on 
my own research to construct and operationalise the variable related to the participation of 
political parties in the appointment of the EMB members. 
                                                          
27 According to data from the PELA survey, trust in elections was increasing before this constitutional change. 
During the 1998-2002 legislature, the mean score of confidence in electoral processes amongst the political 
elite was 3.18. Then, during the 2002-2006 legislature, it increased to 3.48. 
28 Moreover, data shows there was no decrease in confidence in electoral processes before the reform. The 
mean trust in elections was 3.39 for the 1994-97 legislature and 3.37 for the 1997-2001 period. An 
independent samples T-test showed there is no statistically significant difference between both means (p=.913, 
2-tailed). 
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For simplicity, the dependent variable is dichotomized. This is for two reasons. First, the PELA 
survey changed the scale used in measuring confidence in electoral processes. While early 
waves employed a five-point scale, more recent surveys have used a ten-point scale. A four on 
a ten-point scale will not necessarily be understood in the same way as a two on a five point 
scale. Using a dichotomous scale enhances comparability. Second, ordinal models pose a 
problem of interpretation. Using the original one to five scale would show the odds of the 
different explanatory variables of achieving for example, category 2, 3 or 4, of confidence in 
electoral processes, which is not clear. The main aim is to know if our variables contribute to 
having confidence in electoral processes. This variable is coded as “0” or low confidence if 
respondents answered 1,2 or 3  (1 through 6 in ten-point scale) and “1” if they answered 4 or 5 
(7 to 10 in ten-point scale). This dichotomisation emulates the operationalization of the variable 
’perceptions of electoral fairness’ for a similar study (Birch, 2008). 
Data for the perceived level of corruption was operationalised using Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Here, scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) 
to 10 (very clean). I employed the 2001 CPI for wave 2, the 2005 CPI for wave 3 and the 2010 
CPI for waves 4 and 5. The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) was used for 
measuring the level of economic development. This index ranges from 0 (low) to 1 (high). The 
HDI score used was that of the year 2000. Information for levels of democracy was obtained 
from the Freedom in the World survey, using the inverted political rights score, with 1 for least 
democratic and 7 for most democratic countries. Freedom House’s 2000 survey was used for 
wave 2, the 2005 survey was used for wave 3, and information for waves 4 and 5 was obtained 
from the 2010 survey. 
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Information for all the individual-level variables was obtained from the PELA survey. Data for 
the support for democracy is coded as 1 when “democracy is preferable to any other type of 
government” and 0 if “In the context of an economic crisis, an authoritarian government can be 
preferable”. Support for elections is coded from 1 to 4, ranging from “don’t agree’ to “strongly 
agree”. Political engagement is coded with a 1 if the level of people’s participation in political 
parties is “limited and marginal”, 2 if it is “limited and marginal, except during elections” and 3 if 
it is “intense and constant”. Political experience is coded as “1” if respondents have held public 
office and “0” if not. Information regarding the winner/loser status on the survey contained 
many missing values (64.4%). Therefore, this variable was constructed from own research 
corroborated with the questionnaire for the existing values. Winners were coded with “1” and 
losers with “0”. For ideology I constructed 2 dummy variables, one for left wing respondents 
(with scores of 1-3 in the original ten point scale) and another for respondents on the right 
(scores of 8-10). Gender is 0 for male and 1 for female and age and education are continuous. 
The variable measuring political party participation in EMB appointment was constructed from 
my own research using national constitutions and electoral laws and from the ACE Electoral 
Knowledge Network’s comparative data on electoral management (ACE, 2015a). This variable 
is coded with “1” if there is no participation from political parties in the appointment of the EMB 
members, “2” for indirect participation, “3” for partial direct participation and “4” for full direct 
participation. 
6.8 Results 
In this section, I conduct an empirical analysis using binary logistic and multilevel regression to 
estimate the effect of individual and country level variables on confidence in electoral 
processes in Latin America. In particular, I present three different models. Models 1 and 2 
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employ logistic regression. Model 1 tests the base hypothesis of this study, which is that when 
political parties participate in the appointment of the members of the EMB there is higher 
confidence in electoral processes.  Model 2 expands on this and tests the effect of the different 
levels of participation of political parties in the EMB appointment process. Then, Model 3 
conducts a multi-level analysis, which is appropriate as data is structured at more than one 
level. The third model also tests the different levels of participation of political parties in the 
EMB appointment process. 
Models 1 and 2 employ logistic regression which allows analysis of binary outcomes and 
estimates the probability of an event occurring given the levels of one or more independent 
variables (Field, 2013).  These are single level models which use data from the responses of 
congressmen and women in Latin America. The participation of political parties in the 
appointment of EMBs, in spite of being constructed from national constitutions and electoral 
laws, is used to make individual inferences. This variable can be used for explaining if - and 
how much - congressmen and women feel represented in the EMB. For instance, in cases 
coded with “1” where political parties do not participate in the appointment of the EMB, it is safe 
to say that legislators (as members of a political party) are not part of the appointment process 
and therefore do not feel represented in the EMB. On the other hand, in cases coded with “4” 
where political parties have a full direct participation in the appointment, one can say that 
congressmen and women feel well represented in the EMB. Nonetheless, in order to have 
more robust findings model 3 conducts a multi-level analysis, which is appropriate as data is 
structured at more than one level (in this case individuals are nested within waves, which are 
nested within countries). This structure incorporates country-level characteristics and allows 
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estimating cross-level relationships (Lee, Gabarino and Lerman, 2007; Wong and Mason, 
1985).  
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Table 6.2 Binary logistic and multilevel regression models of participation of political parties in EMB 
appointment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
 OR(Se)  OR (Se) OR (Se) 
Participation of parties in EMB 
appointment 
2.21(0.30) *** . . 
Degree of participation of parties in EMB 
appointment
a
 
   
Indirect participation . 2.34 (0.32) *** 3.28 (1.85) * 
Partial direct participation . 2.10 (0.36) *** 3.04 (2.05) + 
Full direct participation . 1.68 (0.30) **  2.11(1.68) 
Economic Development 0.81 (0.66) 1.38 (1.40) 10.53 (46.22) 
Corruption 1.39 (0.06) *** 1.42 (0.06) *** 1.49 (0.25)* 
Democracy 1.28 (0.06) *** 1.21 (0.07) ** 1.35 (0.38) 
Support for Democracy 1.13(0.19) 1.13 (0.19) 1.31 (0.24) 
Support for Elections
b
    
Somewhat agree 0.92 (0.29) 0.87 (0.27) 0.95 (0.32) 
Agree 1.62 (0.47)+ 1.50 (0.44) 1.76 (0.55) * 
Strongly agree 2.30 (0.66)** 2.14 (0.62) ** 2.40 (0.74) ** 
Political engagement
c
    
Limited, except during elections 0.98 (0.08) 0.96 (0.08)  0.92 (0.09) 
Intense and constant 1.12 (0.13) 1.10 (0.13) 1.51 (0.22)** 
Political experience 1.12 (0.09) 1.14 (0.09) + 1.18 (0.10) + 
Winner 2.71 (0.20) *** 2.69 (0.20) *** 3.33 (0.29) *** 
Left 0.58 (0.05) *** 0.59 (0.05) *** 0.61 (0.06) *** 
Right 1.12 (0.13) 1.13 (0.13) 1.18 (0.15) 
Sex 0.78 (0.07)** 0.77 (0.07)** 0.76 (0.08) * 
Age 1.00 (0.00)* 1.01 (0.00)* 1.00 (0.00) 
Education 1.03 (0.03) 1.04 (0.37) 1.18(0.05) *** 
Constant 0.01(0.00) *** 0.01 (0.00) *** 0.00(0.00) *** 
Log likelihood -2252.25 -2248.38 -2006.45 
Pseudo R
2  
0.12 0.12  
Rho   0.25(0.04) 
N (level-1) 3,872 3,872 3,872 
N (level-2)   47 
Notes: Dependent variable is confidence in electoral processes (binary variable). Coefficients are odds 
ratios, standard errors in parenthesis. Models run with Stata 12.1 
a:Reference category is “No participation”; b:Reference category is “Don’t agree”; c: Reference category 
is “Limited and marginal” +p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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In Model 1, I tested the base question of this study, which is whether the participation of 
political parties in the appointment of the members of the EMB yields higher levels of 
confidence in electoral processes or not. I constructed a dummy variable where “1” represents 
countries where parties participate in the appointment process and “0” represents countries 
where parties do not have a role in this. I specified the latter as the reference category. This 
reference specification was used for all categorical variables. Column 1 in table 6.2 presents 
this model. The model confirms the hypothesis. Cases where parties participate in the 
appointment process are associated with higher levels of confidence in electoral processes. In 
fact, as shown by the odds ratio they are twice as likely (2.21 times more likely) to have 
confidence in electoral processes than the reference category of “no participation”. 
Regarding controls, results are mixed. The economic development of the country was not 
significant. For corruption, countries with less perceived corruption are more likely to have 
trusted electoral processes. Then, the more democratic a country, the more likely it is to have 
confidence in electoral processes. Support for democracy did not have a significant effect. 
However, strong support for elections was significant. Political engagement and political 
experience were not significant. Then, in line with expectations, political winners are more than 
two times more likely than losers to be confident that the elections are conducted properly. 
Ideology is a significant predictor. Left-wing respondents are less likely to trust electoral 
processes. However there is no effect for right-wing legislators. Males are slightly more trusting 
of elections than females. Age has no effect. Education is not significant. Figures 6.8 and 6.9 
below visually illustrate the effect of some of the controls with a significant effect on trust in 
elections. We can clearly see that parliamentarians with a strong support for elections and 
those classified as political winners tend to have more confidence in electoral processes. 
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 Figure 6.8 Relationship between support for elections and trust in elections 
 
Figure 6.9 Relationship between winner/loser status and trust in elections 
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However, this needs to be further detailed. The aim of this research is to find out the effect of 
the different levels of involvement of political parties in the appointment process. For this 
reason, a second model includes this variable with four categories: EMBs where political 
parties have no role in the appointment of their members; EMBs where parties have an indirect 
participation; EMBs with partial direct participation; and EMBs with full direct participation. 
Column 2 in Table 6.2 reports the results of this model. 
The main hypothesis holds: the participation of political parties in the appointment of EMB 
members is more likely to yield higher levels of confidence in electoral processes. All EMB 
models are more likely to have confidence in electoral processes than the reference category, 
“No participation in EMB appointment”, which is automatically omitted from the results table. 
However, there are differences amongst the proposed EMB models. Countries with “indirect 
participation” and “partial direct participation” are the most likely to yield higher levels of 
confidence in electoral processes. The odds ratio column illustrates this. When political parties 
have an indirect role in the appointment of the EMB members a country’s legislators are about 
2.34 times more likely to have confidence in electoral processes than their counterparts in 
countries where parties do not have a role in the appointment. When political parties have a 
partial direct participation the degree of likelihood is 2.10 times. Cases of full participation are 
also significant, although with a lower likelihood (odds ratio=1.68). Regarding the controls, 
Model 2 confirms the findings of the first model.  
As the structure of the data incorporates country-level characteristics a multilevel analysis is 
conducted in Model 3. Results of multilevel modelling are presented in the last column in Table 
6.2 and are fairly consistent with models 1 and 2. Regarding the participation of political parties 
in the appointment of EMB members, I find that only the second and third types of EMB model 
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have a significant impact on confidence in elections. Therefore, cases where political parties 
have an indirect and partial direct participation in EMBs are most likely to yield higher levels of 
confidence in electoral processes. Full direct participation loses significance. Completely multi-
party EMBs do not differ significantly from the reference category of “no participation”. 
In Figure 6.10 below, marginal effects show that confidence in electoral processes is 
significantly higher where political parties have an indirect and a partial direct role in the 
appointment of the EMB members (appointment types 2 and 3, respectively), compared to the 
baseline situation when parties do not participate in the appointment process. The value for 
these two appointment models is positive and is in line with the values of odds ratios in the 
multilevel regression (indicating these two models are more than 3 times more likely to have 
confidence in electoral processes than the reference category) 
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Figure 6.10 Marginal effects for political party participation in EMB appointment (Model 3-
multilevel). 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
First, as model 1 showed, congressmen and women are more likely to have better evaluations 
of elections when political parties are included in the appointment process. When parties 
participate in this process, it is more likely that they will trust and support the work, activities 
and decisions of the EMB. However, when political parties are excluded from this process, it is 
likely that electoral processes will be less trusted by them and the chances of having a 
contested and challenged election will increase.  
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Second, although the participation of political parties in the appointment process is positive, not 
all forms of inclusion yield the same level of benefits in terms of confidence in elections. As 
shown by model 3, countries with an indirect participation or a partial direct participation are 
more likely to generate trust in electoral processes. EMBs with full participation by political 
parties are not statistically significant. This does not seem so surprising if we take into account 
that EMBs which are entirely composed by party agents can be problematic, as some of the 
theory discussed previously highlights. Having party representatives alone can lead to 
infighting and to gridlock dynamics in the decision making process. This, in turn can lead to not 
only to long negotiations and a lack of efficiency but can potentially contribute to a perception 
of disorganisation and disorder in the EMB and on election processes themselves.  
In contrast, having an indirect or partial direct level of participation is preferred to other EMB 
models. This is also not very surprising. These two models lie between the expert and the 
multiparty based EMB models (occupying an intermediate position in terms of political party 
appointment powers) and can therefore draw advantages from both. In Uruguay (an example 
of partial direct participation) four ministers of the Corte Electoral are directly appointed by 
parties while the remaining five are selected by a two-thirds majority by both Houses of 
Parliament. These are known as neutral ministers and are chosen because of their reputation. 
In fact, they “must be citizens who, by their political standing, can guarantee impartiality” 
(Uruguay Const. art. 324). This ensures not only that political parties and their views are taken 
into account, but also that the EMB can benefit from the experience and reputation of these 
neutral ministers. These examples show we can have the best of both worlds and while some 
aspects from the expert-based model are desirable (such as professionalism, experience and 
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in some cases a good reputation of EMB members), it is not wise to exclude political parties 
from the selection process of EMB members.  
This chapter is limited to analysing the role of political parties in the appointment of the EMB 
members but there are other ways in which parties can participate and political support can be 
achieved. One way to do this is through inter-party committees and similar arrangements 
where all political parties can get to know, discuss and give their opinion on campaign and 
election administration matters. Several EMBs in Latin America provide good examples of this. 
Established in 1997, Panama’s National Council of Political Parties (CNPP) works as a 
permanent consultation structure between the country’s political parties and the magistrates of 
the Electoral Tribunal. It holds monthly sessions and has discussed many important election 
related topics. In its first session, Magistrate Valdés captured the spirit of this Council stating 
that it would work as “preventive medicine (…) and foster a more democratic system and an 
increasingly democratic electoral process” (Campo, 2007).  
These examples are beyond the scope of this paper but do provide a future research avenue 
and a key lesson that reinforces the main findings of this study: it is very important that political 
parties have a say in an essential democratic institution such as the Electoral Management 
Body. Trust flourishes when there is a good relationship between the EMB and political parties 
and when their interests, opinions and suggestions are considered (IDEA, 2006). As this work 
shows, some models of political party participation in EMB appointment are better than others 
(i.e. indirect participation and partial direct participation are preferred to full direct participation). 
However, a key conclusion is that including political parties in this process is a smart strategy. 
This not only contributes to greater confidence in electoral processes but, as a result, to the 
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legitimacy of the political system. At the end one must remember that involvement and 
inclusion must be at the centre of any system that calls itself democratic.  
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7. CHAPTER 7: FREE AND FAIR, BUT ALSO VISIBLE AND INFERABLE: THE ROLE OF 
ELECTION RESULTS IN POST-ELECTION PROTESTS. 
7.1 Introduction  
“Without transparency there is no way for citizens to know for themselves that elections are 
genuine”  
Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, 2012.  
 
Transparency is a key component for the credibility and legitimacy of an election. A number of 
international treaties and guidelines –ranging from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and UN General Assembly resolutions to International IDEA’s Handbook on Electoral 
Management Design and the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral 
Matters- hold that transparency is a key guiding principle to ensure both the actual and the 
perceived integrity of the election (IDEA, 2006). Transparency makes visible all the activities 
and procedures that make up the electoral cycle and can expose bias towards any candidate 
and help fight inefficiency and fraud (IDEA, 2006). Therefore, it should be present in the 
organisation of elections and in activities as diverse as campaign funding, electronic voting, 
judicial proceedings, vote counting and the transmission of results (Venice Commission, 2002; 
IDEA, 2006; 2014). In addition, transparency reduces uncertainty and tensions and allows 
people to verify the authenticity of the election, giving actors fewer arguments to challenge the 
process. In short, without transparency there is no way for citizens to know for themselves that 
elections are genuine (Global Commission, 2012).  
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This is especially important in election results. Transparency can improve confidence on the 
entire election and reduce post-election volatility (Global Commission, 2012). When election 
results are published in a timely fashion and these are accurate and clear, rumours and doubts 
decrease. When information about the vote tallies and results is open and widely available, 
speculation is prevented, leaving little room for suspicion “and post-polling competition among 
contenders” (Lopez Pintor, 2000:81).  The 2006 presidential election in Costa Rica is a good 
example. In this election, preliminary results from 88.45 % of polling stations showed that the 
margin between the two leading candidates was very narrow (a little more than 3,000 votes). 
One of the candidates claimed irregularities in the process and tensions erupted between 
political parties and citizens. Then, the Supreme Tribunal for Elections (TSE) decided to order 
a manual recount of each vote from the remaining 11.55% of polling stations. This was 
conducted in a very clear and open manner and demonstrated the transparency in the 
institution and the process, leading to a clear and uncontested result and reducing post-
election tensions between parties. 
However, when election results are not transparent, the opposite happens. Where preliminary 
or official results are not published, are poorly communicated or not released in time, 
uncertainty, rumours and tensions follow. Citizens and parties will suspect that somewhere and 
somehow, someone is modifying these results to their advantage. In addition, the failure to 
clearly communicate election results can lead to the suspicion that fraud has been committed 
and this can lead to challenges, protests and in some cases, even violence. The second round 
of the 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan is a good example. First, preliminary results for 
the election were expected by 2 July but were not released until almost a week later. As a 
result, accusations of vote fraud from both sides were widespread. Then, after preliminary 
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results gave the win to Ashraf Ghani, the runner up Abdullah Abdullah refused to accept the 
outcome and claimed that up to two million votes cast in the run off were fraudulent (Bijlert and 
Clark, 2014). John Kerry, the U.S. State Secretary had to intervene and travelled to Kabul to 
announce a political agreement including a 100% audit of the vote to be supervised by the 
United Nations. As the audit took more than two months to complete, tensions increased, 
leading to violence, including brawling in audit halls (The Economist, 2014).  Finally, a deal was 
reached to form a government of national unity: Mr Ghani became President and Mr Abdullah 
became a sort of Chief Executive Officer with similar powers. However, the deal stated that 
results of the audit were not to be published, casting a shadow of doubt over the elections.   
EMBs have an important role to play in avoiding uncertainty, tensions and instability after an 
election. First of all, EMBs have the power to organise a sound election, including a 
transparent results stage. EMBs can ensure that information on vote statements is transmitted 
quickly; that result transmission logistics are efficient; that preliminary results systems provide 
citizens with timely information; that information on results at all levels (national, regional, 
district and polling station) is published; that results are verified by third parties; and that results 
are complete, clear and easy to understand. Ultimately, EMBs can make sure that information 
on election results is timely, open and widely accessible to all involved actors, from parties to 
citizens. Second, by ensuring transparency in results, EMBs can contribute in shaping the 
perceptions of citizens and parties so that they support the election and its outcome. Making all 
information visible can eliminate any shadow of doubt.  
As shown by the literature review, academic research has only begun to study the impact of 
transparency in electoral processes from a more systematic approach and has been muted in 
the role it plays in the election results stage for preventing or reducing post-election protests or 
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violence.  In particular, research on transparency in elections has mostly looked at the role of 
election monitoring (Simpser and Donno, 2012; Hyde 2010; Ichino and Shundeln, 2012; Kelley, 
2012) and at specific measures for increasing transparency, from the implementation of 
transparent ballot boxes to the use of crowdsourcing to verify the accuracy of results (Sjoberg, 
2013; Arias, Garcia and Corpeño, 2015; DI and IFES, 2015). However, research has not yet 
focused on the role of transparency in the election results stage. Therefore, the main question 
in this research is: do transparent election results play a role in preventing post-election 
protests? 
This paper analyses the role of transparency of the results in preventing post-election protests. 
This is explored through a comparison of the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections in Mexico. 
Both elections were well organised, peaceful, met international standards for election 
administration and overseen by a strong and professional electoral institution (EU, 2006b; NDI, 
2006: OAS, 2012a).Then, both elections were challenged in court and followed by protests. 
However, while the protests after the 2006 election were massive and extended for a 
significant amount of time, the 2012 post-election protests where considerably smaller, very 
brief and dismissed as minor by many (Flores-Macias, 2013; Serra, 2014; Wood, 2015).  
I argue that the degree of transparency in the election results stage in both elections explains 
this variation. In particular, I analyse three mechanisms used by Mexico’s Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE) to process and communicate election results: the programme of preliminary 
election results (PREP), the quick count system, and the official tabulation and communication 
of results. The degree of transparency in each of these is assessed following Michener and 
Bersch’s (2013) minimal definition, which considers transparency’s two essential conditions: 
visibility and inferability.  
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7.2 The cases and method 
The role of transparency in election results in mitigating post-election protests is explored 
through a comparison of the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections in Mexico. Whereas the 
2006 election was followed by a series of massive demonstrations and a civil disobedience 
campaign that involved protracted protests lasting almost two months, protests after the 2012 
election were considerably smaller, short lived and received much less support. The scope and 
breadth of the protests in each election is sufficiently different for conducting a comparative 
analysis and tracing the role played by election results.  Moreover, these two cases naturally 
share a number of characteristics that allow controlling for a number of factors in explaining 
post-election protests.   
This research will rely on a paired comparison of these similar systems to show how the 
differences in the degree in transparency in election results affected the level of post-election 
protests. This method facilitates causal analysis and generating hypotheses, through an 
intimacy of analysis and a deep knowledge of the cases under study (Tarrow, 2010). More 
specifically, this method was chosen as it allows contrasts of institutions and assessment of 
their influence in behaviour and outcomes (Tarrow, 2010). In particular, the research will 
undertake a structured focused comparison, which allows conducting a controlled comparison 
of a small N (King, Keohane and Nye, 1994). This technique requires using questions that 
structure and guide the data collection process in a systematic way.  These questions will be 
asked to draw the same type of information from the election results phase in each election, 
with a focus on its three distinct stages a) the preliminary results programme, b) the parallel 
vote tabulation system and c) the official tabulation of results.  The research will explore the 
following questions: 
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 What was the extent of protests after the 2006 and 2012 elections in terms of their 
magnitude, duration and consequences? 
 Were the procedures, systems and strategies used by the EMB for the tabulation, 
presentation and communication of results transparent? In particular: 
o Was the processing and communication of preliminary election results 
transparent? 
o Was the processing and communication of the Quick Count results 
transparent? 
o Was the processing and communication of the official vote tabulation 
transparent? 
 How did the transparency (or lack thereof) shape citizens’ and political parties’ 
perception of the election?  
 Are there any other factors that could have contributed to the reduction in protests after 
the 2012 election? 
7.2.1 The similarities 
There are many similarities between the 2006 and 2012 elections. First of all, the country’s 
political and electoral system did not experience any changes between contests. Every six 
years Mexico holds a general election in which all eligible citizens vote for the President of the 
country, all 128 members of the Senate and all 500 Deputies in the Lower House. The 
President is elected by a plurality of votes in a single round election. Second, both elections 
were organised by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), an autonomous public body.. In 
addition, election disputes in both elections were resolved by a specialised court, the Electoral 
Tribunal of the Judicial Power of the Federation (TEPJF). Third, and most importantly, the 
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political party system in Mexico during this period has had the same composition, with three 
major parties with national presence (Serra, 2014). These main parties are the National Action 
Party (PAN), the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD). 
More specifically, both cases share important similarities in relation to the electoral process. 
According to international election observation missions both the 2006 and 2012 elections 
were considered free and fair and met international standards of election administration. 
According to the European Union the 2006 elections were “competitive, transparent and well 
administered, and were held in an atmosphere of respect for freedoms of expression, 
assembly and association” (EU, 2006b:1). The 2012 election was equally qualified in very 
positive terms, with the OAS Election Observation Mission Chief, former Colombian President 
Cesar Gaviria, declaring Mexico’s electoral system as “robust and reliable” and the election 
day as “peaceful, respectful and well organized” (OAS, 2012b). In particular, both elections 
were exceptionally well organised by IFE. This assessment is shared by the Election 
Observation Mission of the European Union for the 2006 contest (EU, 2006a) and by the 
Mission by the Organisation of American States for the 2012 contest (OAS, 2012a) In fact, 
IFE’s “technical capacity and state of administrative preparedness” for organising elections has 
been widely recognised (NDI, 2006).  
Moreover, both cases also have similarities in the type of campaign and the actors involved. 
First, both contests quickly turned into a two-way race. Although the three main parties 
competed in both elections, only two of them had a real possibility of winning, with the other 
one soon slipping into a distant third place (Camp, 2013:452). In 2006, the two main 
candidates were Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), from the PRD and Felipe Calderon 
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Hinojosa, from the PAN. Roberto Madrazo from the PRI was far behind them. 2012 also ended 
up being a two way race, this time between Enrique Peña Nieto from the PRI and AMLO. 
Behind these two front runners came Josefina Vazquez Mota, from the PAN. In both cases 
AMLO participated as one of the main two contenders and came in second place twice. 
Additionally, both contests quickly turned into a two way contest and were quite polarised, with 
deep differences between the main candidates and their supporters (Bruhn and Greene, 2007; 
Schedler, 2007). In addition, AMLO’s “polarizing rhetoric” (Serra, 2014:352) contributed to 
tensions in both the 2006 and 2012 campaigns. In fact, much like in 2006, the 2012 electoral 
results showed “a country divided roughly in half, with Peña Nieto or the PAN winning in the 
north and AMLO in most of the south” (Flores-Macias, 2013:135).  
Finally, both elections where characterised by their potential for conflict. Allegations of foul play 
were common in both campaigns. In 2006, AMLO accused President Fox of campaigning in 
favour of Felipe Calderon (Cambio de Michoacán, 2006) and of orchestrating a “state-
controlled election” (Schedler, 2007). Then, the 2012 campaign was characterised by 
accusations against the PRI for exceeding campaign finance limits (Serra, 2014) and for 
violating the electoral code by paying radio and TV stations to obtain favourable coverage for 
Peña Nieto (Intolerancia, 2012a; Proceso, 2012). Moreover, throughout the 2012 campaign, 
AMLO again complained of a “dirty war” against him with some claiming that this was a re-
edition of 2006 where he also accused PAN of holding a “dirty war” (Ramos, 2012). Against 
this backdrop, in both 2006 and 2012 AMLO claimed the elections had been plagued with 
fraud, specifically against him. As a result, he refused to accept election results and challenged 
them against the TEPJF.  
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7.2.2 The differences 
In spite of these similarities, it is important to note that both cases differ in two aspects which 
could be relevant in explaining the extent of post-election protests, therefore they need to be 
accounted for. A first difference is the approval in 2007-2008 of an electoral reform. This reform 
granted IFE new functions (INE, 2015) and brought changes in two key areas (INE, 2015a): the 
introduction of a new political communication model and of new rules for recounting votes.  
First, the new communication model prohibited negative advertisements against candidates 
and political parties (Serra, 2014). These can be considered a main factor in the polarisation of 
a campaign and therefore a reason behind tensions during an election, which could in turn lead 
to post-election protests. However, the new regulation did not make a difference in 2012. 
Regardless of the new regulations, the campaign was quite polarised, with the country split in 
half between the two candidates (Flores-Macias, 2013). Second, IFE’s power to stop negative 
campaign ads was not very effective and did not make the campaign any cleaner. As 
mandated by law IFE did not act as a filter for this type of propaganda, but rather as an a 
posteriori regulator. Advertisements deemed as negative29 could not be removed before airing, 
and could only be taken down after a formal complaint had been submitted, analysed and 
resolved by IFE (IFE, 2012a). Therefore, negative ads could be effectively on air for days 
before being removed and after having an effect on the campaign. Second, rules for recounts 
were updated, increasing the cases in which votes can be recounted. These are addressed in 
the next section as they are considered part of the explanation as to why post-election protests 
decreased in the 2012 election.  
                                                          
29According to the law, all types and contents of electoral propaganda are allowed as long as their expressions do not 
denigrate or slander anyone (IFE, 2012) 
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A second difference between these cases and arguably the most important one is the 
closeness in election results. In 2006, Felipe Calderon won with 35.89 per cent of the votes, 
while AMLO received 35.31 per cent and Roberto Madrazo 22.26 per cent (IFE, 2006). Smaller 
parties obtained the rest of the votes. In this case, the difference between the two main 
candidates was of barely 0.58 per cent, equivalent to 243,934 votes. In contrast, in 2012, 
Enrique Pena Nieto obtained 38.21 per cent of the votes, followed by AMLO with 31.59 per 
cent and Josefina Vazquez Mota with 25.41 per cent (IFE, 2012b)30. This meant that the 
difference between the first place and the runner up in 2012 was of 6.62 per cent, 6 points 
more than in 2006. 
A number of scholars have argued that close elections, such as the 2006 presidential contest 
in Mexico, have certain characteristics that can potentially lead to having disputed election 
results. Close elections are an indicator of the competitiveness of an election and are also 
known to spark high levels of anxiety among the voters (Howell and Justwan, 2013). This type 
of race is associated with uncertainty and excitement, which can lead to higher levels of 
engagement. As Kam and Utych (2011: 1252) outline, “While few people stay to watch the end 
of a blow-out sporting event, almost everyone remains glued to their seats if the game goes to 
overtime”. In particular, closer races make people think more about the candidates, seek more 
information about the election and in general increase their engagement (Kam and Utych, 
2011). Not knowing who will win or having a narrow margin between winner and loser naturally 
draws more attention. This can have consequences for the election in general. From a more 
practical point of view, when the difference between the first and the second place is razor-thin, 
the loser in the contest is less willing to support not only the outcome of the election but also 
                                                          
30 Results for both elections are the official results produced by the IFE after the district level count and do not 
include any changes by the TEPJF after resolving challenges to the election. 
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the political system in general (Nadeau and Blais, 1993). Moreover, closer races can “draw 
greater attention to questions of electoral integrity and magnify existing suspicion” (Birch, 2008: 
309). Therefore, it follows from this literature that close races can potentially increase chances 
for challenging an election. 
However, recent research has presented a different hypothesis for explaining the rejection of 
election outcomes in democratic regimes. As Hernandez-Huerta (2015) highlights, the 
conventional approach on this matter has identified either weak electoral institutions or election 
fraud as the main reasons why parties reject election results. Instead, he proposes a blackmail 
theory and argues that in presidential democracies, losing parties do not dispute election 
results to protest or challenge fraud, but “to strengthen their own capacity for negotiation with 
the newly elected government” (Hernandez-Huerta, 2015: 4). In particular the aim of disputing 
elections is to obtain benefits. These can include reforming the electoral process, passing 
certain key legislation, obtaining cabinet positions or committee chairs in congress, amongst 
others. In short, while in authoritarian regimes losing politicians dispute election results for 
publicising fraud and maybe removing the incumbent, in democracies – where elections are 
free and fair - it seems that they do so as an excuse to advance their own agenda (Hernandez-
Huerta, 2015). 
This seems certainly to have been the case in the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections in 
Mexico. As outlined before, domestic and international observers regarded both elections as 
free and fair and as exceptionally administered (EU, 2006a; EU, 2006b; NDI, 2006; OAS, 
2012). Nonetheless, both contests were disputed by AMLO. Then, if we follow Hernandez-
Huerta’s argument (2015), in the context of elections with minor irregularities, the rejection of 
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results consists of a negotiation strategy and therefore the challenge to the election is purely 
political. This was the case in both contests. 
First of all, past experience and events during both elections suggest that the rejection of the 
election outcomes by AMLO was strategic. As advanced by Eisenstadt (2007), AMLO was 
politically formed during the years of the “concertacesiones” where after a fraudulent election, 
the ruling PRI would negotiate through an informal gentleman’s agreement (or concertacesion) 
with the opposition. In exchange for demobilizing a protest or for supporting an election 
outcome, the opposition would get something in return. An example of this is PRI’s promise to 
enact PAN electoral reform initiatives in exchange for its support in the certification of the 
highly questioned 1988 presidential election. AMLO learned from these informal arrangements 
and has used this style of post-electoral bargaining a number of times. After AMLO lost the 
1988 election for the governorship of the state of Tabasco and after his party performed poorly 
in the state’s local elections in 1991, he decided to rally his supporters and march from 
Tabasco to Mexico City. The aim was to protest the local election results and pressure the 
national PRI government for obtaining some concessions. The strategy worked and the 
Minister of the Interior granted the PRD three municipal wins in the state (Eisenstadt, 2007). As 
the author suggests, AMLO’s continued contestation is rational when viewed through this 
historical lens. In fact, out of the 5 different elections AMLO has contested, he has won one 
(Mexico City Mayor in 2000) and lost the remaining four (Tabasco governorship in 1988 and 
1994; Mexico Presidential in 2006 and 2012). Not surprisingly, he has disputed all of these four 
elections.  
Second, AMLO’s challenges in court conform to this political strategy. In fact, his 2006 post-
electoral mobilisations were more based on “historic claims rather than on empirical evidence” 
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(Eisenstadt, 2007:42). An example of this is thata few days after the closing of the polls, AMLO 
offered as evidence of fraud a video that seemed to be a public relations stunt as it contained 
little objective value. The video shows an unidentified person introducing several ballot papers 
into a ballot box, arguably in favour of his rival, Felipe Calderón. The scene was shot at polling 
station number 2227 in the city of Salamanca, Guanajuato where representatives of political 
parties had signed the final tally sheet, acquiescing to the good conduct of the election. IFE 
explained the video was out of context, as  during the vote count, a few ballots from the 
congressional election were found inside the ballot box for the presidential election, and 
therefore had to be introduced into the corresponding box (Ramos, et al, 2006). For the 2012 
election the “evidence” of fraud was yet more colourful and void of substance. The post-
electoral complaint included over 1,600 items, including one pig, three chickens and two ducks 
(CNN, 2012) in addition to umbrellas, bottle openers, calendars and pens with the image of 
Enrique Pena Nieto. These were presented as evidence of large scale vote buying by the PRI 
and widely regarded as empty claims and as a means to pressure the TEPJF (Hiriart, 2012: 
Ordorica, 2012). The TEPJF dismissed AMLO’s challenge on the grounds that it did not 
contain enough evidence of election irregularities (Granados, 2012). 
In addition to AMLO’s political calculations, it seems that in Mexico post-election disputes are a 
common occurrence. Hernandez-Huerta’s study (2015) finds that in 21 per cent of all 
presidential elections in democratic states between 1974 and 2012, the runner-up party has 
challenged the outcome of the election. The averages for South and Central America are of 
9.67 per cent and 23.21 per cent, respectively. However, for Mexico this figure goes up to a 
stunning range between 41 and 67 per cent. In fact, the country is recognised as one where 
losing candidates frequently challenge the results of the election (Hernandez-Huerta, 2015). 
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Given the qualitative nature of this study, the margin of victory cannot be controlled for 
completely. However, all these pieces of evidence amount to the fact that in Mexico, post-
election disputes occur regardless of the closeness of the race.  
7.3 The framework: Post-electoral protests and transparency in election results. 
Post-election protests are defined as protests which are held as a way to challenge the election 
and are staged during the post-election stage, after polling stations close and results are 
announced. In particular and using Norris, Frank and Martinez I Coma’s definition of 
contentious elections (2015), they include protests which challenge either the legitimacy of 
electoral actors, procedures, or outcomes. Moreover, following Brancati’s work on pro-
democracy protests, this definition excludes protests “regarding human rights or political and 
civil rights which are not directly about the electoral process” (Brancati, 2014:1513). 
Post-electoral disputes are common in Mexico, but they do vary from one election to another. 
However, and in spite of the many similarities between the 2006 and 2012 elections, protests 
after each of these contests were strikingly different. In 2006, after election results were 
available, AMLO refused to recognise his defeat, called a massive fraud and rallied his 
supporters to protest against the results. They flooded into the streets, with estimates counting 
around 1 million people (El Universal, 2006). These protests then turned into a permanent 
street demonstration blocking one of the city’s main avenues for two months. Then four months 
after the election, AMLO called for a constitutional convention, had himself proclaimed 
Mexico’s “legitimate president” and insisted that the election had been stolen. The 2012 
protests pale in comparison to 2006. Protests in 2012 were much smaller and short lived; they 
did not turn into a permanent street sit-in that paralysed an entire city. AMLO did challenge the 
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results but he did not organise further demonstrations, declare himself the winner or make 
himself Mexico’s legitimate president.  
Transparency in election results will be measured using Michener and Bersch’s minimal 
definition of transparency (2013). This framework is suitable for this research as it departs from 
common broad and theoretical notions of the term and offers a precise and analytical concept 
which allows identifying and assessing it. It is therefore of assistance in evaluating 
transparency policies. For the authors, transparency is constituted by two essential conditions: 
visibility and inferability. Visibility, as the word implies, is associated with the semantics of “light 
and sight” (Michener and Bersch, 2013: 237). It has visual properties and therefore is related to 
the presence of information, as opposed to its absence. In particular, to be visible, information 
must meet two conditions. First, it must have a high degree of completeness, which means it 
should offer a full picture, without major omissions31. Second, it must be easy to locate, which 
translates into being easy to come across even without looking for it. Inferability, on the other 
hand, not only has to do with the information itself but also has an interactive aspect, as it 
depends on the receiving audience. Inferability is about the quality of the information. It has 
three key attributes: disaggregation, verifiability and simplification. When information is 
disaggregated it is presented directly, without mediation and in raw form. Verifiability has to do 
with the verification of the data by a third party, which also increases its inferability. Finally, 
simplification relates to having accessible and easier to understand information (Michener and 
Bersch, 2013).  
                                                          
31 However, as the authors state, knowing when information is complete or not is a dilemma that can only be 
addressed through research (Michener and Bersch, 2013) 
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The transparency of election results will be assessed according to this definition. First of all, 
information on election results needs to be “visible” and therefore complete and easily found. 
Information on preliminary results must be sufficient, with a higher coverage of the country 
being an indicator of more visibility. Using weather terminology, as suggested by Michener and 
Bersch, this would amount to having a high “percentage of visibility” (Michener and Bersch, 
2013:238). In addition, information must be available to all stakeholders (citizens, political 
parties, media, election observers, etc.).  Information on official results must also be complete, 
open and widely available.  However, as argued before, visibility is not sufficient. To be 
transparent, information must also be “inferable”, or in other words disaggregated, verifiable 
and simple. Disaggregation entails that information on election results must be presented 
directly in its original form. It is to be unmodified by any actor which can filter contents and thus 
present an incomplete or biased picture. When election officials communicate election results 
they must do so clearly and accurately, being faithful to the numbers provided by the tally 
sheets and their aggregation. In short, the less mediated the information on results, the better. 
Verification requires that information on election results can be verified by a third party. An 
example of this is result transmission systems that are verified by a specialised independent 
body. In addition, verification means that third parties can access the information (at all levels) 
and check its accuracy. Simplicity requires that information on election results is 
straightforward, with sign posts that make it easier to infer.  This can be achieved by using 
graphs, labels or other aides to make information more understandable. A ‘user-friendly’ 
website that provides full election results and allows to ‘zoom in’ on them at the country and 
state or district level is a good example of this. 
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These parameters will be used to assess the transparency in election results in the 2006 and 
2012 Mexico presidential elections. However, one must note that this conceptualisation is not 
intended to provide a scale with a certain number of levels of transparency. Rather, it provides 
a transparency continuum. Visibility and inferability are both needed to achieve transparency 
and are overlapping concepts. As a result, they allow for continuous transparency degrees, 
“from poor to excellent quality and all points in between” (Michener and Bersch, 2013: 234). 
Therefore, the evaluation of election results in both study cases will be done in terms of more 
or less transparency, and not through pre-defined levels. 
 
7.3.1 Somewhat visible but not inferable: the 2006 presidential election results in Mexico. 
On 2 July 2006 41.7 million Mexicans went to the polls in the most transparent and well 
administered elections the country had ever experienced. In the words of the words of the 
European Union Election Observation Mission final report:  
“The 2 July 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections generally complied with international 
principles for genuine democratic elections. They were competitive, transparent and well 
administered, and were held in an atmosphere of respect for freedoms of expression, 
assembly and association, demonstrating a firm commitment of Mexican citizens to the 
strengthening and consolidation of democracy. The legislative framework provides for the 
conduct of democratic elections and many safeguards have been adopted during the last 
decade to guarantee transparency of the process” (EU, 2006b:1) 
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In particular, for that election, an army of 913,389 citizens were randomly selected and then 
trained as polling officers to organise and oversee the process. 130,477 polling stations were 
installed across a large country with many geographical challenges. Only 11 polling stations (or 
.0001 per cent) were not installed, setting a record in the IFE’s history32. More than 25,000 
nationals were registered and accredited as election observers to enhance the transparency of 
the election. These were complemented by 693 international observers. A staggering 
1,240,860 political party representatives oversaw the work of the citizens and watched over the 
election in a majority of polling stations (IFE, 2007). In addition, the IFE, “one of the most 
trusted and respected public institutions in the country” (EU, 2006b) worked hard to ensure the 
voting process was fair and well-administered (NDI, 2006). At the end, official results gave 
Calderon (PAN) 35.89 per cent of votes. Obrador (PRD) received 35.31 per cent.  
However, and in spite of these achievements, this election culminated in an “intense political 
drama that made headlines around the world” (Estrada and Poire, 2007:73). Soon after IFE 
announced preliminary election results the night of the election, both AMLO and Felipe 
Calderon proclaimed victory. AMLO rejected the results and announced he would challenge 
them in court and on the streets. In particular, he demanded a nationwide recount of the 
results, “voto por voto, casilla por casilla” (vote by vote, polling station by polling station), 
arguing that the preliminary results programme had been manipulated (Granados, 2006). On 
the streets, he called his supporters to protest against the results and to begin a strategy of 
civil disobedience. He denounced a massive fraud and refused to recognise Calderon as the 
victor. His followers flooded the streets of many cities in the country and especially of Mexico 
City. In the capital, 1.1 million people (El Universal, 2006) were reported to take part in the 
                                                          
32 In the 1991 elections 164 polling stations were not installed by a number of reasons, 22 polling stations were 
not installed in 1994, 121 in 1997, 18 in 2000 and 83 in 2003.  (IFE, 2007:29)  
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mobilisations, making up probably the largest demonstration in the history of the city (La 
Jornada, 2006). These demonstrations, on AMLO’s orders, quickly turned into a permanent 
street sit-in (Castaneda and Morales, 2007) with his followers camping permanently and 
blocking one of Mexico City’s most important avenues, Paseo de la Reforma, from July to 
September, for a total of 48 days (ADN, 2012). A few months later AMLO called for a 
constitutional convention and had his supporters proclaim him Mexico’s “legitimate president” 
and he even received a fake presidential band (Jorge Villalpando Castro, 2014). Throughout 
Calderon’s tenure as president, AMLO referred to him as Mexico’s illegitimate president.  
What was the role of election results in contributing to these high levels of protests in the 
aftermath of the 2006 election? Although the election results stage had positive aspects, it was 
not completely transparent, leading to suspicion and tensions and thus fuelling post-election 
protests. This will be assessed by considering three key moments of the election results stage 
in Mexico: the programme of preliminary election results (PREP), the quick count system, and 
the tabulation and communication of official results.  
7.3.1.1 The PREP 
The PREP is a programme that offers preliminary results which are disseminated for 
informational purposes only and therefore have no legal effect. Information for the PREP is 
taken from the tally sheets produced after polling stations close and votes are counted. A copy 
of the tally sheet is sent to Centres of Data Reception and Transmission (CEDAT) in each of 
the 300 electoral districts in the country, and then transmitted to a National Centre of 
Preliminary Results. Then, they are posted on IFE’s website and made available. The results 
are posted from 8pm on Sunday and the database is updated every 10 minutes, as results 
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come in from different parts of the country. The PREP, as a preliminary system, runs for 24 
hours until 8pm on the Monday after the election.  
For the 2006 election the PREP proved to be visible but not very inferable. The PREP was 
quick, effective and widely available to all stakeholders.  On average tally sheets were 
captured in 1.2 minutes and only 12 minutes passed between the reception of the tally sheet 
and the publication of its results. The PREP also provided a high percentage of visibility, 
showing information for 98.45 per cent of the tally sheets in the country, which is a very high 
number considering this is a preliminary results system. This was also a high number for IFE’s 
own standards, if we compare it to the 93 per cent of the tally registered in the PREP for the 
2000 presidential election (IFE, 2006b). The PREP is also verifiable. It can be audited by 
political parties and is designed and implemented by an Advisory Technical Committee 
(Comité Técnico Asesor), composed by renowned experts in the fields of information security, 
telecommunications, software development, internet and distance learning (IFE, 2006a). These 
specialists are selected in an open procedure by IFE’s General Council. Finally, the system 
was also accurate. It showed Calderon had a slight lead over Lopez Obrador, and was 
therefore compatible with official final results and with other preliminary results exercises (EU, 
2006b). 
However, and in spite of its good technical performance, the PREP lacked disaggregation and 
simplicity, which are two key components of inferability and transparency.  A few months 
before the election, a number of criteria were approved to determine how the information on 
the tally sheets would be entered into the PREP system33. These criteria outlined 6 different 
                                                          
33 “Criterios procedentes en caso de que se identifiquen campos de información que se encuentren en blanco 
o sean ilegibles en las actas de escrutinio y cómputo” (IFE, 2006c) 
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situations where information would not be published, including cases of tally sheets with empty 
boxes or where figures were unreadable or mistaken (IFE, 2006c). These tally sheets were 
classified as “inconsistencies” and even though they were processed, the data included in 
them was not aggregated to the database.  The PREP database did show the total number of 
processed tally sheets but was not clear in showing which ones were aggregated and which 
ones were not (EU, 2006b). In fact, IFE itself admits that this was not clear enough for the 
citizenry (INE, 2015b). In total, 11,184 tally sheets, amounting to 2,581,226 votes were 
classified as inconsistencies. This “created considerable confusion among the public” (EU, 
2006b) as they thought these votes were missing. After this, AMLO declared that close to 3 
million votes had been “lost” (Garduno and Becerril, 2006). This, in turn, lead to accusations of 
manipulation of the PREP and to AMLO demanding a full (“vote by vote, polling station by 
polling station”) recount of the election.  
7.3.1.2 The Quick Count 
Second, the IFE conducts a Quick Count system to offer preliminary election results. This 
consists of a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) that uses a randomly selected sample of polling 
stations across the country to provide a statistical estimation of the votes received by each 
candidate. Although PVT is normally used as a mechanism of control for verification of election 
results by third parties such as election observation organisations, in this case it is the IFE who 
deploys this system as a second exercise to provide preliminary results. In particular, for the 
2006 election, IFE collected the official results from a representative sample composed of 
7,636 polling stations from all the districts in the country. For obtaining and verifying the 
projected results, the Quick Count uses three statistical methods: robust, classic and Bayesian, 
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which offer estimations of results within a range. These are released the same night as the 
voting took place.  
The Quick Count system was accurate and quick in predicting an estimate of the results for the 
presidential election. From a sufficient number of polling stations from the sample (7,263 
polling stations, equivalent to 95.12 per cent of the total) and with information from all 300 
electoral districts, it was able to provide results just a few hours after polling stations closed. 
These results were offered with a very small margin of error of 0.3 per cent and a 95 per cent 
level of confidence (IFE, 2006d). The Quick Count was also verifiable. An Advisory Technical 
Committee was also set up for defining and verifying the scientific criteria used in the system. 
This Committee, composed of five prominent specialists, was selected in an open manner by 
the IFE’s councillors. Moreover, political parties were able to audit its work and also 
participated in the process of selecting the representative sample of polling stations (IFE, 
2006d). 
However, the communication of results of the Quick Count was not simple and clear. At 10:45 
pm the Technical Committee presented a report with the estimations yielded by the three 
statistical methods. The three estimates showed an overlap between the two main candidates, 
Felipe Calderon and AMLO (Figure X). From this, Luis Carlos Ugalde, President Councillor of 
IFE, decided and announced on national TV that the results of the quick count were not going 
to be publicised (EU EOM, 2006). The argument offered was that since the statistical margins 
of error could not allow to clearly state the candidate who obtained most of the votes and that 
the margin between the first and the second candidate was too narrow, then it was not possible 
to announce a winning candidate (Ciberactivo, 2006). This generated confusion and suspicion. 
According to a 2006 poll by Parametria group (Ortega and Somuano, 2013), 45 per cent of 
217 
 
 
 
citizens disagreed with the decision made by IFE’s president not to make those results public. 
Moreover, 45 per cent of the population said it was frustrated by that decision and 35 per cent 
claimed the 2006 election was not trustworthy. In addition, many thought that maybe IFE was 
concealing a result that did not favour the ruling PAN (Aparicio, 2009). Tensions were high. In 
addition, political parties did not agree with Ugalde’s decision and demanded to know the 
estimations of the Quick Count, even if the trends were not conclusive (EU EOM, 2006). A day 
after the election, IFE conceded and decided to release the estimations. However, it was too 
late, the damage had been done. Due to the lack of information and uncertainty on election 
night, both candidates had declared themselves winners and celebrated their victory (Ugalde, 
2008; Saragoza, Ambrosi and Zarate, 2012). AMLO was already claiming a massive fraud 
where election results were hidden from the public. His supporters were ready to protest. 
Figure 7.1 Quick Count estimation of results for the two main candidates. 3 methods. 
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Source: Report of the Technical Advisory Committee of the Quick Count for the 2006 presidential election.  
The blue line represents the estimation of the results obtained by Felipe Calderon. Yellow represents Andres 
Manuel Lopez Obrador. 
7.3.1.3 The district count 
Third, the IFE conducts a “district count” to provide official results. The Wednesday after 
election day all 300 district level offices of the IFE tabulate the results from all the tally sheets 
from all the polling stations in the country. There are no exceptions. This count provides the 
official results of the election, unlike the PREP or the Quick Count, which provide preliminary 
results. This process started on 5 July and went on uninterrupted until all of the results were 
added up.  In order to do this, results from tally sheets are aggregated by staff from the IFE. 
However, as required by the electoral code if there was evidence that electoral packages had 
been tampered with, then packages had to be reopened and votes for that polling station were 
to be counted again. This was also the case when tally sheet results from the electoral 
packages did not match the results in the tally sheet copy obtained by the president of the 
district level office (IFE, 2006e).  
The district count for the 2006 election was open, verifiable, and widely available. Information 
was presented in a simple, disaggregated manner. The process started at 8am on 5 July and 
went on for over 30 hours in all 300 district offices under the supervision of representatives 
from all political parties. All tally sheets and their results were verified. After being validated, 
results of each tally sheet were captured by a computer system that transmitted them to a 
network that made results available to the entire nation (IFE, 2006e). Then, when the 
tabulation for the district was complete, results were also posted outside the district office. As 
shown in Table 7.1, the official results from the district count were compatible with PREP’s 
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preliminary results and located within the ranges offered by the Quick Count, which means 
they were accurate (Aparicio, 2009).   
Table 7.1 Comparison of Quick Count, PREP and District Count. 
Procedure Felipe Calderón AMLO 
Quick Count  
Robust method 35.25 per cent-37.40 per cent 34.24 per cent-36.38 per cent 
Classic method 35.68 per cent-36.53 per cent 34.94 per cent-35.70 per cent 
Bayesian method 35.77 per cent-36.40 per cent 35.07 per cent-35.63 per cent 
PREP 
PREP  
(98.45 per cent of tally sheets) 
36.38 per cent 35.34 per cent 
PREP (including inconsistencies) 35.91 per cent 35.29 per cent 
District count 
District count 35.89 per cent 35.31 per cent 
 
However, the results offered by the district count were not completely inferable. Although 
aggregated results were verifiable by political parties, individual votes were not, which was the 
main request of AMLO’s call of “voto por voto, casilla por casilla”, which required a nationwide 
recount of the results (Granados, 2006). The electoral code did allow for a recount in certain 
cases such as when tally sheets had been tampered or included mistakes but left that decision 
to IFE’s district offices. However, in spite of having the power to order a broader recount, these 
offices decided to recount only 2,864 tally sheets, which represented a mere 2.19 per cent of 
the total of polling stations (Elizondo Gasperin, 2012).This was accepted neither by AMLO and 
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his followers nor by large sections of the general population. According by a poll conducted by 
Ipsos Bimsa soon after the election, 48 per cent of people interviewed across the country 
would have preferred the IFE to conduct a full vote recount, which did not happen (Buendia y 
Bustos, 2006). 
The very limited recount of the votes, along with the mismanagement and miscommunication 
of the inconsistencies found in the PREP and IFE’s decision not to communicate the Quick 
Count estimates added up to a wide lack of trust in the election and its results. Suspicions and 
tensions increased. This was capitalised on by the runner up who quickly called fraud and 
rallied his supporters to protest. The mass demonstrations that followed paralysed the capital 
city for almost two months and only ended a few days after the final resolution of the TEPJF 
confirming Felipe Calderon’s victory. Throughout Calderon’s presidency AMLO continued to 
denounce him as an usurper (Davila, 2011) and to call himself Mexico’s “legitimate president”.  
7.3.2 Visible and inferable: the 2012 presidential election results in Mexico. 
The 1 July 2012 presidential and congressional election was conducted peacefully with no 
major irregularities and by voters and election officials with “a high sense of civic responsibility 
and serious-minded attitude” (COPA, 2012:1). Electoral institutions were strong and staffed by 
an experienced group of professionals who carried out their tasks effectively (EU, 2012). 
Moreover, the election was technically well prepared. During election day, more than a million 
polling officers worked at the 143,132 polling stations across the country. Only 2 stations were 
not installed (IFE, 2012). The election was also watched over by more than 2 million political 
party representatives covering all polling stations. According to the OAS Election Observation 
Mission Final Report, all of the polling stations visited by their team had at least one party 
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representative monitoring them (OAS, 2012). In addition, 32,805 national and 696 international 
observers from 66 countries witnessed the election. On 8 July, the official results announced 
by the IFE confirmed PRI’s Enrique Pena as the winner of the election with 38.21 per cent of 
the votes, followed by AMLO with 31.59 per cent. 
As in 2006, in 2012 Mexico’s electoral institutions performed well and organised a technically 
accurate election. However, in contrast to 2006, the 2012 elections were not followed by the 
same level of protest. One day after official results were announced, AMLO organised a press 
conference where he rejected the election process and its results. In particular, he argued that 
the elections were marred by manipulated opinion polls, vote buying and violations of 
campaign spending limits that favoured the PRI candidate. Three days later AMLO legally 
challenged the election through the TEPJF. However, on this occasion AMLO did not claim 
victory. Rather, he asked the TEPJF to invalidate the election. In parallel, he called on his 
supporters to protest (Cano, 2012). However, this time the protest did not attract the same 
level of attention or support as in 2006. The protest organised one week after the election 
attracted about 50,000 people (The Guardian, 2012), only one twentieth of the people that 
participated in protests 6 years before. Moreover, these protests were dismissed by scholars 
and media outlets as minor (Flores-Macias, 2013; Serra, 2014; Wood, 2015). In addition, 
demonstrations were short-lived. Protests lasted a few hours, and did not protract for days or 
months – or turned into a sit-in- as in 2006. Moreover, AMLO’s own political party decided not 
to support his mobilizations (Flores-Macias, 2013; Serra, 2014). This eventually led him to quit 
the PRD and start a party of his own, the Movimiento de Regeneracion Nacional (MORENA), 
which obtained its official registration in 2015. Finally, after the 2012 election there were no 
calls for organising a constitutional convention or a false swearing in ceremony for AMLO.  
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To what extent and how did the communication of election results in the 2012 election 
contribute to having lower levels of post-election protests? Soon after the 2006 elections, there 
was a conscious decision by political parties and the electoral authorities to avoid repeating 
that conflict in the future (Serra, 2010). First of all, Congress and political parties designed and 
voted an election reform that amongst other things was aimed at making election results more 
transparent (INE, 2015a). For example, this reform included new rules and procedures that 
guaranteed a more complete vote recount after an election. Second, the implementation of this 
election reform by IFE, coupled with a number of internal policies regarding the communication 
of results, significantly increased transparency in this key aspect of the election and contributed 
to mitigate post-election conflict. The two novelties described above will be explained in detail 
through the assessment of the transparency in the PREP, the Quick Count and the District 
Count, as assessed for the 2006 election. 
7.3.2.1 The PREP 
In terms of transparency, the preliminary election results system used in the 2012 election 
represented a significant improvement from the 2006 PREP. As in 2006, the PREP was 
accurate, open and timely. It provided a high percentage of visibility, as it showed information 
for a total of 141,935 polling stations, or 98.95 per cent of the total, slightly higher than the 
2006 record (98.45 per cent). As before, the 2012 PREP was designed and implemented by an 
Advisory Technical Committee of experts and audited by the National Autonomous University 
of Mexico (UNAM). Then, its results were consistent with those offered by the quick count and 
the district count, therefore confirming its accuracy and transparency (IFE, 2012c).   
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However, for this election the PREP overcame the problems faced in 2006 and implemented 
two major improvements that made it more inferable. First, the criteria for entering the 
information of the tally sheets into the PREP system were changed. In 2006, the criteria lead to 
information from 11,184 “inconsistent” (unclear or illegible) tally sheets not being published. In 
2012, the new criteria addressed such cases and instructed polling officers how to enter them 
into the system. Now, tally sheet results were included in the system even if they were not easy 
to read (i.e. if the box for the total number of votes was empty or if election results in figures or 
words were illegible). In contrast to 2006, in 2012, all tally sheets were published, including the 
ones with “inconsistencies” and more information was available to political actors (OAS, 
2012a). This made the information for the PREP more inferable. 
Second, and for the first time in history, the IFE decided to make the information from all tally 
sheets from all 143,132 polling stations available to the public (IFE, 2012d; INE, 2015c). For 
previous contests – Including the 2006 election -, the IFE published the aggregated results by 
polling station and by district and country level. However, for the 2012 election, 600 data entry 
assistants located in all 300 electoral districts, were in charge of scanning each of the tally 
sheets for all three federal elections (president, senate, congress). These digital images were 
then uploaded to IFE’s website so that citizens, political parties, the media and all interested 
parties were able to see the physical tally sheets and cross check them to the PREP’s results 
posted on the website. Not only that, but IFE also developed a smartphone app for following 
preliminary results (Intolerancia, 2012). Stakeholders could now witness the results by seeing 
an actual copy of what polling officers wrote with their own hands.  
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7.3.2.2 The Quick Count 
For the 2012 election, the results provided by the Quick Count were not only accurate and 
timely but were also publicised and communicated in a simple and clear manner.  In 2012, IFE 
conducted a Parallel Vote Tabulation to have an estimate of the results for the presidential 
election. A total of 7,597 polling stations were selected as a representative sample of the 
country (out of these 6,260 stations – or 82.4 per cent of the sample - were deemed to be 
sufficient to provide results). Tally sheets from these polling stations were used to estimate the 
results. The results had a small margin of error of 0.5 per cent and a 95 per cent confidence 
interval (IFE, 2012e).  As in other contests, the Quick Count was designed and implemented by 
a Technical Committee of five renowned specialists selected publicly by the IFE’s General 
Council. These experts, as in 2006, used three different statistical methods to estimate the 
results. These were presented as 3 expected results intervals or ranges for each candidate.  
By 22:45 pm on election day, the Technical Committee had finalised its report and estimated 
results were ready to be announced. This time, and as opposed to 2006, the IFE’s president 
decided to make the results public.  In a decision taken years before and against the backdrop 
of the 2006 post-election crisis, IFE had decided to release the results no matter what. In this 
sense, IFE’s president decided that no matter the estimated intervals and no matter if the 
margin between candidates was very narrow, results would be communicated, especially since 
in Mexico “we have learnt that when IFE does not provide election results the same day as the 
election, this causes a state of uneasiness amongst society and brings situations that can cast 
a shadow of doubt or jeopardise the political stability of the country” (Red Politica, 2012:1). In 
the words of Leonardo Valdés Zurita, president of the IFE between 2008 and 2013, “in relation 
to election results, timeliness and transparency will be our best contribution to democracy” (El 
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Universal, 2011). Moreover, as can be seen in his nation-wide speech (Macroeconomia, 2012), 
Valdés was clear and concise in this explanation of the use of the quick count and of the other 
methods employed by the IFE for obtaining results. As a result, fewer people were willing to 
question the integrity of the electoral institution. Now no one could accuse the IFE of 
withholding or hiding information: everything was visible for everyone.  
7.3.2.3 District Count  
A major change between the 2006 and 2012 elections was the passing of new legislation. In 
2007, the Mexican Congress approved a far reaching electoral reform that increased 
provisions for vote recounts (Elizondo Gasperin, 2012). In 2006, the electoral code stated that 
votes would be recounted in three situations: a) if results from the tally sheets did not match 
their copies b) if tally sheets or packages had visible evidence of being tampered or c) if the 
tally sheet from a polling station was missing (COFIPE, 1996). In contrast, the 2007 reform 
expanded the number of causes for conducting recounts. Now, IFE’s district offices have to 
recount the votes when a) there are evident mistakes or inconsistencies in the tally sheets, b) 
the number of null ballots is greater than the vote difference between the two candidates that 
obtained the most number of votes, c) all the votes in a polling station have been cast in favour 
of one single candidate, and d) the vote difference between the candidate that gained most 
votes and the runner up is less than 1 per cent (Elizondo Gasperin, 2012).  
With these new rules the IFE was able to recount more votes and therefore have more 
inferable results. Whereas during the 2006 election the IFE district offices recounted 2,864 tally 
sheets, representing 2.19 per cent of all polling stations, for the 2012 election conditions were 
very different. For that election, the IFE automatically recounted 241,790 electoral packages 
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from all three federal elections held. Out of these, 78,469 packages were recounted for the 
presidential election, which represented a stunning recount of 45,049,356 ballots, or 54.82 per 
cent of the total (Elizondo Gasperin, 2012). The difference is shown in Table 7.2. As in other 
elections, this procedure was conducted by IFE’s professional staff and supervised by 
representatives from all political parties. Finally, the district count provided the official results of 
the election, which confirmed the preliminary data offered by PREP and the Quick Count.  
Table 7.2 Polling stations recounted by IFE for the presidential election. 2006 and 2012. 
Year 2006  2012  
Polling stations recounted 2,864 78,469 
 per cent of total 2.19 per cent 54.82 per cent 
 
7.4 Transparent election results and mitigating post-election protests  
How did transparency in election results contribute to the extent of protests after these 
elections? Through this qualitative analysis it is difficult to prove that other contextual and 
individual factors – such as the closeness of the result, or the different decisions of agents like 
AMLO or attitudes of the people in 2006 and 2012 - might not have played a role in this. 
However, the study suggests that transparency reduces uncertainty, suspicion and rumours 
and therefore can help mitigate post-election protests and prevent them from escalating into 
wider problems. I would contend that this interpretation is especially plausible in the light of the 
QCA analyses reported in this thesis.  
Transparency provides certainty about the process and makes it verifiable. With visible and 
inferable results political parties and candidates have fewer arguments to challenge the 
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election, especially when this challenge is more political. Following Michener and Bersch 
(2013), both elections were assessed considering transparency’s two essential conditions: 
visibility and inferability. In general terms, while the 2006 election results where to some extent 
visible, their inferability was not very good. Starting with the PREP, in spite of its accuracy and 
high percentage of visibility, the information provided was not inferable. This is as the 
programme did not publish information from a total of 11,184 tally sheets (equivalent to 
2,581,226 votes) classified as unclear to read (or “inconsistent” in the electoral lingo), raising 
concerns about potential missing votes. This was then used by AMLO and his supporters to 
accuse IFE of stealing those votes. Moreover, the Quick Count results were not completely 
visible or inferable. Although the Count was accurate and conducted in a professional manner 
and verified by independent experts, the results were not made available to the public. The 
decision of IFE’s President not to publicise the quick count’s results created uncertainty, 
leading both candidates to proclaim victory and fuelling suspicions about IFE hiding the “real” 
results from the people. Finally, the district count was visible but not inferable. Although 
complete and timely, IFE’s district level offices, decided not to open the majority of electoral 
packages, even when they could have done this. This decision was taken in spite of AMLO’s 
main demand for increased transparency and to conduct a “vote by vote, polling station by 
polling station” recount. 
In contrast, in the 2012 election the absolute transparency in the publication of PREP, the 
decision to communicate the results calculated by the Quick Count and the new recount 
procedures all contributed to having fewer post-election protests. First, publishing all tally 
sheets, including those with “inconsistencies” made the PREP more inferable and reduced any 
potential confusion. This made it difficult for anyone to claim that millions of votes had been 
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lost. Second, publishing the Quick Count results contributed to the transparency of the 
process. Releasing results “no matter what” decreases people’s suspicion that the “real” results 
are hidden from them. Now no one could accuse IFE of being partial. Third, the new triggers 
for having an automatic recount addressed the immediate cause of AMLO’s post-election 
protests (Jackson, 2014:6). While in 2006 AMLO’s demand to have a full recount was not 
addressed, in 2012 new regulations allowed for this. Now, not only aggregated results but also 
individual votes could be verified. 
The election results stage is one of the most sensitive areas in an electoral process and plays 
a very important role in the reduction of post-election conflict. When election results are not 
transparent, suspicions and tensions arise, potentially leading to conflict. On the other hand, 
when results are transparent, citizens trust the process and can verify its authenticity. As we 
will discuss in the conclusion, this has important implications for the field of electoral 
governance. Lawmakers, election officials and international practitioners all have to pay special 
attention to the election results stage, it is these few hours that can make or break an election.  
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8. CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND WAYS FORWARD 
Why are elections characterised as “free and fair” sometimes followed by protests and even 
violence? When reading newspapers after any election held anywhere in the world it is not 
uncommon to find stories about long queues, poorly designed ballot papers that confuse 
voters, incredibly intricate voting machines and tired poll workers who did not fill out the tally 
sheets correctly. In more complex scenarios, reports highlight incidences of vote buying, ballot 
box stuffing, unequal access to media, state bias in favour of one of the candidates and even 
violence against specific groups or candidates. Not all stories are about sausage sizzles and 
barbeques at voting centres (BBC, 2016). People challenge elections and their results. And 
this can happen even in democratic countries that hold good quality elections. The Perceptions 
of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index shows that between 2012 and 2015, 33.3% of elections in 
democratic countries were challenged, while 20.6% were followed by peaceful protests and 5% 
by violence. Moreover, several elections have been challenged in spite of having moderate or 
high electoral integrity scores.34 
This contradicts conventional wisdom which argues that quality in the electoral process is 
enough for the election to be credible and successful. According to this view, if all or most 
aspects of the administration of the election are sound and properly implemented, then the 
acceptance by citizens and political parties will follow. However, the legitimacy of the election 
not only lies in its good administration. As history shows, sometimes elections that are 
characterised as “free and fair” are challenged and protested, while elections with 
administrative and logistical issues have been accepted. Why is this? The key is that elections 
                                                          
34
 Electoral Integrity scores are obtained using version 4.5 of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (Norris 
et al, 2016). 
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not only have to be objectively “free and fair”, but also believed to be free and fair. Of course, 
the technical side of the election is important, but also important are other aspects that 
contribute to having positive perceptions of the process and its outcome. If parties and people 
believe the elections are free and fair, results are accepted and democracy takes its course. 
However, if they don’t, trust in elections and confidence on the entire political system suffers, 
threatening peace and stability. 
As a result, this research has sought to answer why in some cases elections are accepted 
while in other cases they are challenged and their outcomes rejected, as outlined by the main 
research question: When, where and under what conditions are election results accepted?  
And derived from this, what can we do to increase the credibility of electoral institutions and 
processes? As described above, there are a number of factors at play, but some are more 
critical than others. As highlighted, the 5th Global Electoral Organization Conference (GEO): 
Credible Elections for Democracy acknowledged that while elections comprise many different 
components35 there are a few key areas that deserve special attention. This thesis looks at the 
support of political parties for the Electoral Management Body (EMB), the overall quality of the 
electoral process and transparency in the election results stage. Findings demonstrate that 
these areas can contribute to an election going smoothly and to the acceptance of the 
outcome.  
 
                                                          
35 Following the Electoral Integrity Project’s and other scholars’ definition (Elklit and Reynolds, 2005; Norris, et 
al., 2015) the electoral cycle is made up by eleven dimensions. These encompass the pre-election stage, 
election day and the post-election, and therefore include activities that range from the legal framework and 
voter registration to the vote count and the processing and communication of results 
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8.1 Beyond free and fair 
. These conditions (the support of political parties for electoral institutions, the administration of 
the electoral process and transparency in the election results stage) were analysed in chapters 
5, 6 and 7. These chapters represent three different research phases and involve three 
different methodologies. Although the three methods do not use the exact same variables, their 
findings are consistent and complement each other. 
Chapter 5 is the first phase of the study and asks When, where and under what conditions are 
election results accepted?  As the first phase, it explored the role of a number of factors in the 
acceptance of election results (democratic consolidation, the closeness of an election, the 
support offered by political parties to electoral institutions, quality in the electoral process, and 
transparency in election results). In order to test the effect of these variables, the chapter relied 
on multivalue Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA). A first model focused on 48 
elections in Latin America and a second model demonstrated the generalisability of the 
findings to other contexts in Africa, Asia and Europe. 
The parsimonious solution offered by the mvQCA analysis is presented as a formula with two 
paths that lead to the acceptance of results36. The first path shows that holding free and fair 
elections in a consolidated democracy is sufficient for the acceptance of results, as long as the 
election result is not close. A second path of minimally necessary and sufficient conditions 
illustrates that elections are accepted when there is support of political parties for the electoral 
institution and moderate to highly transparent election results. If these conditions are present, it 
is very likely that results will be accepted, even if the results of the election are very close.  
                                                          
36
 See chapter 5 for both complex and parsimonious formulae.  
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No condition by itself can lead to the acceptance of results. Conditions need to happen 
simultaneously. Each of these conditions is necessary; but by themselves they are not sufficient. 
For example, if political parties support the electoral institutions but the election experienced 
significant flaws and the results were not transparent, it is likely that results will not be accepted. 
In a similar way, even a high quality election will not be accepted if its results are delayed and/or 
not clear and if political parties do not trust the EMB. So, contrary to conventional wisdom, having 
free and fair elections is not enough for results to be accepted. Other factors are needed. This is 
the main finding of the QCA. 
8.2 Political party support and transparent results 
Holding free and fair elections is not enough for accepting the legitimacy of an election. In 
addition, political parties need to support the electoral institutions and elections results need to 
be transparent. Chapters 6 and 7 drilled down further into these conditions in order to analyse 
their role in the acceptance of results. In particular, the aim was to better understand what  
election officials, legislators and international election assistance practitioners can do to 
improve the integrity and credibility of elections at home and abroad. 
8.2.1 Including political parties in electoral institutions 
Chapter 6, To include or not to include? Party representation in electoral institutions and 
confidence in elections: A comparative study of Latin America, looks at the support of political 
parties for electoral institutions. Guided by the findings from QCA analysis, I hypothesise that 
the support of political parties – measured by their inclusion in the appointment of the members 
of the EMB – matters. Political party support is fundamental for the legitimacy of electoral 
institutions and processes. Political parties constitute a main channel of communication 
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between citizens and the political system. They are a permanent means for citizens to voice 
and articulate their interests and also have a strong influence in public opinion. For instance, if 
parties believe that the electoral institution is not impartial they will certainly communicate this 
to their members and to citizens in general through a number of channels. On the other hand, if 
parties feel the EMB is legitimate then it is likely chance that citizens will also know how they 
feel.  
Moreover, political parties are the main object of regulation of EMBs and as such need to be 
consulted on most – if not all - election related activities. EMBs around the world differ in their 
mandates but one common attribute is that all of these bodies regulate aspects of political 
party life and make decisions that affect political parties. These range from the delimitation of 
boundaries to the oversight of political party finance, including controls and sanctions ranging 
from spending caps to the cancellation of a party’s registration for receiving certain types of 
funding. Decisions taken by the EMB can either help or hurt political parties. At the same time, 
parties are in a strategic position and can either support or challenge these decisions. Taking 
them into account and listening to them therefore becomes important. 
The hypothesis is that political parties must be included in the appointment process. When parties 
have a voice in the appointment it is more likely that they will support the members of the EMB 
and their decisions. When parties are included they are given a voice. This allows their views and 
concerns to be taken into account and represented in the election body. This creates trust and 
makes it more likely for parties to support the activities of the EMB, including the electoral 
process and its outcome. However, when parties are excluded their interests and worries are not 
considered and their relationship with the EMB suffers. Being left out can also make them feel 
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that the EMB and their members are not legitimate or impartial and can therefore lead them to 
challenge the election and its outcome.  
Political parties have a special relationship with EMBs. Parties are interested in controlling the 
EMB so they can benefit from their decisions but at the same time they need the EMB to be 
perceived as impartial so that in case of winning an election, it is seen as legitimate. Research 
has outlined two models describing the relationship between the EMB and political parties. In 
the “expert” model, the management of elections depends exclusively on independent experts 
who are not appointed by political parties. On the other hand, in the “multi-party” model, 
political parties nominate their own agents so that their interests are well represented on the 
board of the EMB. In the first model impartiality results from the impartiality of each EMB 
member; in the second model impartiality comes because parties act as watchdogs of each 
other. Scholars have not agreed on which of these models is best for the credibility of 
elections. While some argue for political autonomy others highlight the need of including party 
representatives. Others provide mixed evidence. 
This thesis addresses this debate and seeks to find out which EMB model is best for having 
confidence in elections. To test this, the inclusion of political parties in EMBs is measured by 
an innovative four point scale of EMB models depending on the level of participation of parties 
in the appointment of their members. The levels are: EMBs with no participation from political 
parties (no participation); EMBs where political parties have an indirect role in the appointment 
(indirect participation); EMBs where some members are party representatives and others are 
selected by another method (partial direct participation); and EMBs where all members are 
political party representatives (full direct participation).  
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Through quantitative analysis this research aims to test the extent to which these four models 
affect confidence in electoral processes. The analysis is based on the University of Salamanca’s 
Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) survey.. Data was taken from 5,261 questionnaires 
to legislators from 18 Latin American countries and four survey waves, producing a total of 47 
dyads or country-waves, which constitute the unit of analysis.  
Regression analyses produce three different models with results. Models 1 and 2 use binary 
logistic regression. Model 1 confirms the base hypothesis of this study, which is that when 
political parties participate in the appointment of the members of the EMB there is higher 
confidence in electoral processes. It does so by using a dummy variable that reduces the four 
categories to two. One category includes all models where parties have some degree of 
participation in the appointment, while the other represents countries where parties do not have a 
role. Model 2 tests the effect of each of the four categories or EMB models on confidence in 
elections. Results show that all EMB models are more likely to have confidence in electoral 
processes than the reference category, which is the model where there is no party participation in 
EMB appointment. However, not all models yield the same benefits. Models of “indirect 
participation” and “partial direct participation” are the most likely to yield higher levels of 
confidence in electoral processes.  
Taking into account the hierarchical structure of the data, Model 3 conducted a multilevel 
analysis. Results show consistency with models 1 and 2. Only EMBs where political parties have 
an indirect role in the appointment or those with a partial direct participation are likely to generate 
trust in electoral processes. These two EMB types actually lie between the “expert” based and the 
“multiparty” EMB models and therefore draw advantages from both of them. For instance, in 
Dominican Republic (an example of an indirect participation model), the five magistrates of the 
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EMB are appointed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and need to meet certain requirements, 
including a bachelor’s degree in law and at least 12 years of professional experience. This 
method gives political parties an opportunity to express their views in the selection process while 
providing the EMB with people with strong professional credentials. This shows that while having 
professional members with experience is positive, it is also very important to consider political 
parties and their views. Expertise without legitimacy can lead to problems. 
On the other hand, results from the multilevel model and from marginal effects show that cases 
where all EMB members are political party representatives do not differ significantly from the 
reference category. Having an EMB composed entirely by party representatives is not 
recommended.  Exclusively multi party EMBs can lead to gridlock in decision making, infighting 
and can contribute to a perception that the election body is kidnapped by parties and their 
interests. 
In short, although including political parties in the appointment of EMB members is desirable, not 
all forms of inclusion yield the same benefits in terms of confidence in elections. The highlight is 
that political parties need to be considered in the appointment of the EMB members. If political 
parties are given a voice and feel represented it is more likely that they will accept the EMB and 
its decisions. On the other hand, if parties do not have a say and their views are excluded, it is 
more likely that they will not support the EMB. If from the start political parties do not feel the EMB 
is legitimate, all the agreements, decisions and policies coming from it risk being considered 
illegitimate as well.   
Moreover, a key underlying finding is that consulting political parties is also important in general, 
and not only for the appointment process. In fact, EMBs have to consider the interests and needs 
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of parties when designing and implementing policies and must provide for reciprocal 
communication with them (IDEA, 2006). This of course, starts with the appointment of the EMB 
members but also applies throughout the election cycle. Having regular contact and consultation 
with parties on the activities and plans of the EMB can result in a good relationship, trust and 
more inclusive and effective decision making. Relevant examples include Costa Rica’s Tribunal 
Supremo de Elecciones monthly “coffee” meetings with the representatives, secretaries and 
presidents of political parties and Argentina’s Consejo Consultivo de Partidos Politicos 
(Consultive Council of Political Parties). 
8.2.2 Free and fair, but also visible and inferable: the role of election results 
Chapter 7 turns to the other variable identified by the QCA analysis as central for the acceptance 
of election results: transparency in election results. The election results stage is characterised by  
hours of uncertainty and finger-crossing that can end in celebrations but can also easily evolve 
into conflict. Moreover, as indicated in the International Obligations for Elections guidelines, this is 
“a point in the process in which the physical exhaustion of electoral officials meets the rising 
emotions of the electoral stakeholders, who are eager to know the results” (IDEA, 2014: 250). 
Transparency is paramount. I hypothesize that when results are timely, clear and open they 
dissipate uncertainty and create an atmosphere of trust. On the other hand, if results are delayed, 
not complete or stop flowing, rumours and doubts about the integrity of the entire election emerge 
and this can lead to conflict.  
I focus on the role of transparent election results in preventing and mitigating post-election 
protests, which was taken as the dependent variable. This is analysed through a paired 
comparison of the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections in Mexico. These two cases were 
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selected as they naturally share a number of characteristics that allow controlling several factors 
Both of these elections met international standards of election administration and were 
considered free and fair by a number of domestic and international observers. Both elections 
were followed by post-election protests. However, while the 2006 protests were massive and 
lasted for months, the 2012 protests small, short lived and did not get much support. In 2006 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) refused to accept election results and called fraud, 
rallying his supporters to start a civil disobedience campaign and to take the streets. Streets were 
taken and a rally in Mexico City gathered up to one million people. This rally became permanent, 
with AMLO supporters staging a two month sit-in in one of the main avenues of the city. Then 
AMLO called for a new constitution and proclaimed himself Mexico’s true legitimate president in a 
public ceremony. By contrast, in 2012 although AMLO also refused to recognize the results, he 
did not call for civil disobedience or make himself legitimate president. Protests were very small 
and not widespread and only lasted a couple of days, not a couple of months. As we can see, 
post-election protest in both cases was sufficiently different for conducting a good comparison. I 
argued that what accounted for this difference was the level of transparency in election results. 
The degree of transparency is assessed by considering two conditions: visibility and inferability of 
information. These conditions are drawn from Michener and Bersch’s (2013) minimal definition of 
transparency, which departs from theoretical notions of the term and offers very analytical 
concepts which can easily be identified and measured. Using these indicators I analyse the 
election results phase in the 2006 and 2012 elections, with a focus on three devices used by 
Mexico’s IFE: the programme of preliminary election results (PREP), the quick count system, and 
the district count (the official tabulation and communication of results). 
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Results show, as expected, that transparency in election results plays a role in the extent of post-
election protests. Transparency shapes citizens’ and political parties’ perceptions of the election 
and with it the potential for conflict. The 2006 election results were visible but not inferable. The 
preliminary election results system was quick and widely available to all stakeholders but lacked 
disaggregation and simplicity. Then, the quick count, a parallel vote tabulation system was 
accurate and quick, but the communication of its results was not simple and clear. The President 
of IFE decided and announced on national TV that the results of the quick count were not going 
to be released. This lack of information created tensions and suspicions about the integrity of the 
election. This created uncertainty and both leading candidates declared themselves winners. 
AMLO called fraud and claimed the results were hidden from the public. Finally, the results 
offered by the district count – the official results of the election – were not completely inferable. In 
spite of legal challenges and demands for a full recount, only 2.19% of polling stations were 
recounted. This further contributed to an opaque atmosphere and was readily used to challenge 
the election in the streets. In contrast, the 2012 election results were both visible and inferable. 
The preliminary results system was improved from 2006, and was accurate, timely and open. An 
example of this improvement is that for the first time in history, IFE decided to scan all the tally 
sheets from the election and make them available to the public. With this, digital images with full 
information from more than 140,000 polling stations were available for anyone, anywhere. The 
quick count was also improved. This time IFE’s President decided to release the results no matter 
what, and that is what he did. Finally, the official results were clear and transparent: the recount 
now reached around 55% of the total of all ballots. Results were more transparent, accurate and 
timely and there was less room for suspicion. As a result, potential sore losers had less elements 
for challenging the election. 
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In short, transparency in election results contributes to preventing and mitigating post-election 
protests. As shown by these two examples, when election results are clear, accurate, widely 
available, easy to understand and verifiable, they contribute to a positive perception of the results.  
Moreover, having a positive perception of the outcome also contributes to having a rosy 
evaluation of the entire process. Transparency makes it harder for anyone to claim that an 
election or thousands of ballots have been stolen. It also increases the cost of rejecting the 
results for strategic and/or political reasons. Transparency reduces uncertainty and dissipates 
doubts and therefore can mitigate post-election protests. This is also suggested by the QCA 
analysis, which contends that having transparency in results contributes to the acceptance of the 
election. 
This has important implications for the field of electoral governance. Electoral laws and 
institutional procedures must guarantee that results are not only visible but also inferable. 
Information must be complete and easy to locate, but also needs to be easy to understand, 
presented without mediation or omissions and verifiable. It is not only about posting aggregated 
election results but also about the way these are presented, communicated and verified by 
citizens and other stakeholders. Therefore political actors, EMBs and international technical 
assistance organisations should pay special attention to that very short period of time between 
the closing of the polling stations and the announcement of results. An electoral process or a 
campaign may take months, but it is these deciding hours or days that can make the whole 
election credible and successful or distrusted and disputed.   
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8.3 The acceptance of election results 
Elections are the largest peace time mobilisation a country performs. Elections involve 
thousands or even millions of poll workers, ballot papers and ballot boxes. They also require 
thousands of hours of planning, organising and training. This is just for election day. Before 
and after voting day, elections require long negotiations in congress for setting the rules of the 
game, registering voters and candidates and auditing every single bank account of every single 
political party, amongst many other tasks and procedures. In addition, as elections determine 
who governs, actors often try to tilt the playing field to their advantage. Politicians and officials 
often try to buy votes and airwaves and flood campaigns with extra cash. It is only natural that 
elections experience problems. Moreover, elections can also be subject to a number of forms 
of malpractice. This affects their credibility and can lead to having challenged election results. 
In turn, these challenges can catalyse into protests which are not always peaceful. Not even 
long established democracies escape these issues.  
Elections have the power to advance stability and democracy but can also become a vehicle for 
conflict. The main difference between these two contrasting outcomes is whether an election is 
accepted and credible or not. When elections are credible, they provide a context for people to 
express their ideas and preferences, for political parties and candidates to organise and 
campaign and ultimately for selecting governments and making those governments accountable 
(Norris, 2014). However, when elections are not credible they can undermine this very purpose. 
Governance, human rights and stability suffer (Birch, 2008; Global Commission, 2012; Molina 
and Hernandez, 1998). Citizens become disenchanted, institutions are weakened and frustrated 
parties and individuals may decide to abandon their commitment to supporting the rules of the 
game. 
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So when, where and under what conditions are election results accepted? And: what can we 
do to increase credibility in electoral institutions and processes?  The focus must be on 
strengthening the integrity of electoral processes. Electoral integrity is an overarching concept 
which encompasses many different aspects that occur before, during and after election day. 
Therefore, there are a number of ways to improve the integrity of elections. However, this 
research has focused on three aspects that have been specifically identified as areas that 
deserve special attention (GEO, 2011). These are the role played by EMBs (specifically the 
support of political parties for the electoral institution), the overall quality of the electoral 
process and the transparency in the election results stage. 
This research has demonstrated the importance of these factors. First, the Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis challenged conventional wisdom which holds that a good quality election 
is enough for the acceptance of election results. While having a “free and fair” election that 
meets international standards for election administration is necessary, other conditions are 
needed. An accepted election requires the support of political parties for the electoral institution 
and the provision of transparent results. By themselves these conditions are necessary, but 
when they act together they are sufficient for results to be accepted. When this happens it is 
very likely that electoral results will be accepted, even if there is a razor thin margin between 
the first and the second place. Then, the quantitative analysis focused on the support of 
political parties for the electoral institution. Binary logistic and multilevel regression showed that 
including parties in the appointment of the members of the EMB is positive in terms of 
confidence in the electoral process. When political parties have a voice and participate in this 
process it is more likely that they will trust the members of the EMB and their decisions, and 
with it trust the entire electoral process. Finally, the small N comparison focused on the election 
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results stage and showed how having transparent results can contribute to prevent and 
mitigate post-election protests. When results are transmitted in a timely fashion, and 
information is complete, simple, widely available and verifiable, there is no room for suspicions 
or rumors. Certainty and clarity overcome gossip and speculation.   
At the time this is being written, a real world event showed us once more how important these 
three conditions are for a credible election. Ecuador went to the polls on 19 February 2017 to 
choose a new president. According to the country’s constitution, a run-off is not needed when 
one of the candidates obtains 40% of the votes and has at least a 10% lead over the second 
most voted candidate. Ecuador’s National Electoral Council results for the first round revealed 
that Alianza Pais’ candidate Lenín Moreno obtained 39.36% of the vote, followed by CREO’s 
Guillermo Lasso with 28.12% of the votes. A run-off was needed. 
Moreover, this was a very close election. And, as our research has shownus, these types of 
elections are particularly difficult. Close elections draw attention and are charged with 
emotions. They accentuate errors and malpractices. Every vote counts. Parties and candidates 
are more ready to challenge the election and believe it is easier to change the results. This is 
especially true in the case of Ecuador, where the election had not only one, but two razor thin 
result margins: Moreno was potentially very close to getting the 40% needed to win the election 
outright and Lasso was also very close to being within the less than 10% vote distance he 
needed to participate in a second round.  
Under such conditions, the electoral process and its outcome need to be beyond doubt. 
Electoral integrity needed to be be high. However, this was not the case in Ecuador. A lack of 
party support for the electoral institution and issues in the communication of election results 
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resulted in protests across the country. This was in spite of an electoral process characterised 
as free and fair and generally meeting international standards for election administration. First, 
since the 2013 election the main opposition parties expressed concerns about the composition 
of the National Electoral Council (CNE). In particular, they criticised its 5 councillors for being 
partial and close to the Executive branch. These doubts were echoed by the main opposition 
party (CREO-Creating opportunities) and its presidential candidate Guillermo Lasso from the 
start of the electoral process in 2016. Second, after the polls closed on 19 February there were 
significant delays in the processing and communication of results. Inconsistencies in tally 
sheets from the provinces of Guayas, Morona and Manabí contributed to this and official 
results were only ready 4 days after people cast their votes (Telesur, 2017). Citizens and 
parties were anxious. Moreover, a traffic spike the night of the election made the CNE website 
crash, further fuelling suspicions.  As a result, protests broke out across the country (in the 
main cities of Quito and Guayaquil but also in a number of regional centres). People demanded 
the CNE to disclose results. Lasso supporters claimed the election was marred with 
irregularities and called for throwing Juan Pablo Pozo, head of the CNE, into prison37 (El 
Universo, 2017). Fortunately, tensions and protests decreased when final results showed a 
run-off was necessary. Both candidates lived to fight another day.    
Even though claims of stolen elections and irregularities will probably never stop, incorporating 
the findings of this research into policy for elections and electoral institutions can contribute to 
the strengthening of electoral integrity and with it to increasing confidence in elections, their 
outcome and the political system as a whole. Better electoral processes, electoral institutions 
that include political parties and election results that are more clear and transparent give sore 
                                                          
37
 (¡Pozo al Calabozo! In Spanish: throw Pozo into prison. 
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losers fewer arguments for calling fraud and can help reducing accusations of vote rigging and 
irregularities, which then translate into less conflict and violence. Luck and run-offs will not 
always save the day. 
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9. APPENDIX 
9.1 Table 1 Challenges to elections in democratic countries, 102 elections. 
Election 
Parties challenged 
the results PEI 
Burundi 2015 P 5.00 22.27 
Kenya 2013 P 4.89 40.95 
El Salvador 2014 P 4.71 59.03 
Burundi 2015 L 4.63 27.08 
Macedonia 2014 P 4.56 47.79 
Malaysia 2013 L 4.53 35.49 
Thailand 2014 L 4.40 50.97 
Honduras 2013 P 4.40 45.20 
Ghana 2012 P 4.38 57.16 
Mexico 2012 P 4.36 62.28 
Nepal 2013 L 4.29 53.61 
Guyana 2015 L 4.29 52.87 
Ukraine 2012 L 4.14 39.87 
Malawi 2014 P 4.13 47.80 
Indonesia 2014 P 4.08 60.14 
Philippines 2013 L 4.07 48.31 
Bulgaria 2013 L 4.05 49.70 
Sierra Leone 2012 P 4.00 56.70 
Pakistan 2013 L 3.97 49.91 
Mexico 2015 L 3.86 52.08 
El Salvador 2015 L 3.78 49.08 
Moldova 2014 L 3.75 56.85 
Comoros 2015 L 3.75 49.61 
Zambia 2015 P 3.67 43.69 
Indonesia 2014 L 3.64 53.28 
Slovenia 2014 L 3.40 78.55 
Colombia 2014 L 3.38 61.16 
Lithuania 2012 L 3.27 72.75 
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Turkey 2015 L 3.20 44.60 
Latvia 2014 L 3.06 71.71 
Croatia 2015 P 3.00 64.82 
Solomon Islands 2014 L 3.00 57.12 
Kyrgyzstan 2015 L 3.00 54.42 
Turkey 2015 L 3.00 47.14 
Romania 2012 L 2.92 48.11 
Turkey 2014 P 2.92 50.98 
Belgium 2014 L 2.91 71.29 
United States 2014 L 2.89 61.67 
Panama 2014 P 2.88 60.44 
Australia 2013 L 2.87 70.10 
Ukraine 2014 L 2.85 53.64 
Hungary 2014 L 2.81 56.18 
Georgia 2012 L 2.71 53.39 
Brazil 2014 P 2.69 67.68 
Bolivia 2014 P 2.64 55.63 
Colombia 2014 P 2.57 58.60 
Estonia 2015 L 2.50 78.55 
Tunisia 2014 P 2.50 69.39 
Bulgaria 2014 L 2.50 62.75 
Guatemala 2015 P 2.50 47.95 
South Africa 2014 L 2.43 62.94 
Georgia 2013 P 2.33 64.14 
Paraguay 2013 P 2.27 55.04 
Botswana 2014 L 2.27 57.92 
India 2014 L 2.18 58.80 
Japan 2012 L 2.15 67.37 
Namibia 2014 P 2.14 60.15 
Mongolia 2013 P 2.11 64.37 
Czech Republic 2013 P 2.11 73.99 
Canada 2015 L 2.00 74.73 
Poland 2015 P 2.00 74.01 
Italy 2013 L 2.00 66.62 
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Tunisia 2014 L 2.00 65.53 
Argentina 2013 L 2.00 65.49 
Ukraine 2014 P 2.00 59.74 
United Kingdom 2015 L 1.90 64.71 
Argentina 2015 L 1.90 62.99 
Lesotho 2015 L 1.90 62.69 
Albania 2013 L 1.89 54.34 
Poland 2015 L 1.87 75.24 
Romania 2014 P 1.83 53.39 
Slovakia 2014 P 1.82 74.57 
Czech Republic 2012 L 1.81 76.20 
Greece 2015 L 1.76 61.83 
Benin 2015 L 1.75 68.34 
United States 2012 P 1.73 62.81 
Slovenia 2012 P 1.70 74.70 
Czech Republic 2013 L 1.67 77.32 
Croatia 2015 L 1.67 68.13 
Japan 2013 L 1.67 66.58 
Mauritius 2014 L 1.67 64.10 
New Zealand 2014 L 1.64 75.39 
Israel 2015 L 1.62 72.71 
Austria 2013 L 1.57 77.03 
Portugal 2015 L 1.56 71.92 
Republic of Korea 2012 P 1.50 76.62 
Japan 2014 L 1.50 70.59 
Lithuania 2014 P 1.43 82.25 
Germany 2013 L 1.42 80.26 
Israel 2013 L 1.42 74.49 
Netherlands 2012 L 1.41 78.46 
Chile 2013 P 1.37 66.38 
Cyprus 2013 P 1.36 73.28 
Spain 2015 L 1.28 68.78 
Sweden 2014 L 1.20 80.80 
Switzerland 2015 L 1.18 78.51 
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Uruguay 2014 P 1.13 75.48 
Norway 2013 L 1.08 83.23 
Greece 2015 L 1.08 70.98 
Finland 2015 L 1.06 86.10 
Denmark 2015 L 1.06 86.41 
Costa Rica 2014 P 1.00 80.81 
Note: Elections held in democratic countries (Polity IV rating of 6 or higher in political rights). The first column 
presents the mean score of challenged elections on a 1 to 5 scale.  The scores are conditionally formatted with 4 
colour scales to better illustrate high and low values (green for high, yellow for moderate, orange for low and red 
for very low). Scores between 3 and 4 represent challenged elections and scores between 4 and 5 represent 
highly challenged elections. The second column shows the electoral integrity score from 1 to 100, scores above 
60 represent elections with high and very  high integrity (green shades), scores between 50 and 59 represent 
moderate integrity (yellow), 40 to 49 is low integrity  (orange) and scores below 40 are cases of very low integrity 
(red formatting).   
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